They will say, “Where is the promise of his coming? For ever since the fathers fell asleep, all things are continuing as they were from the beginning of creation.” 2 Peter 2:4

By Alexander Perepechko

Craig ZumBrunnen

Vladimir A. Kolossov

Ellen S. O’Meara

Published on May 12, 2017

Abstract: This research empirically supports the hypothesis that in post-Soviet Russia, Soviet modernization engendered support for occidentalist parties, while pre-Revolutionary political regionalism engendered support for fundamentalist parties. Soviet development predicts “successful” modernization and change in occidentalist voting in (1) the continental Russian core, (2) early-modernized territories and (3) commercial export centers in the maritime European North and maritime European South, but does not predict continuity in occidentalist voting in newly industrialized regions. The political space of failed modernization and continuity in traditionalist voting includes the countryside and many towns, especially in the more recently urbanized territories and western border regions.

Keywords: Russia; Modernization; Political Culture; Election; Constituent Assembly; Sixth Duma; GIS; Probit.

We acknowledge support for portions of this article provided by U.S. Department of Education Title VI Program for Technological Innovation and Cooperation for Foreign Information Access (TICFIA) Award Number P337A990006-01, the Suzzallo Libraries at the University of Washington, and the IFS Family Foundation. We would like to thank Nicholas Chrisman, Richard Morrill, and Timothy Nyerges for valuable comments on the early drafts of this article.  We acknowledge Béatrice von Hirschhausen and Ellen O’Meara for conversations and encouragement. Our special thanks to Violette Rey for important comments on a later draft.

Introduction

This paper compares and contrasts the geography of the 1917 Constituent Assembly and the 1995 6^th State Duma (Lower House) elections in order to reveal patterns of change and continuity. During the Soviet period Russia became an industrialized and urbanized country with a highly educated citizenry. While Soviet modernization led to a more “modern” social structure, post-Soviet Russian liberal/civic parties have been very much weaker than those in Western Europe and also substantially weaker than those in most East European countries. Perhaps surprising to some observers, rhetoric, symbols, slogans, and even programs and statutes of the major Russian parties that ran party lists in the election to the Constituent Assembly of 1917 and in the 6^th State Duma of 1995 have some common elements. There are several explanations for these common elements which are presented below.

First, the cleavage structure in pre-Revolutionary and contemporary Russia was and is dominated by the confrontation between occidentalism (or “Western way”) and fundamentalism (or “third way”), two of Russia’s major political traditions (O’Loughlin, O’Tuathal & Kolossov 2005; Perepechko, Kolossov & ZumBrunnen 2006; Sente 1993). The liberal parties such as People’s Freedom (“Kadets” or CD) in 1917 and Democratic Choice of Russia (DVR in Russian, hereafter, we use the English acronym DCR), Yabloko (“Apple”), and Our Home is Russia (NDR in Russian, hereafter, we use the English acronym OHR (Our Home is Russia was reasonably called the party of ‘‘formal liberal democracy’’ (Tucker 2006)) in 1995 supported the integration of Russia into the global economy and backed the political values of a civil society and liberal democracy that are representative of Western tradition. The left parties, such as, Russia’s Social Democratic Workers Party (bolsheviks or “Bolsheviks”) and the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) in 1917, and the Communist Party of Russian Federation (KPRF in Russian, hereafter, we use the English acronym CPRF) in 1995 and nationalist, such as, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in 1995, and other parties advocating Russian conservative traditions and authenticity, represent the third way. Next, the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and the 6^th State Duma election of 1995 reflected an overthrow of the national paradigm – from “capitalism” to “socialism” in 1917 and from “totalitarianism” to “democracy” under the Yeltsin regime (1991-1999). The Constituent Assembly election of 1917 was the last and most free election in the pre-Soviet period (1906-1917) and the 6^th State Duma election of 1995 was the first truly free election in the post-Soviet time (1991 and after). These two elections feature numerous parties on the proportional representation ballot (more than a dozen in 1917 and forty-three(!) in 1995), very high turnouts and a fierce competition. Results of the parliamentary election of 1993 have been seriously called into question due to wide spread charges of vote fraud (see McFaul 2001; Sob’yanin & Sukhovol’ski 1995). For these reasons there are no analyses of the 1989, 1991 and 1993 elections – or more recent elections – in this project and how they might differ from those held in 1995. Finally, in the pre-Soviet period only the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 used an electoral system that transformed the votes into party seats similar to the one employed in post-Soviet Duma elections (Electoral Law 1961; Federal’nyi Zakon 1995).

