Category Archives: Geopolitics

Простой саботаж. Практическое руководство (Oтрывок)

Geopolitics, Sabotage, Strategy, Tactics, , ,

Otto Soglow. Wanted! – For Sabotage – Firebug Ferdie, 1942

Опубликовано 1 октября, 2021 г.

История стратегических исследований в США изобилует пособиями, практическими руководствами, методическими указаниями и  спецкурсами по «экзотическим» для большинства университетов и академических учреждений темам. Лишь по прошествии многих лет, а то и десятилетий некоторые из этих изданий становятся доступными широкой публике. Одной из таких тем является саботаж. Предлагаемый широкому читателю адаптированный перевод введения в «Практическое руководство по саботажу», подготовленное в 1944 г. Управлением стратегических служб (Office of Strategic Services, OSS), дает представление о теории и практике саботажа (Simple, 1944) . Переведенный материал может быть использован в общеобразовательных целях. Переводчики и издатель не несут ответственности за содержание данной публикации и за возможные ошибки и неточности перевода с английского языка на русский язык.

Александр Перепечко

Вера Хортон

Простой саботаж

1. Введение

a) Цель данной работы — дать определение простому саботажу, описать возможные последствия его применения и представить предложения о том как привлечь граждан к саботажу и вовлечь их в деятельность по его проведению.

b) Понятие диверсии варьирует от высокотехничного государственного переворота (coup d’état), требующего детального планирования и привлечения специально обученных оперативных работников, до бесчисленных простых действий, которые может совершить обычный гражданин-саботажник. Настоящая работа посвящена в первую очередь второму типу.

Для простого саботажа не требуются особые инструменты или специальное оборудование. Он проводится обычным гражданином, который может действовать индивидуально или в составе группы. Ему вовсе не обязательно быть активным членом организованной группы. Организационная рамка для этого гражданина должна быть задана так, чтобы свести к минимуму риски получить травму, быть обнаруженным и подвергнутым расправе.

c) Оружием гражданина-саботажника являются соль, гвозди, свечи, галька, нитки или любые другие материалы, которые обычно находятся в распоряжении домовладельца, квартиросъемщика или работника определённой профессии. В арсенале такого саботажника — кухонная полка, куча мусора, обычный набор инструментов и других принадлежностей. Целями саботажа обычно являются объекты, к которым в повседневной жизни он имеет открытый и легкий доступ.

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The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Putin, Strategy, , , ,

Based on Hieronymus Bosch. Death and the Miser [Fragment], c. 1490

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on January 24, 2021

In parts 1 and 2 of this paper, we explored a few important features of Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).

Irredentism and other manifestations of the Russian world are, above all, a façade of the personal interests of Vladimir Putin and his group. Since the legal infrastructure of private property rights and security of a person do not have sufficient basis in Russia, this cabal managed to restore Russia’s historical patrimonialist system and adjust it to the era of globalization. Globalization allows Russia’s elites to maximize their gains by keeping domestic markets open for their predation while minimizing their own personal risk by depositing profits in secure offshore accounts.

Under the Putin regime a new breed of globally minded criminal businessmen and politicians emerged and took center stage in the Russian Federation. This regime is about the kleptocracy where thieves rule. It is also about the adhocracy because in reality the elite in this regime is defined by its service to the needs of the Kremlin rather than by any specific institutional or social identity.

Relations between strategy, policy, and the personal interests of Putin’s siloviki – politicians from the security and military services who came into power – look unusual for a westerner. Putin and his strongmen see their personal interests as state interests and routinely resort to the aid of the state apparatus to defend these interests. We have the unfortunate case in which 1) military strategy is intended to defend the personal interests of Putin and his circle as state interests and 2) politics, including the politics of the Russian world, is subordinated to this strategy. In other words, policy is subordinated to strategy and strategy serves the personal interests of Putin and his group.

Also, some special circumstances have led to the regrettable situation when organized crime has been weaponized and access to information has been monetized in Russia.

