Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics
N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland
N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 28, 2016

In part 1 of this paper, we realized that public authority in the United States has likely been hijacked by special interests. The predominant part of the American elite stubbornly defends the dysfunctional status quo at its own peril. In a world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces, neither presidential candidate has formulated a strategy to implement his or her vision for America’s future. In this situation, we conjectured that the persistence of long wave-like cycles in economics and elites on the global and national scale might shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.

Long cycles fulfill a mostly strategic goal. Leaders who identify the current Kondratiev wave (K-wave) and current Pareto elite cycle are able to take the lead in economic and social development and to avoid revolutionary transformation of society…

What are the relationships between the current K-wave and current Pareto elite cycle in America? How might these relationships impact the current state and future development of the United States? Does the appeal to emotion of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and rivalries between political parties and groups echo the deeply troubled long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites in America? Perhaps troubled so badly that the presidential candidates have not spoken about their strategies at all…
Continue reading Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2) →

Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 1)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics
N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia
N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 16, 2016

Multiple analysts of the current presidential candidates in the United States like to say that our founding fathers are turning over in their graves. Without a doubt, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are extremely controversial candidates. Regretfully, the appeal to emotions of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and hassles between political parties and groups have gained the upper hand in this election. This makes American voters confused and angry. Citizens become less and less certain about the reality in which they live and more and more frightened about the future of this world.

It has become harder for a social scientist to foresee consequences of elections and to produce electoral forecasts. In this world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces (Bernard et al, 2013), it is next to impossible to predict when and why critically important socio-economic and political events might happen and how these events might be interconnected. Empirically detecting the mechanisms of societal change, and thereby calibrating policy to the real economy, is difficult. In this situation, the persistence of long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites on the global and macro-regional scale, allows one to shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.
Continue reading Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 1) →

Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang.
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang

By Alexander Perepechko

with Dmitry Shchigelsky

Published on August 1, 2016

Alarming Political and Military Indicators for Belarus and Ukraine

According to the Fund for Peace (FFP) data, political and military indicators play the key role in an understanding of the fragility of the Belarusian and Ukrainian states. Out of six indicators, all but one (“public services”) have been in the poor or weak category (Figure 26).

One can notice at once that Ukraine’s weakness is attributed to temporal and situational circumstances. Only during the last couple of years, several political and military indicators quickly moved to the poor category (8-10). The indicators of “state legitimacy” and “external intervention” express high alert and danger. Elites remain strongly factionalized and the “security apparatus” of the state is quickly failing; these two indicators are in the weak category (6-8) and are quickly worsening. Russian intervention and occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas put the Ukrainian state on the brink of collapse. Nevertheless, with the help of western powers and the Ukrainian diaspora, the Ukrainian people were able to halt Russia’s intervention. Ukraine is slowly moving away from the edge of the abyss – from being a critically weak (almost failed) state toward a weak state.
Continue reading Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3) →

Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 2)

Elites, Geopolitics
Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream - MTZ tractors... Unsold.
Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream – MTZ tractors… Unsold.

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 30, 2016

Weaknesses of two fragile states: Warning social and economic indicators for Belarus and Ukraine.

Recall that in the part 1 of this research I found multiple similarities in the political development of the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries. Created on ruins of dissolved empires, these rural countries experienced short periods of a democracy, and the triumphant agrarian populism, followed by dictatorship and a fragile state. I also outlined that agrarian populism in this part of the world has two tactical impasses. Firstly, Populism cannot benefit from the simultaneous victory of an agrarian party (movement, group, or corporation) and the rise of a democratic political regime because liberal capitalism can easily destroy peasants as a class. Secondly, economic strains and crises in this part of the world leave little chance to put into action programs based upon rural populist ideals of comprehensive social transformation. I inferred that similarities between the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries lead to a similar four-stage political path: democratization, rise of peasant Populism, dictatorship, and a fragile state. Yet, we still need to find out how the last stage might look for Belarus…

