Based on Hieronymus Bosch. Death and the Miser [Fragment], c. 1490
By Alexander Perepechko
Published on January 24, 2021
In parts 1 and 2 of this paper, we explored a few important features of Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).
Irredentism and other manifestations of the Russian world are, above all, a façade of the personal interests of Vladimir Putin and his group. Since the legal infrastructure of private property rights and security of a person do not have sufficient basis in Russia, this cabal managed to restore Russia’s historical patrimonialist system and adjust it to the era of globalization. Globalization allows Russia’s elites to maximize their gains by keeping domestic markets open for their predation while minimizing their own personal risk by depositing profits in secure offshore accounts.
Under the Putin regime a new breed of globally minded criminal businessmen and politicians emerged and took center stage in the Russian Federation. This regime is about the kleptocracy where thieves rule. It is also about the adhocracy because in reality the elite in this regime is defined by its service to the needs of the Kremlin rather than by any specific institutional or social identity.
Relations between strategy, policy, and the personal interests of Putin’s siloviki – politicians from the security and military services who came into power – look unusual for a westerner. Putin and his strongmen see their personal interests as state interests and routinely resort to the aid of the state apparatus to defend these interests. We have the unfortunate case in which 1) military strategy is intended to defend the personal interests of Putin and his circle as state interests and 2) politics, including the politics of the Russian world, is subordinated to this strategy. In other words, policy is subordinated to strategy and strategy serves the personal interests of Putin and his group.
Also, some special circumstances have led to the regrettable situation when organized crime has been weaponized and access to information has been monetized in Russia.
Putin’s career path greatly aggravates this situation. It seems as though Lieutenant Colonel Putin is a protégé of the powerful “caste” of the Colonel Generals and a creature of the world of criminal businessmen and politicians. One cannot exclude that this caste looks at him as a “custodian” of their offshore banking accounts, real estate, and businesses in the West and elsewhere.
Putin and almost all members of his inner circle have records of service in the KGB and its successors. It is not surprising that active measures (also called subversion, “hybrid warfare,” hostile measures, or sharp power) are used by Russia as a policy instrument to influence and now and then control foreign states using non-kinetic and sometimes kinetic methods.
Do Putin’s active measures have historical antecedents? The late Soviet period gives us some clues.