Putin’s career path greatly aggravates this situation. It seems as though Lieutenant Colonel Putin is a protégé of the powerful “caste” of the Colonel Generals and a creature of the world of criminal businessmen and politicians. One cannot exclude that this caste looks at him as a “custodian” of their offshore banking accounts, real estate, and businesses in the West and elsewhere.

Putin and almost all members of his inner circle have records of service in the KGB and its successors. It is not surprising that active measures (also called subversion, “hybrid warfare,” hostile measures, or sharp power) are used by Russia as a policy instrument to influence and now and then control foreign states using non-kinetic and sometimes kinetic methods.

Do Putin’s active measures have historical antecedents? The late Soviet period gives us some clues.

Continue reading The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 3) →

The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 2)

Belarus, Elites, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Geopolitics, Putin, Russia, Strategy, Tactics, , , , , ,
[Man with tattoo] [image]. (n.d.). [Drawing].

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 16, 2019

In part 1 of this research essay we discussed how geography, irredentism, and patrimonialism may elucidate Russia’s aggressive behavior in Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).

The political asymmetry in the Black Sea, where the maritime NATO has been present while continental Russia is almost absent, has been the important geostrategic rationale behind Russia’s military power projection in Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and Crimea and eastern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Ukraine).

Similar political asymmetry takes place in the Baltic Sea. To break this asymmetry, Russia keeps and expands its military presence in the Kaliningrad exclave and in landlocked Belarus. And here is what might happen in the future. Following a missile barrage, Russian troops from Kaliningrad advance towards Belarus through the Suwalki Gap and cut the Baltic States off from the rest of the NATO countries. As a result, the landward hegemon Russia receives land access to its Baltic Sea exclave and the Baltic States turn into NATO’s exclave!

Continue reading The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 2) →

The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 1)

Belarus, Elites, Geopolitics, Putin, Russia, Strategy, , , , , , ,

Alexander Perepechko. Force, crime, and strategy.

by Alexander Perepechko

Published on November 27, 2018

Geography and strategy. Why the Eastern Europe-2?

In a series of papers (parts 1, part 2 and part 3) in Russian for the leading Belarusian newspaper Naviny, I analyzed in detail the current geostrategic situation in the Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), a large macro-region located between the NATO and Russian Federation (RF). I was delighted that these publications were followed by a discussion, often heated, in which a variety of opinions – including my own – were expressed. I assumed at that time that my modest contribution to the geostrategic analysis of the Eastern Europe-2 was over.

While keeping an eye on that part of the world, I started a project on health care, a top issue for American voters in the 2018 intermediate elections. The comparative analysis of American and other developed countries health care systems appeared at www.geostrategy.info.

But soon it became clear that the Eastern European topic required special attention again. Hostile-aggressive actions of the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin against the West escalated. He even threatened to use modernized nuclear weapons and new missiles in the future war.
Continue reading The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 1) →

Continuity and change in Russia’s occidentalist and fundamentalist vote in electoral geography 1917-1995

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics, , , , , , ,

Alexander Perepechko. Continuity…

They will say, “Where is the promise of his coming? For ever since the fathers fell asleep, all things are continuing as they were from the beginning of creation.” 2 Peter 2:4

By Alexander Perepechko

Craig ZumBrunnen

Vladimir A. Kolossov

Ellen S. O’Meara

Published on May 12, 2017

Abstract: This research empirically supports the hypothesis that in post-Soviet Russia, Soviet modernization engendered support for occidentalist parties, while pre-Revolutionary political regionalism engendered support for fundamentalist parties. Soviet development predicts “successful” modernization and change in occidentalist voting in (1) the continental Russian core, (2) early-modernized territories and (3) commercial export centers in the maritime European North and maritime European South, but does not predict continuity in occidentalist voting in newly industrialized regions. The political space of failed modernization and continuity in traditionalist voting includes the countryside and many towns, especially in the more recently urbanized territories and western border regions.

Keywords: Russia; Modernization; Political Culture; Election; Constituent Assembly; Sixth Duma; GIS; Probit.

