By Alexander Perepechko
Published on October 3, 2012
Theorists of elites have shown that a foundation mythology would not be sufficient to provide a political consensus for the ongoing political process in America. The ways in which the ruling class renews its membership are of critical importance for the future of this country. Elite-related theories state that elites vary with respect to the number and rank of social forces which they represent (control, conciliate, tolerate, stimulate or create). There has to be a certain correlation between the dynamics of elites and the dynamics of social forces in a country (Mosca, 1972: xix). I have provided examples to show that electoral and parliamentary mechanisms are not the only means of this renewal. The theory of elites emphasizes important challenges pertaining to the modification of the ruling class.
Firstly, when the ruling class can no longer deliver crucial services to society, this ruling class is no longer relevant. In the 21st century, neo-conservatives failed to deliver security to Americans, and neo-liberals denied many Americans (leaving aside immigrants, refugees and foreigners!) the American dream. Electoral, parliamentary and political party mechanisms are not enough anymore to fix the long-lasting structural crisis. Important rules by which the ruling class renews itself need to be changed. Otherwise, a structural crisis can turn in a systemic crisis.
Secondly, reformers can fall short if they effectively and quickly carry out radical changes. Fast radical changes create social forces which reformers find difficult to absorb and represent. In other words, the virtues of people in reformist governments do not match the virtues of emerging leaders of newly created societal forces. Gorbachev’s reforms (Diskin, 2009; Poptsov, 2011) created social forces (a democratic movement in Russia and nationalist movements in the republics) that they could not absorb and represent, and failed. The Chinese communists carefully studied Russia’s lesson and avoided this error. The American ruling class grasped long ago that slow and continuous modification of elites (Mosca, 1939: 469) and incremental and moderate reforms can make a country immortal. Perhaps this is why America never experienced political revolutions and social upheavals comparable to those in Eurasia. At the same time, American foreign policy experts often encourage elites abroad to produce fast radical changes. For example, these advisors (see Hahn, 2012) encouraged “Glasnost’ 2.0” and “Perestroika 2.0” projects (“White Revolution”) in Russia during the tenure of Medvedev’s presidency.
Thirdly, when radical changes are urgently needed, the American system of checks and balances with two political parties can be ineffective and slow. For example, American elites turned health care and other needed reforms into political games and campaign issues and “moved” these reforms back and forth for decades. High ranking bureaucrats and elected officials, who serve many terms in office, are least interested in successful reforms because effective and fast radical changes can have unpredictable consequences and may put their jobs on the line. Moreover, Modernity set up consensus as the main framework of the political system in western countries. Yet, cleavages between the left and right in recent America go beyond this framework, and the “post-democratic” political process moves in two opposite directions: 1) post-modernists empty values, discard norms and attempt to stop development; 2) counter-modernists try to revive fundamentalist societal constructs and historical economic models (Kurginyan, 2007: 11-12). As a result of this de-modernization of politics, the state and other elements of the American political system have become paralyzed.
Fourthly, the actual modification of the ruling elites always starts with a new political force, rising within governed classes (Mosca, 1939: 256). Initially, this force can be very small. Eventually, it obtains a significant share in government.
Fifthly, violent and far-reaching renovations of the old political class can arise from a revolution (Mosca, 1972: 414). Revolution takes place when a large gap opens between the myths and beliefs of the masses and the norms and institutions of the political system (see figure 1 in my April 22, 2012 post). This gap blocks access of capable persons to government and political elites. Cooptation of these ambitious individuals into the existing political system, without changing the system, can however postpone an upheaval.
Sixthly, whatever the cause of the event (for example, revolution) that radically changes the composition and order of the ruling class, a significant part of the old ruling class almost always manages to enter the new ruling class.
Seventhly, a few dozen (or perhaps a hundred) persons occupy key offices (sometimes in rotation), control the management of the state and make most important decisions in a country. The selection criteria for this small circle of associates, which makes up the highest level of the ruling class, is this: persons who already belong to the group have to be satisfied. In other words, the consent, or at minimum the implicit approval, of persons who are already in similar posts is almost always required (Mosca, 1972: 402-403). The top executive (such as a president) cannot form or modify the top level of the ruling class by whim.
Eighthly, the stability of any political system depends on the level of morality, intelligence and activities of the middle level of the ruling class. The middle stratum in the United States is large and often associated with a state apparatus of the State. Besides New York and California with the international cities, the leadership qualities of people running politics in the states are framed by provincialism. Politicians and bureaucrats in the states know how to communicate with locals and have the active sympathy and support of their constituents. These “rulers” hide a passive-aggressive energy toward cosmopolitanism behind politeness and smiles. They silently resist the involvement of newcomers from cosmopolitan cities and federal authorities in local affairs. Many state elected officials and bureaucrats are sincerely trying to “do their best to do things right”. In this sense, they share protestant ethics and often entered the world of state politics by hard work. Not unlike bureaucrats in Germany or Scandinavian countries, officials in the states are good with administrative routines and procedures. What the ruling class in the states misses is passionate thinking, spirituality and imagination.This is possibly why this class got trapped in political constructs created by left theorists and religious radicals.
For example, post-modernists, Marxists and gender theorists consider Washington State to be a testing ground for “sustainable development” and claim that they can solve the problem of inequality and non-uniformity in development. Their “solution” is based on a “world city” core complemented by a “world village” periphery (in line with Mao Zedong’s terminology) (Kurginyan,2011: 41). In fact, post-modernists turn “sustainable development” inside out when Seattle with its service economy is set against the rest of Washington with its manufacturing and agriculture. On their lips “sustainable development” implies 1) non-development, 2) fixation on social roles (sex differences in social behavior), 3) labor division based on identity, and 4) quotas for consumption and population growth…
Theorists of elites claim that modification of the middle stratum of the ruling class requires the following “techniques”. Entering the middle stratum involves some intrigue and charlatanry. State-level functionaries need to learn how to dissimulate and make themselves useful. They have to meticulously observe rules of advancement based upon the principle of seniority. These “rules” exclude the motivation to do any more or any better than others. If a person is not going to lose his position or promotion, this person has to do the minimum and keep innovative ideas to herself. There is no reason to think that these techniques are not relevant to the Washington State ruling class.
Diskin, I. (2009) Krizis… I Vsyo zhe modernizatsiya! [Crisis… And nevertheless modernization!]. Moscow: Evropa.
Hahn, G. H. Glasnost’ 2.0, Perestroika 2.0, and the Nascent Russian White Revolution. BSR-Russia, January 13, 2012. Available at http://www.bsr-russia.com/en/politics/item/2067-glasnost%E2%80%99-20-perestroika-20-and-the-nascent-russian-white-revolution.html.
Kurginyan, S. (2011) System of Coordinates. In V. Sood & S. Kurginyan (Eds.), Radical Islam. Perspectives from India and Russia. Delhi:Macmillan: 6-43.
Kurginyan, S. (2007) The Weakness of Power. The Analytics of Closed Elite Games and its Basic Concepts. Moscow: ECC.
Mosca, G. (1972) A Short History of Political Philosophy. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.
Mosca, G. (1939) The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza Politica). New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Poptsov, O. (2011) Anshlag v Kremle. Svobodnykh presidentskikh mest net. [Full house in Kremlin. Free presidential seats are absent.] Moscow: Eksmo: Algoritm.