Acquisition, Processing and Use of Russia’s Raion/Municipality-level Spatial Data: Counter-mapping for Russia in Seattle, 2000-2004

Geographic Information Systems (GIS), , , , , , , , , ,
Alexander Perepechko. The ghost of Suzzallo

By Alexander Perepechko and Dmitry Sharkov

Published on August 13, 2017

Abstract: In this paper, we explore how a counter-mapping framework can contribute to developing a freely accessible worldwide geographic information (GI) service for Russia, a country with a legacy of classified (closed and semi-closed) information systems. The Russian Federation Digital Data (RFDD) project and the Central Eurasian Interactive Atlas (CEIA) were the major products of these efforts. This article describes the volunteered geographic information (VGI) methods which were used to create these products. We portray how in 1994-2004 volunteers and paid part-time citizen science at the University of Washington and its consortial partners (the Evergreen State College and South Seattle Community College) obtained geographic data from Russia, developed GIS databases in the United States using appropriate hardware and software, assured the quality of these data and created a clearinghouse and geoportal for delivery and use of the dataset. A focus on error detection to improve data quality was crucial for this project. The consortium was organized in 2000 to promote the creation of a GIS database on Russia and dissemination and use of these datasets using the Web. Unfortunately, the project has failed to publish the dataset beyond the Universities’ Consortium. CEIA is for limited use and serves as a curricular and research focus of Russian Studies programs in the Universities’ Consortium.

Keywords: Central Eurasian Interactive Atlas (CEIA), Clearinghouse, Counter-mapping, Data quality, Database, Geographic information (GI), Geographic information service, Geoportal, Russia, National spatial data infrastructure (NSDI), Russian Federation Digital Data (RFDD), Data quality, Universities’ Consortium Geographic Information Service (UC GI Service), Volunteered geographic information (VGI).

We acknowledge support for portions of this article provided by U.S. Department of Education Title VI Program for Technological Innovation and Cooperation for Foreign Information Access (TICFIA) Award Number P337A990006-01, the Suzzallo Libraries at the University of Washington, and the IFS Family Foundation. We are thankful to Michael Goodchild, Nicholas Chrisman, Massimo Craglia, and Ellen O’Meara for valuable suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Continuity and change in Russia’s occidentalist and fundamentalist vote in electoral geography 1917-1995

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics, , , , , , ,
Alexander Perepechko. Continuity…

They will say, “Where is the promise of his coming? For ever since the fathers fell asleep, all things are continuing as they were from the beginning of creation.” 2 Peter 2:4

By Alexander Perepechko

Craig ZumBrunnen

Vladimir A. Kolossov

Ellen S. O’Meara

Published on May 12, 2017

Abstract: This research empirically supports the hypothesis that in post-Soviet Russia, Soviet modernization engendered support for occidentalist parties, while pre-Revolutionary political regionalism engendered support for fundamentalist parties. Soviet development predicts “successful” modernization and change in occidentalist voting in (1) the continental Russian core, (2) early-modernized territories and (3) commercial export centers in the maritime European North and maritime European South, but does not predict continuity in occidentalist voting in newly industrialized regions. The political space of failed modernization and continuity in traditionalist voting includes the countryside and many towns, especially in the more recently urbanized territories and western border regions.

Keywords: Russia; Modernization; Political Culture; Election; Constituent Assembly; Sixth Duma; GIS; Probit.

We acknowledge support for portions of this article provided by U.S. Department of Education Title VI Program for Technological Innovation and Cooperation for Foreign Information Access (TICFIA) Award Number P337A990006-01, the Suzzallo Libraries at the University of Washington, and the IFS Family Foundation. We would like to thank Nicholas Chrisman, Richard Morrill, and Timothy Nyerges for valuable comments on the early drafts of this article.  We acknowledge Béatrice von Hirschhausen and Ellen O’Meara for conversations and encouragement. Our special thanks to Violette Rey for important comments on a later draft.
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The enigma of Donald Trump (part 3)

Elites, Strategy, , , ,
Alexander Perepechko. De-GLOBolshevization?

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 30, 2017

The geography of risks. The votes for Donald Trump

Risks, identified, measured, and analyzed in parts 1 and 2 of this research, can be associated with a few maps from the 2016 presidential election.

