[The Belarusian Revolution] [image]. (n.d.). [Photo].

By Alexander Perepechko, Dmitry Shchigelsky, Ihar Tyshkevich, Youras Ziankovich

SEATTLE – NEW YORK – KYIV – HUSTON

Published on December 26, 2020

INTRODUCTION

The political confrontation in Belarus has reached a stalemate. Neither of the two opposing sides can win in the short-term or long-term. Neither of these side is willing to calmly discuss key issues which the country will face after the confrontation ends.

This situation pushed us to create a virtual platform where participants can discuss the events, processes, and logic of the Belarusian crisis. Based on these discussions, forecasts of future developments in this country will possibly be made. For a start, we offer here an analytical summary of our first discussion.

The goal of this publication is to start outlining the area for future debates.

We hope to include new participants, topics, and questions. We also intend to publish summaries of future discussions. With any luck, political actors would use them as inputs for decision-making…

NEW BUSINESSES AND NEW MIDDLE CLASS

Five months of political confrontation in Belarus have led to the situation when the state fails to fulfill its key functions. New socio-economic groups are denied political power and any political representation. Political communication between the government and citizens has failed. What is more, the usurper Lukashenko sporadically loses a sense of reality. Security and justice for citizens are not guaranteed any more…

The first signs of the current crisis in Belarus can be found at the turn of the year 2016-2017. The latent phase of this crisis began in 2018. It seems as though the main cause of the crisis is that the transformation of state institutions and the political system did not follow the transformation of society and the business environment. Indeed, during the last decade, society and business in Belarus have changed significantly.

Niche tech businesses and new branches of economics have recently played an important role in Belarus. They are not concerned much about economic rent or the administration of state assistance. Instead, they are preoccupied with the technological base and labor quality.

Niche tech businesses and new branches of economics created the urban middle class. Started and expanded under special treatment offered by the state, workers for these companies have lived in an “economic reservation.” Decrees of the president of Belarus granted tax exemptions and other benefits to workers of technopark and special economic zones. Such a worker can freely dispose his or her high income and live a high quality life.

In exchange for this life, the political regime demanded that the workers give up aspirations to power and direct political representation. In other words, the personalistic authoritarian regime, rigid and hardly capable of change, offered economic wellbeing in exchange for political non-participation.

But the growth and expansion of the niche businesses and new branches of economics made special privileges and special economic treatment by the state obsolete and unnecessary. Crucially, the middle class grew to one million and requested to change the political system and rules of the game.

THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF SOCIETY

While the falsification of results of the presidential election and the failure of the government to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic are the key triggers of the crisis in Belarus, the growing complexity of society and the inability of the archaic political regime to professionally manage it are the actual causes of the crisis. Indeed the opposition and international community are calling for the transformation of the regime, for the structural upgrade of the political system and making this system more sophisticated and modern.

It seems as though the regime’s “strategy” attempts to simplify and archaize the society so that it would fit the management capabilities of the primitive political system. Only after this goal is achieved, according to the assertions of old elites, will change be possible.

It seems as though the motto “stabilization and strengthening the control goes first and change follows” echoes slogans of reforms in Singapore and China. But this first impression may be wrong. To qualify for Singaporean or Chinese type of reforms, two preconditions must be met. First, the quality of the power elite has to increase. Second, the social elevator has to be launched at least to some extent.

Belarus does not meet these two qualifications. The opposite occurs instead. A significant part of new generation managers are denied participation in decision-making and new talents are not allowed to participate in politics.

FAILED POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The political regime is incapable of understanding the peculiar properties of the new businesses and interests of the new social class, and incapable of establishing proper communication with them.

When one million citizens drop out of communication with the political regime, the society becomes deeply fractured and loses faith in government. Belarusians no longer trust Lukashenko and his promises to reform the system.

In response to mass nonviolent protests, the regime tries to attack and control the cyberspace. Not unlike “luddites” in early 19th century Europe or communists in mid 20th century in USSR and China, lukashists fight back against the rising technologies. The regime tries to hack Telegram accounts, control Internet traffic, and censor information. State controlled media in Belarus today is reminiscent of Goebbels’ propaganda machine in Nazi Germany.