We acknowledge support for portions of this article provided by U.S. Department of Education Title VI Program for Technological Innovation and Cooperation for Foreign Information Access (TICFIA) Award Number P337A990006-01, the Suzzallo Libraries at the University of Washington, and the IFS Family Foundation. We would like to thank Nicholas Chrisman, Richard Morrill, and Timothy Nyerges for valuable comments on the early drafts of this article.  We acknowledge Béatrice von Hirschhausen and Ellen O’Meara for conversations and encouragement. Our special thanks to Violette Rey for important comments on a later draft.
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Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics

Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang.
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang

By Alexander Perepechko

with Dmitry Shchigelsky

Published on August 1, 2016

Alarming Political and Military Indicators for Belarus and Ukraine

According to the Fund for Peace (FFP) data, political and military indicators play the key role in an understanding of the fragility of the Belarusian and Ukrainian states. Out of six indicators, all but one (“public services”) have been in the poor or weak category (Figure 26).

One can notice at once that Ukraine’s weakness is attributed to temporal and situational circumstances. Only during the last couple of years, several political and military indicators quickly moved to the poor category (8-10). The indicators of “state legitimacy” and “external intervention” express high alert and danger. Elites remain strongly factionalized and the “security apparatus” of the state is quickly failing; these two indicators are in the weak category (6-8) and are quickly worsening. Russian intervention and occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas put the Ukrainian state on the brink of collapse. Nevertheless, with the help of western powers and the Ukrainian diaspora, the Ukrainian people were able to halt Russia’s intervention. Ukraine is slowly moving away from the edge of the abyss – from being a critically weak (almost failed) state toward a weak state.
Continue reading Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3) →

Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 2)

Elites, Geopolitics

Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream - MTZ tractors... Unsold.
Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream – MTZ tractors… Unsold.

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 30, 2016

Weaknesses of two fragile states: Warning social and economic indicators for Belarus and Ukraine.

Recall that in the part 1 of this research I found multiple similarities in the political development of the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries. Created on ruins of dissolved empires, these rural countries experienced short periods of a democracy, and the triumphant agrarian populism, followed by dictatorship and a fragile state. I also outlined that agrarian populism in this part of the world has two tactical impasses. Firstly, Populism cannot benefit from the simultaneous victory of an agrarian party (movement, group, or corporation) and the rise of a democratic political regime because liberal capitalism can easily destroy peasants as a class. Secondly, economic strains and crises in this part of the world leave little chance to put into action programs based upon rural populist ideals of comprehensive social transformation. I inferred that similarities between the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries lead to a similar four-stage political path: democratization, rise of peasant Populism, dictatorship, and a fragile state. Yet, we still need to find out how the last stage might look for Belarus…

A weak state, a failed state, a collapsed state, and a recovered (reanimated) state are specific concepts reflecting different stages of a fragile state (Carment, Langlois-Bertrand, Samy, 2016; Rotberg, 2003). Fragile states are on the brink of collapse in at least one of three areas: 1) authority over territory and the populace, 2) capacity of the economy and resource mobilization, and 3) effective and responsive governance (see Carment & Samy, 2014; Jenne, 2003). In other words, the state fails because it is seized with internal violence and cannot deliver positive political goods to the population.
Continue reading Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 2) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 4)

Geopolitics, Strategy

Based on Eric Fischer. Tweets
Based on Eric Fischer’s “Tweets”

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 7, 2016

From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)

In the period of Late Modernity, or even postmodernity, the clausewitzian trinity is still popular among American military-political leaders. In his seminal The Rise and Decline of the State, Israeli strategist Van Creveld summed up results of this approach over the last half-century for developed countries: “From France to the United States, there has scarcely been one “advanced” government in Europe and North America whose armed forces have not suffered defeat at the hands of underequipped, ill-trained, ill-organized, often even ill-clad, underfed, and illiterate freedom fighters or guerillas or terrorists; briefly, by men – and, often, women – who were short on everything except high courage and the determination to endure peacekeeping operations, and whatever other types of operations that were dreamt up by their masters” (2009: 395).