A. The social risks defined by “group grievance” and “refugees and IDPs” are – at least to some degree – real in the United States. These risks are perceived as acute ontological insecurity by the majority of whites: most whites, even the majority of college graduated whites (49%), voted for Donald Trump (Figure 34). During his emotional – postmodernist! – campaign, the charismatic Trump raised the fear level, played up humiliation, and articulated a need for the great leader. Trump’s nativist (some incorrectly use the term “nationalist”) (see Leahy, 2015) perspective and rhetoric awakened dormant features of universal human nature in Middle America. Machiavellian intelligence (in a time of resource scarcity or crisis a “lion” can terrify the “wolves”) became a powerful factor in the electoral behavior of these voters.
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The enigma of Donald Trump (part 2)

Elites, Strategy, , , , ,
Alexander Perepechko. GLOBolshevization

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 11, 2017

In the part 1 of this paper we discussed the Machiavellian intelligence approach in elitology. According to this theory, when we must act under uncertainty (a state of mind) with incomplete information about risks (the world is almost out of control) our “non-logical” conduct follows from a particular belief about the world in conjunction with a particular sentiment, desire or psychic state. This conduct is guided by two permanent sets of assumptions associated with two particular ways of life shaped by evolution. The two specific cultural and personological patterns, developed over time to help us withstand different risks during upswings and downswings of socio-economic and political development, influence our experiences of uncertainty into one of two fixed ways. In a competitive individualist environment a “fox” can discover snares. In a time of resource scarcity or crisis a “lion” can terrify the wolves.

We already learned (see figure 32) that a new Pareto long elite cycle started in 2008. It seemed as though the upswing of this new elite cycle could have become more and more synchronized with the new psychosocial health economic cycle (and with the fading IT long economic cycle) in the American economy. Unfortunately, during Obama’s presidency the governing elite was overrun by individuals with the skills and inclination to utilize legal and financial means and ideological persuasion. In Pareto’s language, these skills and proclivities are a deceitful and cunning craft. Overrun by these “foxes,” the governing elite lost its political domination in the 2016 presidential election: the upswing of the new elite cycle, which began in 2008, took a downturn in 2016. The new psychosocial health economic cycle (and the fading IT long economic cycle) and the downswing of the Pareto long elite cycle are asynchronous again…

As we know, downswings are related to an increase in in-group altruism as well as prejudice and suspicion toward out-groups (“others”). During periods of resource scarcity or crisis, risks to social solidarity dominate. This is a good time for Pareto’s “lion,” which can describe the conservative authoritarian personality. We pointed at increasing risks in socio-economic development, at the imbalance in elite circulation, and at political Balkanization as important threats which played to the hands of Donald Trump. We also emphasized that Trump skillfully used uncertainty, pertaining to postmodernist media, social networks, and expert knowledge. He succeeded in presenting himself as an intense realist preoccupied with objective reality and able to restore foundational principles and to develop a strategy for the United States.
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The enigma of Donald Trump (part 1)

Elites, Strategy, , , , ,
45/2016. Cartogram by Mark Newman

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 4, 2017

After the 1948 presidential election in the United States, the Chicago Daily Tribune ran with the headline “Dewey Defeats Truman.” Actually, Harry Truman beat the Republican Thomas Dewey. A copy fell into Truman’s hands and he simply smiled at the mistake because the Republican-supporting Chicago Daily Tribune had once referred to him as a nincompoop (Greenslade, 2016). Since that time electoral forecasts have improved dramatically: social scientists and political technologists can now forecast election results with more than 95% certainty. But in 2016 history repeats itself. Mass media, social networks, academics, experts, and analysts in the United States and abroad almost unanimously forecasted the victory of Hillary Clinton in the presidential election. The Democratic presidential nominee signed her autograph on the Newsweek “Madam President” commemorative magazine backstage after a campaign rally on November 7, 2016 in Pittsburgh. 125,000 copies of this magazine are for sale on eBay, Amazon, and similar commercial websites and can be purchased – if you are lucky – for 80-100 American dollars.

The vast majority of predictions failed miserably. American voters and the Electoral College worked against the liberal establishment candidate Hillary Clinton. She was sponsored by Wall Street, part of the IT sector, and some special interests and globalist institutions. Today these same organizations and individuals predict major trouble in the United States because Donald Trump won the election.

Indeed, a few polls and analysts anticipated the victory of Donald Trump, and the independent American filmmaker and writer Michael Moore was one of them. After the election, Moore (2016) acknowledged: “Fire all pundits, predictors, pollsters and anyone else in the media who had a narrative they wouldn’t let go of and refused to listen to or acknowledge what was really going on. Those same bloviators will now tell us we must “heal the divide” and “come together.” They will pull more hooey like that out of their ass in the days to come. Turn them off.” In fact, only two polls consistently showed Trump in the lead—the USC Dornsife/Los Angeles Times and the IBD/TIPP tracking polls.
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Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics
N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland
N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 28, 2016

In part 1 of this paper, we realized that public authority in the United States has likely been hijacked by special interests. The predominant part of the American elite stubbornly defends the dysfunctional status quo at its own peril. In a world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces, neither presidential candidate has formulated a strategy to implement his or her vision for America’s future. In this situation, we conjectured that the persistence of long wave-like cycles in economics and elites on the global and national scale might shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.