A weak state, a failed state, a collapsed state, and a recovered (reanimated) state are specific concepts reflecting different stages of a fragile state (Carment, Langlois-Bertrand, Samy, 2016; Rotberg, 2003). Fragile states are on the brink of collapse in at least one of three areas: 1) authority over territory and the populace, 2) capacity of the economy and resource mobilization, and 3) effective and responsive governance (see Carment & Samy, 2014; Jenne, 2003). In other words, the state fails because it is seized with internal violence and cannot deliver positive political goods to the population.
Continue reading Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 2) →

Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 1)

Elites, Tactics
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 25, 2016

In the middle of March, 2016, I presented a lecture “Belarus: Heeling to the West and New Risks” to students of the Eastern European School of Political Studies (EESPS). This new contact with Belarusians inspired me to do research on Belarus.

What is going to happen to my country of origin? What is the logic of political development of Belarus after 1991? Are there any analogies in the world? Does the recent crisis in the country signify that the Lukashenko regime has symptoms of a fragile state – a state on the brink of collapse? Why? Is there any strategy to avoid the collapse of the Belarusian state? Does the Ukrainian experience matter? How?

I first will look for examples of regimes similar to the one in the Republic of Belarus…
Continue reading Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 1) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 5)

Elites, Strategy
From "Soldier of Fortune" written by David Coverdale & Ritchie Blackmore in 1974
From “Soldier of Fortune” written by David Coverdale & Ritchie Blackmore in 1974

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 9, 2016

Illicit activities authorized by powers: contractors vs. mercenaries

Private military and security companies have been operating in a legal vacuum for decades. In doing so, they pose a considerable threat to civilians and to international human rights law. Confusion begins with the subject matter definition.

According to The Montreux Document. On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict (hereafter, The Montreux Document) (2009: 9), private military and security companies are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.

In accordance with the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) (2013: 18), private security companies and private security service providers include any company whose business activities include the provision of security services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective of how such a company describes itself. Security services guard and protect persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for which personnel are required to carry or operate a weapon in performance of their duties.

So, what is similar in these definitions? And what is the difference between them?
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 5) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 4)

Geopolitics, Strategy
Based on Eric Fischer. Tweets
Based on Eric Fischer’s “Tweets”

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 7, 2016

From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)

In the period of Late Modernity, or even postmodernity, the clausewitzian trinity is still popular among American military-political leaders. In his seminal The Rise and Decline of the State, Israeli strategist Van Creveld summed up results of this approach over the last half-century for developed countries: “From France to the United States, there has scarcely been one “advanced” government in Europe and North America whose armed forces have not suffered defeat at the hands of underequipped, ill-trained, ill-organized, often even ill-clad, underfed, and illiterate freedom fighters or guerillas or terrorists; briefly, by men – and, often, women – who were short on everything except high courage and the determination to endure peacekeeping operations, and whatever other types of operations that were dreamt up by their masters” (2009: 395).

In two previous research essays we discovered that international jihadists find operational ground across the world by sponging off local leaders (often Salafists) and criminal groups. When I was working on this paper, new facts proved this finding.

Supported by the Russian Air Force, Syrian (also, Iranian and Lebanese) governmental ground troops squeezed out IS military units and moderate Syrian groups in several strategically important locations and significantly expanded a zone controlled by Damascus (Van Creveld, 2015). The area under ISIS control was reduced by one-third (Bidder et al, 2016). With Russia’s help, the regime of Assad might manage to reinstate control over all territories of the Syrian state. But even this development would not save the dictator from a demographic impasse. Assad understands that he and his Alawite minority cannot rule Syria without major changes. His first option is democratic elections and political power sharing mechanisms. The second option is tyrannical: Assad might use a depopulation strategy against Sunnis. In order to change the country’s demographics and create a religiously and ethnically homogenous Syria, the dictator might utilize a policy of cleansing through deportation, displacement, and killing of the Sunni population. Local Sunni communities that have supported anti-Assad fighters probably would be targeted first.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 4) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy
Alexander Perepechko. Off Valencia, San Francisco, CA
Alexander Perepechko. Off Valencia, San Francisco, California

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 7, 2016

From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)

To a significant extent, low intensity conflict in the United States and the Middle East is defined by social demographic, geopolitical, and geostrategic parameters of state and non-state actors. In this research essay I will discuss some of them.