LUKASHENKO’S MIND

Psychiatric problems of the usurper increase uncertainty in communication not only between the power elite and populace but also inside this power elite. Any personalistic authoritarian regime is very sensitive to any inadequacy at the upper level. During his speech in the second half of August 2020, at the wheeled tractor plant in Minsk, Lukashenko showed definite signs of decompensation. However at an interview with four Russian journalists in early September 2020, his behavior unambiguously demonstrated compensation.

The period of his compensation coincided with malfunction of the system. Activities of the security forces declined. Also, there were attempts to resolve the conflict and to organize the political communication. It seems as though several groups inside the system attempted to initiate a problem-solving process. But none of these groups was bold enough to take responsibility to go all the way. By the end of August, these actions canceled each other out and the crisis grew deeper.

(IN)SECURITY

Security is a basic human need. In Belarus the situation with the safety of citizens is especially alarming. If the state does not perform its functions, another organization or structure will try to fill the vacuum.

For example, the Church and mafia at some point played this role in Italy and several countries of Latin America. In recent times, a new hybrid structure that combines politics and profits, two seemingly incompatible activities, has emerged. We are referring to the warlord-led gang wars (Bandenkrieg). The mentality of these gang fighters combines the greed of a thug and ideological conviction of a punisher.

This kind of development can result from revolution and major changes in the political system. As a crisis deepens, more citizens lose trust in the state. After the revolution, it might take many years (if not decades!) to eliminate these gangs. If citizens do not trust the state and regard its security organizations as alien and even dangerous forces, even the world’s least corrupt and most competent police apparatus can hardly work efficiently.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

The Belarusian state has failed to perform its key functions and entered systemic crisis. In 2020, this crisis has passed into the open phase and spilled into streets of Belarusian cities. Such open systemic crisis can lead to:

1) revolutionary removal of the old political system and old elites;

2) transformation involving changes in political communication and perhaps in the political power structure;

3) “freezing” of the crisis and the slow degradation of state institutions;

4) a failed state, in which national statehood is eliminated and the territory and population are ruled by a foreign power.

Attempts by the political regime to delay the transformation, the regime’s unwillingness to organize political communication, and the increased violence of the state security apparatus against its citizens indicate that the usurper and his clique are inclined to implement the tactical scenario aimed at freezing the crisis (number 3).

OPPOSITION IN THE DARK

Unfortunately, the actions of opponents of the regime remind us in some way of the actions of the ruling elite. In particular, the opponents attempt to encapsulate themselves in their own information space. They do not wish or are unable to critically analyze their own actions. In addition, their analysis of the situation lacks flexibility even at the tactical level. Their central slogan to “replace the dictator” does not reflect the major causes of the crisis – the growing complexity of Belarusian society and the call for a transformation of the system. This slogan reflects the superficial goal of the opposition aimed at replacing Lukashenko — the top of an obsolete archaic political system.

THREE QUESTIONS

When the old elite, new elite, and counter-elite are fragmented and when Svetlana Tsikhanovskaya and members of the Presidium of the Coordination Council are forced into exile, several questions need to be asked.

How are the activation and structuration of radical groups going? If they enter the political game as independent actors, say at the end of February or early March of 2021, the balance of forces in Belarus might change.

Work on constitutional reform will continue. Some pro-government elites favor constitutional changes and the Russian Federation also pushes for them. Lukashenko proposes constitutional changes in line with his own vision. In any case, several groups will control this process. What will be the balance among these competing groups by the end of January? This balance will define the scenario of constitutional change and will identify a group (or groups), which will increase its influence in the process of systemic transformation.

At this point, the role of existing proto-parties and new party projects in the Belarusian crisis is unclear. At least 5 groups are working on new political party projects against the backdrop of mass protests. What interest groups will influence new political party projects? It’s likely that a part of Belarusian business, Lukashenko’s coterie, the Russian Federation, and at least two opposition groups are among these interest groups. In search of electoral niches, most of the new political parties would announce themselves as independent actors and publicize their programs by spring.