By Alexander Perepechko
Published on March 16, 2019
In part 1 of this research essay we discussed how geography, irredentism, and patrimonialism may elucidate Russia’s aggressive behavior in Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).
The political asymmetry in the Black Sea, where the maritime NATO has been present while continental Russia is almost absent, has been the important geostrategic rationale behind Russia’s military power projection in Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and Crimea and eastern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Ukraine).
Similar political asymmetry takes place in the Baltic Sea. To break this asymmetry, Russia keeps and expands its military presence in the Kaliningrad exclave and in landlocked Belarus. And here is what might happen in the future. Following a missile barrage, Russian troops from Kaliningrad advance towards Belarus through the Suwalki Gap and cut the Baltic States off from the rest of the NATO countries. As a result, the landward hegemon Russia receives land access to its Baltic Sea exclave and the Baltic States turn into NATO’s exclave!