According to the Pew Research Center, only 37% of Muslim Americans were born in the United States; 35% were born in the Middle East, North Africa, or Pakistan. 19% of Muslims in America are not U.S. citizens (Income Distribution, 2009; Muslim Americans, 2011). The Muslim American population is much younger, on average, than the non-Muslim population. More than three-quarters of Muslim Americans are either first-generation immigrants (63%) or second-generation Americans (15%), with one or both parents born outside of the country. 55% of the first generation immigrants are from the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan. Muslim Americans – particularly those born in the United States – are more likely than Americans as a whole to have only high school education. Among the 12 largest religious groups, Muslims have a relatively small middle class; only two religious groups – Jehovah’s Witness and historically Black Protestant churches – have a middle class smaller than Muslims. Moreover, after the economic crisis of 2008, the income pattern represents something of a decline for Muslim Americans. 29% of Muslims are underemployed. Underemployment is particularly prevalent among younger Muslim adults: 37% of those under 30 are underemployed. Muslims are underrepresented in the military. Only about 0.16% of the active-duty and reserve members in the U.S. military self-identify as Muslims (Khan & Martinez, 2015).

These numbers are worrisome. The high percentage of marginalized youth (unemployed with low levels of education), high proportion of first-generation immigrants and second-generation Americans in the Muslim population, and high share of immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan suggest that radicalization of Muslims in the United States is among the possible scenarios. Yet this process is not as straightforward as some clichés offered by some analysts and media.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 3) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 2)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy
George Scallion Future Map
George Scallion Future Map

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on December 30, 2015

From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)

Together with small families and mammismo, changes in governmental regulations pertaining to legitimate and other types of societal activities partially explain why Americans do not want to fight and die in wars. In spite of this unheroic realism, the Middle East slowly but surely exports low intensity conflict (LIC) to American state territory. Also, proper American organized crime might evolve into LIC by coalescing along religious, racial, political, and socio-economic lines and merge with foreign-born LIC…

Based on an analysis of temporal patterns of radical Islamic terror attacks in the United States, I suggested in my previous research essay that the hierarchically organized bureaucratic security and intelligence agencies created after September 11, 2001 might not be up to the task of fighting radical Islam. Indeed jihadists change strategy and tactics very often and operate efficiently. American security and intelligence agencies operate according to governmental regulations which frame their strategy. How good is this strategy?

Before we look at governmental regulations pertaining to illicit activities and activities regulated by classified legal procedures, we need to analyze one more interesting pattern – a geographic pattern of radical Islamic terror attacks in the United States.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 2) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 1)

Elites, Strategy
Reginald Mitchell Jr. The Matrix
Reginald Mitchell Jr. The Matrix

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on November 27, 2015

The Kurginyan Matrix

Compared to earlier stages of Modernity, Late Modernity in the West is less “heroic.” Americans and Europeans do not want to go to war and fight. Together with small families and mammismo, changes in governmental regulations pertaining to illegal activities, illicit activities, and activities regulated by classified legal procedures partially explain this unheroic realism. What are these activities about? When did governmental regulations change for these activities? Why did these changes occur?

As a matter of fact, Modernity (and we live in Late Modernity), like any other epoch (except post-modernity), is about regulations. Regulations can be viewed in a variety of ways. We know that secular law is a key regulator in the epoch of Modernity. In the West, most of societal life is located within the domain of legal activities.

But this is not the only domain where societal life can be found in western societies. The elitologist from Russia Sergey Kurginyan (2007: 42-46, 52), l’enfant terrible of the methodological school of Georgy Shchedrovitsky, uses a normative matrix to define legitimate and other types of societal activities in the West. According to this matrix, there are 4 types of activities relating to legality: 1) legal activities; 2) illegal activities; 3) activities regulated by classified legal procedures; and 4) illicit activities authorized by powers. The first diagonal of this matrix is (legal activities) + (illegal activities) and the second diagonal is (activities regulated by classified legal procedures) + (illicit activities authorized by powers). Figure 13 depicts these two diagonals.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 1) →