From a geographic perspective, this phenomenon raises the very interesting and timely scholarly task of the comparison of change/continuity in the vote between pre-Soviet and post-Soviet Russian elections. How did Soviet modernization transform the vote for fundamentalist traditions and Western traditions in different regions of the country? In this project we investigate a) the impact of Soviet development efforts, or economic and social modernization (change) and pre-Revolutionary political culture (continuity) on the vote for the parties of “fundamentalist tendency” and on the vote for the parties of the “Western tendency” in the election of 1995; and b) geographic patterns of change/continuity for pre-Soviet/post-Soviet pairs of occidentalist and third-way parties through the relationships amongst geographies of partisanship (the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and the Duma election of 1995) and demographic and socioeconomic phenomena in pre- and post-Soviet periods.

The central objectives of this research are: 1) to detect and compare the impact of change/continuity on voting for the occidentalist Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) and Yabloko (“Apple”) parties and the fundamentalist LDPR in the Duma election of 1995 and 2) to uncover the change/continuity geography for two pairs of occidentalist pre-Soviet/post-Soviet parties – the CD (People’s Freedom or “Kadets”)/DCR and CD/Yabloko parties, and the fundamentalist pair of parties – PSR (Party of Socialist Revolutionaries)/LDPR parties. We attempt to achieve these two major objectives by appropriately reorganizing the spatial electoral data for the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and the Duma election of 1995 and by utilizing a probit model to allocate selected spatial demographic and socioeconomic data for the pre- and post-Soviet periods into sets of relatively homogenous regions. The reason for choosing these particular parties for analysis is explained later on. But first we need to discuss a territorial transmission mechanism underlying continuities in Russian regions across a century-long time span.

Theoretical framework for comparison of the Russian elections

      Transmission mechanisms for electoral behavior

Geographers, such as Brunet and Rey (1996), Cox (1995), Kaganskii (2001), Kirby (1993), Reynolds (1994), and Sack (1986), have pointed to socioeconomic interactions as important characteristics of territory in terms of location and administrative boundaries. In Soviet Russia, where the state played an extremely important role in production processes, place is the container for that activity. Thus, in alignment with Hägerstrand’s (1975) and Giddens’s (1987; 1986) more general arguments, socioeconomic interactions endured at the local level and were preserved through local settings (“locales” or “localities”) in Russia. For instance, a household, a populated place, a basic economic unit, an urban environment, or a natural environment is localized in time-space in relation to routinized social practices and played a crucial role in the construction of encounters across space and time. These localized socioeconomic interactions are crowded together within raion-level administrative units. Administrative boundaries help identify a good deal of isomorphism between socio-territorial collectivities of voters and jurisdictions in which they reside. As a consequence, the displacement in the evolution of the class structure can never be either total or complete. Large-scale internal migration flows and tremendous transformations of regional economies and political cultures occurred between 1917 and 1995, yet surprisingly these dynamic factors did not create a collapse of the localism that is still feeding spatial variations in political behavior.