In two previous research essays we discovered that international jihadists find operational ground across the world by sponging off local leaders (often Salafists) and criminal groups. When I was working on this paper, new facts proved this finding.

Supported by the Russian Air Force, Syrian (also, Iranian and Lebanese) governmental ground troops squeezed out IS military units and moderate Syrian groups in several strategically important locations and significantly expanded a zone controlled by Damascus (Van Creveld, 2015). The area under ISIS control was reduced by one-third (Bidder et al, 2016). With Russia’s help, the regime of Assad might manage to reinstate control over all territories of the Syrian state. But even this development would not save the dictator from a demographic impasse. Assad understands that he and his Alawite minority cannot rule Syria without major changes. His first option is democratic elections and political power sharing mechanisms. The second option is tyrannical: Assad might use a depopulation strategy against Sunnis. In order to change the country’s demographics and create a religiously and ethnically homogenous Syria, the dictator might utilize a policy of cleansing through deportation, displacement, and killing of the Sunni population. Local Sunni communities that have supported anti-Assad fighters probably would be targeted first.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 4) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy

Alexander Perepechko. Off Valencia, San Francisco, CA
Alexander Perepechko. Off Valencia, San Francisco, California

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 7, 2016

From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)

To a significant extent, low intensity conflict in the United States and the Middle East is defined by social demographic, geopolitical, and geostrategic parameters of state and non-state actors. In this research essay I will discuss some of them.

According to the Pew Research Center, only 37% of Muslim Americans were born in the United States; 35% were born in the Middle East, North Africa, or Pakistan. 19% of Muslims in America are not U.S. citizens (Income Distribution, 2009; Muslim Americans, 2011). The Muslim American population is much younger, on average, than the non-Muslim population. More than three-quarters of Muslim Americans are either first-generation immigrants (63%) or second-generation Americans (15%), with one or both parents born outside of the country. 55% of the first generation immigrants are from the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan. Muslim Americans – particularly those born in the United States – are more likely than Americans as a whole to have only high school education. Among the 12 largest religious groups, Muslims have a relatively small middle class; only two religious groups – Jehovah’s Witness and historically Black Protestant churches – have a middle class smaller than Muslims. Moreover, after the economic crisis of 2008, the income pattern represents something of a decline for Muslim Americans. 29% of Muslims are underemployed. Underemployment is particularly prevalent among younger Muslim adults: 37% of those under 30 are underemployed. Muslims are underrepresented in the military. Only about 0.16% of the active-duty and reserve members in the U.S. military self-identify as Muslims (Khan & Martinez, 2015).

These numbers are worrisome. The high percentage of marginalized youth (unemployed with low levels of education), high proportion of first-generation immigrants and second-generation Americans in the Muslim population, and high share of immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan suggest that radicalization of Muslims in the United States is among the possible scenarios. Yet this process is not as straightforward as some clichés offered by some analysts and media.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 3) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 2)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy

George Scallion Future Map
George Scallion Future Map

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on December 30, 2015

From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)

Together with small families and mammismo, changes in governmental regulations pertaining to legitimate and other types of societal activities partially explain why Americans do not want to fight and die in wars. In spite of this unheroic realism, the Middle East slowly but surely exports low intensity conflict (LIC) to American state territory. Also, proper American organized crime might evolve into LIC by coalescing along religious, racial, political, and socio-economic lines and merge with foreign-born LIC…

Based on an analysis of temporal patterns of radical Islamic terror attacks in the United States, I suggested in my previous research essay that the hierarchically organized bureaucratic security and intelligence agencies created after September 11, 2001 might not be up to the task of fighting radical Islam. Indeed jihadists change strategy and tactics very often and operate efficiently. American security and intelligence agencies operate according to governmental regulations which frame their strategy. How good is this strategy?

Before we look at governmental regulations pertaining to illicit activities and activities regulated by classified legal procedures, we need to analyze one more interesting pattern – a geographic pattern of radical Islamic terror attacks in the United States.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 2) →