Long cycles fulfill a mostly strategic goal. Leaders who identify the current Kondratiev wave (K-wave) and current Pareto elite cycle are able to take the lead in economic and social development and to avoid revolutionary transformation of society…

What are the relationships between the current K-wave and current Pareto elite cycle in America? How might these relationships impact the current state and future development of the United States? Does the appeal to emotion of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and rivalries between political parties and groups echo the deeply troubled long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites in America? Perhaps troubled so badly that the presidential candidates have not spoken about their strategies at all…
Continue reading Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2) →

Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 1)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics
N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia
N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 16, 2016

Multiple analysts of the current presidential candidates in the United States like to say that our founding fathers are turning over in their graves. Without a doubt, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are extremely controversial candidates. Regretfully, the appeal to emotions of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and hassles between political parties and groups have gained the upper hand in this election. This makes American voters confused and angry. Citizens become less and less certain about the reality in which they live and more and more frightened about the future of this world.

It has become harder for a social scientist to foresee consequences of elections and to produce electoral forecasts. In this world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces (Bernard et al, 2013), it is next to impossible to predict when and why critically important socio-economic and political events might happen and how these events might be interconnected. Empirically detecting the mechanisms of societal change, and thereby calibrating policy to the real economy, is difficult. In this situation, the persistence of long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites on the global and macro-regional scale, allows one to shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.
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Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang.
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang

By Alexander Perepechko

with Dmitry Shchigelsky

Published on August 1, 2016

Alarming Political and Military Indicators for Belarus and Ukraine

According to the Fund for Peace (FFP) data, political and military indicators play the key role in an understanding of the fragility of the Belarusian and Ukrainian states. Out of six indicators, all but one (“public services”) have been in the poor or weak category (Figure 26).

One can notice at once that Ukraine’s weakness is attributed to temporal and situational circumstances. Only during the last couple of years, several political and military indicators quickly moved to the poor category (8-10). The indicators of “state legitimacy” and “external intervention” express high alert and danger. Elites remain strongly factionalized and the “security apparatus” of the state is quickly failing; these two indicators are in the weak category (6-8) and are quickly worsening. Russian intervention and occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas put the Ukrainian state on the brink of collapse. Nevertheless, with the help of western powers and the Ukrainian diaspora, the Ukrainian people were able to halt Russia’s intervention. Ukraine is slowly moving away from the edge of the abyss – from being a critically weak (almost failed) state toward a weak state.
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Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 2)

Elites, Geopolitics
Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream - MTZ tractors... Unsold.
Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream – MTZ tractors… Unsold.

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 30, 2016

Weaknesses of two fragile states: Warning social and economic indicators for Belarus and Ukraine.

Recall that in the part 1 of this research I found multiple similarities in the political development of the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries. Created on ruins of dissolved empires, these rural countries experienced short periods of a democracy, and the triumphant agrarian populism, followed by dictatorship and a fragile state. I also outlined that agrarian populism in this part of the world has two tactical impasses. Firstly, Populism cannot benefit from the simultaneous victory of an agrarian party (movement, group, or corporation) and the rise of a democratic political regime because liberal capitalism can easily destroy peasants as a class. Secondly, economic strains and crises in this part of the world leave little chance to put into action programs based upon rural populist ideals of comprehensive social transformation. I inferred that similarities between the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries lead to a similar four-stage political path: democratization, rise of peasant Populism, dictatorship, and a fragile state. Yet, we still need to find out how the last stage might look for Belarus…

A weak state, a failed state, a collapsed state, and a recovered (reanimated) state are specific concepts reflecting different stages of a fragile state (Carment, Langlois-Bertrand, Samy, 2016; Rotberg, 2003). Fragile states are on the brink of collapse in at least one of three areas: 1) authority over territory and the populace, 2) capacity of the economy and resource mobilization, and 3) effective and responsive governance (see Carment & Samy, 2014; Jenne, 2003). In other words, the state fails because it is seized with internal violence and cannot deliver positive political goods to the population.
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Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 1)

Elites, Tactics
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 25, 2016

In the middle of March, 2016, I presented a lecture “Belarus: Heeling to the West and New Risks” to students of the Eastern European School of Political Studies (EESPS). This new contact with Belarusians inspired me to do research on Belarus.

What is going to happen to my country of origin? What is the logic of political development of Belarus after 1991? Are there any analogies in the world? Does the recent crisis in the country signify that the Lukashenko regime has symptoms of a fragile state – a state on the brink of collapse? Why? Is there any strategy to avoid the collapse of the Belarusian state? Does the Ukrainian experience matter? How?

I first will look for examples of regimes similar to the one in the Republic of Belarus…
Continue reading Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 1) →