Basic rules for territorial delimitation of the two most basic Soviet and Russian administrative units – “raions” (rather analogous to American counties) and “gorsovets” (cities) – were delineated in the report of Vladimirskii (1920) at the Second Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in 1920. The formation of raions was based on a certain level or degree of geographic homogeneity pertaining to the rural population. A raion rarely had/has a highly differentiated environment. Usually, this basic administrative unit was/is bounded by natural economic borders (Anuchin 1977). Radkey (1950) tells us that in the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 under the pressure placed upon an inert mass the population of entire basic administrative units voted as a herd and cast nothing but one party votes. In the Soviet era, raions served as the organizational units for all administrative and social institutions.

The concepts of raion/gorsovet and their boundaries, place, localism, and herd voting are useful in that they help to understand administrative territorial units as transmission mechanisms underlying continuities in Russian regions across a century of time. Administrative power containers were and are successful in controlling institutions and production processes. They were and are, however, less successful on the level of non-institutionalized local and social group loyalties. Yet these theories pointed to modernization and political culture as important characteristics defining spatial variations in electoral behavior.

      Modernization and voting

Two related sets of voting behavior shaped Russian electoral geography in the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and the Duma election of 1995: 1) the rivalry between places/regions where residents tended to support policies favoring modernization, innovations and free-market-oriented institutions and other places/regions where residents tended to support policies favoring economic redistribution, and 2) the division between places/regions where the populations tended to be occidentalist/cosmopolitan-oriented vs. regions where the populations tended to be orientalist/fundamentalist/particularistic–oriented (Kitschelt 1992; Slider, Gimpel’son & Chugrov 1994).

Urbanization, different industries, and different occupational structures are important characteristics of labor in terms of voting. These attributes of modernization describe how the voter reacts to the economic situation. By casting a vote for a particular occidentalist or fundamentalist party, the voter projects, in fact, the consequences of his vote for a specific populated place, industry, and occupation.

Urbanization to a considerable extent represents the transformation of places under the impact of Soviet developmental efforts. Some scholars argue that as a component of Soviet modernization, urbanization promoted egalitarian principles for the spatial organization of the built environment (Bater 1980; Goguel 1983; Sob’yanin & Sukhovol’ski 1995) and made Russia’s political space more homogeneous. By the late 1980s about one-half of the Soviet urban population lived in mikroraions, standardized apartment complexes accommodating several thousand people. Others suggest that although the Soviet regime tolerated and encouraged rurbanism (see Mihali 2005) – patriarchal authoritarian attitudes brought to cities from the countryside, in large cities and agglomerations with high densities of population and mass communications the voter became more liberated from the yoke of “horde voting” (the term was coined by Durkheim (1997)) and eventually became more individualist and pro-Western. Furthermore, some others point to evidence that by the time of the 1995 election reformers had thus far failed to create markets for land, strong free markets for labor, and stable currency markets, the other key capitalist institutions. Without these institutional and economic changes, occidentalist voting in 1995 remained, as Körösényi (1991) notes, essentially urban, intellectual voting.

Urban dwellers, educated, skilled workers and white-collar personnel provided the mass support for modernization in both 1917 and 1995. Located in large cities, many of them worked in the machinery building and the metal-working industries (Eckert & Treïvich 1995; Kotkin 1992; Radvanyi 2000). Machinery was the focus of industrialization after the Bolshevik Revolution, and machinery became one of the epicenters of the post-Soviet economic crisis. Free labor and a rational system of administration and management of a European type did not appear at large machinery construction and metal-working plants in Russia. Similar to pre-Soviet period, in 1932 an internal passport system was established. The right to a residence permit (propiska), and thus a housing allocation, was made dependent upon having employment and remaining regularly employed. Instead, these plants were dependent upon economic autarky provided by the Soviet state. Like in other socialist countries, workplace-based communist cells used indoctrination (such as socialist emulation (sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie)) and compulsion (Kott 2001) to stimulate production processes. During the time of post-Soviet market reforms, these large plants became a “rustbelt”. As an important characteristic of the country’s social structure, the metal-working industry is an essential characteristic of voting patterns.

