Category Archives: Tactics

Простой саботаж. Практическое руководство (Oтрывок)

Geopolitics, Sabotage, Strategy, Tactics, , ,

Otto Soglow. Wanted! – For Sabotage – Firebug Ferdie, 1942

Опубликовано 1 октября, 2021 г.

История стратегических исследований в США изобилует пособиями, практическими руководствами, методическими указаниями и  спецкурсами по «экзотическим» для большинства университетов и академических учреждений темам. Лишь по прошествии многих лет, а то и десятилетий некоторые из этих изданий становятся доступными широкой публике. Одной из таких тем является саботаж. Предлагаемый широкому читателю адаптированный перевод введения в «Практическое руководство по саботажу», подготовленное в 1944 г. Управлением стратегических служб (Office of Strategic Services, OSS), дает представление о теории и практике саботажа (Simple, 1944) . Переведенный материал может быть использован в общеобразовательных целях. Переводчики и издатель не несут ответственности за содержание данной публикации и за возможные ошибки и неточности перевода с английского языка на русский язык.

Александр Перепечко

Вера Хортон

Простой саботаж

1. Введение

a) Цель данной работы — дать определение простому саботажу, описать возможные последствия его применения и представить предложения о том как привлечь граждан к саботажу и вовлечь их в деятельность по его проведению.

b) Понятие диверсии варьирует от высокотехничного государственного переворота (coup d’état), требующего детального планирования и привлечения специально обученных оперативных работников, до бесчисленных простых действий, которые может совершить обычный гражданин-саботажник. Настоящая работа посвящена в первую очередь второму типу.

Для простого саботажа не требуются особые инструменты или специальное оборудование. Он проводится обычным гражданином, который может действовать индивидуально или в составе группы. Ему вовсе не обязательно быть активным членом организованной группы. Организационная рамка для этого гражданина должна быть задана так, чтобы свести к минимуму риски получить травму, быть обнаруженным и подвергнутым расправе.

c) Оружием гражданина-саботажника являются соль, гвозди, свечи, галька, нитки или любые другие материалы, которые обычно находятся в распоряжении домовладельца, квартиросъемщика или работника определённой профессии. В арсенале такого саботажника — кухонная полка, куча мусора, обычный набор инструментов и других принадлежностей. Целями саботажа обычно являются объекты, к которым в повседневной жизни он имеет открытый и легкий доступ.

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The splendors and miseries of Lieutenant Colonel Putin in Eastern Europe-2 and elsewhere (part 2)

Belarus, Elites, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Geopolitics, Putin, Russia, Strategy, Tactics, , , , , ,
[Man with tattoo] [image]. (n.d.). [Drawing].

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 16, 2019

In part 1 of this research essay we discussed how geography, irredentism, and patrimonialism may elucidate Russia’s aggressive behavior in Eastern Europe-2 (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).

The political asymmetry in the Black Sea, where the maritime NATO has been present while continental Russia is almost absent, has been the important geostrategic rationale behind Russia’s military power projection in Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and Crimea and eastern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Ukraine).

Similar political asymmetry takes place in the Baltic Sea. To break this asymmetry, Russia keeps and expands its military presence in the Kaliningrad exclave and in landlocked Belarus. And here is what might happen in the future. Following a missile barrage, Russian troops from Kaliningrad advance towards Belarus through the Suwalki Gap and cut the Baltic States off from the rest of the NATO countries. As a result, the landward hegemon Russia receives land access to its Baltic Sea exclave and the Baltic States turn into NATO’s exclave!

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Medicine Jar

Elites, Strategy, Tactics,

Alexander Perepechko. Comfortably numb world

by Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 8, 2017

In a previous paper, I explored Kondratiev waves. These waves (sometimes called K-waves or cycles) show that economic and social development is primarily determined by long periodic cycles characterized by technological innovations in specific economic/industrial areas (Kondratieff, 2014) (Figure 28). A cycle lasts about 40-60 years. These long cycles fulfill a mostly strategic role: leaders who identify the current Kondratiev wave early are able to take the lead in economic and social development and benefit the most from its impetus.

I found that the recent information technology (IT) long wave – the 5th Kondratiev cycle – has faded, although not ended yet. IT was and still is a source of power for the 5th cycle. While the 5th wave is on the decline, the 6th Kondratiev wave has started. Psychosocial health (or health care) is the growth vehicle of the new K-wave. The health care can be defined as health in a holistic sense – physical, biological, psychological, and mental health (Nefiodow & Nefiodow, 2015: 47, 57).

I also conjectured that America is losing its lead in the development of the psychosocial health sector to Europe, Japan, and China. Does this mean that American elites pay little attention to health care as the new engine of economic growth?

Indeed many politicians and media in America are highly skilled in the art of manufacturing and presenting biased information about health care. This unfortunate fact must not prevent us from an effort to find some truth about the matter. When reforms pertaining to health legislation stall, independent social science expertise in this area is in urgent need.

