Tag Archives: #geopolitics

Простой саботаж. Практическое руководство (Oтрывок)

Otto Soglow. Wanted! – For Sabotage – Firebug Ferdie, 1942

Опубликовано 1 октября, 2021 г.

История стратегических исследований в США изобилует пособиями, практическими руководствами, методическими указаниями и  спецкурсами по «экзотическим» для большинства университетов и академических учреждений темам. Лишь по прошествии многих лет, а то и десятилетий некоторые из этих изданий становятся доступными широкой публике. Одной из таких тем является саботаж. Предлагаемый широкому читателю адаптированный перевод введения в «Практическое руководство по саботажу», подготовленное в 1944 г. Управлением стратегических служб (Office of Strategic Services, OSS), дает представление о теории и практике саботажа (Simple, 1944) . Переведенный материал может быть использован в общеобразовательных целях. Переводчики и издатель не несут ответственности за содержание данной публикации и за возможные ошибки и неточности перевода с английского языка на русский язык.

Александр Перепечко

Вера Хортон

Простой саботаж

1. Введение

a) Цель данной работы — дать определение простому саботажу, описать возможные последствия его применения и представить предложения о том как привлечь граждан к саботажу и вовлечь их в деятельность по его проведению.

b) Понятие диверсии варьирует от высокотехничного государственного переворота (coup d’état), требующего детального планирования и привлечения специально обученных оперативных работников, до бесчисленных простых действий, которые может совершить обычный гражданин-саботажник. Настоящая работа посвящена в первую очередь второму типу.

Для простого саботажа не требуются особые инструменты или специальное оборудование. Он проводится обычным гражданином, который может действовать индивидуально или в составе группы. Ему вовсе не обязательно быть активным членом организованной группы. Организационная рамка для этого гражданина должна быть задана так, чтобы свести к минимуму риски получить травму, быть обнаруженным и подвергнутым расправе.

c) Оружием гражданина-саботажника являются соль, гвозди, свечи, галька, нитки или любые другие материалы, которые обычно находятся в распоряжении домовладельца, квартиросъемщика или работника определённой профессии. В арсенале такого саботажника — кухонная полка, куча мусора, обычный набор инструментов и других принадлежностей. Целями саботажа обычно являются объекты, к которым в повседневной жизни он имеет открытый и легкий доступ.

Continue reading Простой саботаж. Практическое руководство (Oтрывок)

The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 3)

Based on Hieronymus Bosch. Death and the Miser [Fragment], c. 1490

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on January 24, 2021

In parts 1 and 2 of this paper, we explored a few important features of Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).

Irredentism and other manifestations of the Russian world are, above all, a façade of the personal interests of Vladimir Putin and his group. Since the legal infrastructure of private property rights and security of a person do not have sufficient basis in Russia, this cabal managed to restore Russia’s historical patrimonialist system and adjust it to the era of globalization. Globalization allows Russia’s elites to maximize their gains by keeping domestic markets open for their predation while minimizing their own personal risk by depositing profits in secure offshore accounts.

Under the Putin regime a new breed of globally minded criminal businessmen and politicians emerged and took center stage in the Russian Federation. This regime is about the kleptocracy where thieves rule. It is also about the adhocracy because in reality the elite in this regime is defined by its service to the needs of the Kremlin rather than by any specific institutional or social identity.

Relations between strategy, policy, and the personal interests of Putin’s siloviki – politicians from the security and military services who came into power – look unusual for a westerner. Putin and his strongmen see their personal interests as state interests and routinely resort to the aid of the state apparatus to defend these interests. We have the unfortunate case in which 1) military strategy is intended to defend the personal interests of Putin and his circle as state interests and 2) politics, including the politics of the Russian world, is subordinated to this strategy. In other words, policy is subordinated to strategy and strategy serves the personal interests of Putin and his group.

Also, some special circumstances have led to the regrettable situation when organized crime has been weaponized and access to information has been monetized in Russia.

Putin’s career path greatly aggravates this situation. It seems as though Lieutenant Colonel Putin is a protégé of the powerful “caste” of the Colonel Generals and a creature of the world of criminal businessmen and politicians. One cannot exclude that this caste looks at him as a “custodian” of their offshore banking accounts, real estate, and businesses in the West and elsewhere.

Putin and almost all members of his inner circle have records of service in the KGB and its successors. It is not surprising that active measures (also called subversion, “hybrid warfare,” hostile measures, or sharp power) are used by Russia as a policy instrument to influence and now and then control foreign states using non-kinetic and sometimes kinetic methods.

Do Putin’s active measures have historical antecedents? The late Soviet period gives us some clues.

Continue reading The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 3)

The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 2)

[Man with tattoo] [image]. (n.d.). [Drawing].

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 16, 2019

In part 1 of this research essay we discussed how geography, irredentism, and patrimonialism may elucidate Russia’s aggressive behavior in Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).

The political asymmetry in the Black Sea, where the maritime NATO has been present while continental Russia is almost absent, has been the important geostrategic rationale behind Russia’s military power projection in Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and Crimea and eastern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Ukraine).

Similar political asymmetry takes place in the Baltic Sea. To break this asymmetry, Russia keeps and expands its military presence in the Kaliningrad exclave and in landlocked Belarus. And here is what might happen in the future. Following a missile barrage, Russian troops from Kaliningrad advance towards Belarus through the Suwalki Gap and cut the Baltic States off from the rest of the NATO countries. As a result, the landward hegemon Russia receives land access to its Baltic Sea exclave and the Baltic States turn into NATO’s exclave!

Continue reading The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 2)

The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 1)

Alexander Perepechko. Force, crime, and strategy.

by Alexander Perepechko

Published on November 27, 2018

Geography and strategy. Why the Eastern Europe-2?

In a series of papers (parts 1, part 2 and part 3) in Russian for the leading Belarusian newspaper Naviny, I analyzed in detail the current geostrategic situation in the Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), a large macro-region located between the NATO and Russian Federation (RF). I was delighted that these publications were followed by a discussion, often heated, in which a variety of opinions – including my own – were expressed. I assumed at that time that my modest contribution to the geostrategic analysis of the Eastern Europe-2 was over.

While keeping an eye on that part of the world, I started a project on health care, a top issue for American voters in the 2018 intermediate elections. The comparative analysis of American and other developed countries health care systems appeared at www.geostrategy.info.

But soon it became clear that the Eastern European topic required special attention again. Hostile-aggressive actions of the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin against the West escalated. He even threatened to use modernized nuclear weapons and new missiles in the future war.
Continue reading The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 1)