Finally, the “rule” has held that countries that modernize and marketize begin changing politically around the time that they achieve middle-income status (Thornton 2008; Zakaria 2008) and create a significant middle class. Since Russia had no concept of private property comparable to that which had arisen in the West under the influence of Roman law – and still does not fully, one should expect that the petty bourgeois voters were and are economically vulnerable; and hence, highly politicized during the periods of revolutions, crises, and radical economic and administrative reforms. Indeed, Russia’s petty bourgeois ceased to exist in the early 1930s and first “reappeared” in the commercial and services sectors of large cities only in the late 1980s.

Modernization theories often presume that radical economic and administrative reforms lead to a liberal-style political system where pro-Western party or parties proliferate in centers and regions of social transformations and innovations in policy and the economy. Yet, caution should be exercised in automatically transferring these theories to Russia. Pro-Western swings of the pendulum in Russian history and politics are shorter than the orientalist ones. Thus, the change in the Russian economy by the force of capitalism can be considered “dashed linear.” Some authors (for example, Sob’yanin & Sukhovol’ski 1995) hypothesize that geographic patterns of continuity/change for the pre-Soviet and post-Soviet parties in Russia may be a manifestation of the political culture.

       Political culture and voting

A political culture typically depicts customs and ancient structures of political life in regions with a traditional economy and stable social stratums (Elazar 1987; Goguel 1970; Lipphardt, Brauch, Nocke 2008; .Seiler 1985; Seiler 2007). The political culture can slow down the process of change and hold up reforms and innovations. Familial, or local, in nature, the political culture operates as a “collective memory” and persists for many decades and even centuries.

Scholars (Kaufmann 1997; Todd 1984) point to patriarchal authoritarianism, egalitarianism and collectivism as familial characteristics of Russian political culture. These features reach back to the Middle Ages and evoke Russian Orthodox tradition. While Protestantism and the Reformation set up the idea of differentiation in the West, in Russia, whose populace neither knew nor experienced the Reformation or Counter-Reformation, ideas of the unity prevailed. This international historical bifurcation led to the two different cultural codes controlling the development of social systems in Russia and the West.

In agreement with this perspective, the cultural code of Eastern Orthodoxy encouraged autocracy and hierarchy. Patriarchal and egalitarian values, norms, and attitudes of the Russian voter were also molded by the mir, the Russian village community historically based upon neighborhood and property (Bater 1996; Fedotov 1960; Robinson 1967; Titkov 2008). In the towns, seasonal laborers (otkhodniki) and even permanent workers retained land in the village. The other important source of Russian collectivism is rod (clan), an eternal kinship-community. An individual is only a transient moment in the eternal life of the rod. Thus, there is left very little place for the freedom and will of the individual.

The geography of the above discussed rural, peasant, collectivist and egalitarian patriarchal authoritarian Russian political culture overall defined the geographical pattern of votes for the PSR in the election to the Constituent Assembly of 1917. The geographical pattern of votes for the Bolsheviks was also mainly rural (Radkey 1950) and was defined, in fact, by the same political culture. This pattern was strongly influenced by the war front, either directly in the form of soldiers’ votes or indirectly in the form of those votes of their wives and their neighbors at home. Votes in areas near railroad lines went to the Bolsheviks because pro-Bolshevik soldiers had worked the villages near the stations. In other words, Bolshevik voting was of short duration and brought about, to a large extent, by relocation diffusion. This diffusion involved the actual movement of soldiers who accepted Bolshevist propaganda, and who carried it to new, often distant locales, where they proceeded to disseminate it.

Both the Bolsheviks and the Kadets enjoyed support in the more politically active central industrial cities of the wealthier regions. In these locations, the so-called “middle class” had drained off in two directions. Professionals (petty-bourgeoisie) often voted for the Bolsheviks as the party of the disaffected. The social classes and groups privileged through property (bourgeoisie, government functionaries, intelligentsia, and gentry) frequently supported the Kadets. The Kadets were the main political party that defended the institution of private property and the interests of the new urban, educated, industrial and commercial groups. In the election to the Constituent Assembly of 1917 Kadet voting reflected a liberal (occidentalist) political culture.