Compared to the rest of the world, how is the health industry doing in America?
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Continuity and change in Russia’s occidentalist and fundamentalist vote in electoral geography 1917-1995

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics, , , , , , ,

Alexander Perepechko. Continuity…

They will say, “Where is the promise of his coming? For ever since the fathers fell asleep, all things are continuing as they were from the beginning of creation.” 2 Peter 2:4

By Alexander Perepechko

Craig ZumBrunnen

Vladimir A. Kolossov

Ellen S. O’Meara

Published on May 12, 2017

Abstract: This research empirically supports the hypothesis that in post-Soviet Russia, Soviet modernization engendered support for occidentalist parties, while pre-Revolutionary political regionalism engendered support for fundamentalist parties. Soviet development predicts “successful” modernization and change in occidentalist voting in (1) the continental Russian core, (2) early-modernized territories and (3) commercial export centers in the maritime European North and maritime European South, but does not predict continuity in occidentalist voting in newly industrialized regions. The political space of failed modernization and continuity in traditionalist voting includes the countryside and many towns, especially in the more recently urbanized territories and western border regions.

Keywords: Russia; Modernization; Political Culture; Election; Constituent Assembly; Sixth Duma; GIS; Probit.

We acknowledge support for portions of this article provided by U.S. Department of Education Title VI Program for Technological Innovation and Cooperation for Foreign Information Access (TICFIA) Award Number P337A990006-01, the Suzzallo Libraries at the University of Washington, and the IFS Family Foundation. We would like to thank Nicholas Chrisman, Richard Morrill, and Timothy Nyerges for valuable comments on the early drafts of this article.  We acknowledge Béatrice von Hirschhausen and Ellen O’Meara for conversations and encouragement. Our special thanks to Violette Rey for important comments on a later draft.
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Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics

N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland
N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 28, 2016

In part 1 of this paper, we realized that public authority in the United States has likely been hijacked by special interests. The predominant part of the American elite stubbornly defends the dysfunctional status quo at its own peril. In a world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces, neither presidential candidate has formulated a strategy to implement his or her vision for America’s future. In this situation, we conjectured that the persistence of long wave-like cycles in economics and elites on the global and national scale might shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.

Long cycles fulfill a mostly strategic goal. Leaders who identify the current Kondratiev wave (K-wave) and current Pareto elite cycle are able to take the lead in economic and social development and to avoid revolutionary transformation of society…

What are the relationships between the current K-wave and current Pareto elite cycle in America? How might these relationships impact the current state and future development of the United States? Does the appeal to emotion of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and rivalries between political parties and groups echo the deeply troubled long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites in America? Perhaps troubled so badly that the presidential candidates have not spoken about their strategies at all…
Continue reading Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2) →

Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 1)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics

N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia
N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 16, 2016

Multiple analysts of the current presidential candidates in the United States like to say that our founding fathers are turning over in their graves. Without a doubt, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are extremely controversial candidates. Regretfully, the appeal to emotions of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and hassles between political parties and groups have gained the upper hand in this election. This makes American voters confused and angry. Citizens become less and less certain about the reality in which they live and more and more frightened about the future of this world.

It has become harder for a social scientist to foresee consequences of elections and to produce electoral forecasts. In this world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces (Bernard et al, 2013), it is next to impossible to predict when and why critically important socio-economic and political events might happen and how these events might be interconnected. Empirically detecting the mechanisms of societal change, and thereby calibrating policy to the real economy, is difficult. In this situation, the persistence of long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites on the global and macro-regional scale, allows one to shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.
Continue reading Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 1) →

Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics

Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang.
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang

By Alexander Perepechko

with Dmitry Shchigelsky

Published on August 1, 2016

Alarming Political and Military Indicators for Belarus and Ukraine

According to the Fund for Peace (FFP) data, political and military indicators play the key role in an understanding of the fragility of the Belarusian and Ukrainian states. Out of six indicators, all but one (“public services”) have been in the poor or weak category (Figure 26).

One can notice at once that Ukraine’s weakness is attributed to temporal and situational circumstances. Only during the last couple of years, several political and military indicators quickly moved to the poor category (8-10). The indicators of “state legitimacy” and “external intervention” express high alert and danger. Elites remain strongly factionalized and the “security apparatus” of the state is quickly failing; these two indicators are in the weak category (6-8) and are quickly worsening. Russian intervention and occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas put the Ukrainian state on the brink of collapse. Nevertheless, with the help of western powers and the Ukrainian diaspora, the Ukrainian people were able to halt Russia’s intervention. Ukraine is slowly moving away from the edge of the abyss – from being a critically weak (almost failed) state toward a weak state.
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Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 1)

Elites, Tactics

Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 25, 2016

In the middle of March, 2016, I presented a lecture “Belarus: Heeling to the West and New Risks” to students of the Eastern European School of Political Studies (EESPS). This new contact with Belarusians inspired me to do research on Belarus.

What is going to happen to my country of origin? What is the logic of political development of Belarus after 1991? Are there any analogies in the world? Does the recent crisis in the country signify that the Lukashenko regime has symptoms of a fragile state – a state on the brink of collapse? Why? Is there any strategy to avoid the collapse of the Belarusian state? Does the Ukrainian experience matter? How?

I first will look for examples of regimes similar to the one in the Republic of Belarus…
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