What were the channels for transmitting pre-Soviet liberal political culture? In Soviet Russia, where the totalitarian regime physically destroyed most objects of architectural and cultural heritage (such as churches, palaces, monuments), the collective memories are an alternative channel for transmitting liberal political culture. As von Hirschhausen (2005) argues different spaces (locales) have different rules pertaining to different memories. The Soviet totalitarian regime managed to capture public space and established a grip upon the private space of Russia’s rural, peasant, collectivist and egalitarian patriarchal authoritarian political culture and adjusted this political culture toward the goals of communism. This regime was, however, less successful in destroying the pre-socialist collective memories. In Soviet Russia, where the CPSU controlled interactions in the workplace, on the streets and roads, in public places and on public transport, memories about the pre-Soviet past “processed” (preserved, developed, and transmitted) in locales-refuges (for example, apartments (often cooperative) or houses, dachi, family history, network of friends, and written sources). When the totalitarian regime failed, concerned social groups and individuals promptly mobilized these spatial memories and converted them to votes for pro-Western political parties.

Theories of modernization and political culture contribute to an understanding of political regionalization as complex interactions of different spatial phenomena that do matter for debate about continuity vs. change in voting for occidentalist and fundamentalist parties in Russia. In the absence of empirically based evidence, these theories however remain heuristic. Moreover, it is not totally clear how to measure political regionalization, how to identify the impact of modernization and political culture on electoral behavior, and how to detect geographic patterns of continuity and change for pre-Soviet and post-Soviet pairs of occidentalist and fundamentalist parties.

After building a Russian spatial database, here we utilize advanced GIS and statistical techniques to uncover and compare political regionalization and continuity/change patterns in 1917 and 1995 (for example, Perepechko, Graybill, ZumBrunnen & Sharkov 2005). As a result, one may draw inferences about the type of these two elections. Two important questions are (1) whether contemporary geographical patterns of the parties of a Western tendency are generated mainly by economic and social changes during the Soviet period and (2) whether the geographical patterns of the parties of the fundamentalist tradition are produced above all by political culture? Communist rule almost totally wiped out many local economies, and autonomous regional, religious, and peasant communities that formed the social bases of traditional Russia’s society. Do patterns in 1995 reflect a more modern, liberal class-based politics? It is also possible, that despite Soviet collectivization, industrialization, urbanization, and the educational “revolution,” Russian society has not been modernized enough to support a cleavage-based party system common for Western-style democracies.

Computational techniques for detection of political regionalizations and continuity/change geographies

To detect and compare the impact of change (Soviet modernization) and continuity (pre-Soviet political culture) on the vote for occidentalist DCR and Yabloko, and fundamentalist LDPR and to investigate geographic patterns of change/continuity for the occidentalist CD/DCR and CD/Yabloko, and fundamentalist PSR/LDPR party pairings, we constructed a GIS database. In this database the Russian Federation is an amalgamation of 1917 guberniyas and 1917 oblasts (do not confuse Oblast for 1917 with Oblast for 1995) (Figure 38) of the Russian Empire and a 1995-RMR-level (Russian macro region) unit that is an amalgamation of 1995 raions and gorsovets (Figures 39 and 40). To match the boundaries of actual 1917 guberniyas to the boundaries of actual 1995 raions and gorsovets, map conflation (Saalfeld 1988; Saalfeld 1985) was approached through an overlay procedure. After the conflation was performed, the raion boundaries within the guberniyas or RMRs were dissolved and the values for the non-spatial attributes were summarized.

To analyze the elections from the two different time periods, it was necessary to relate statistics originally presented for complete guberniyas/oblasts within the boundaries of the Russian Empire with statistics presented by complete and incomplete 1917 guberniyas/oblasts within the boundaries of the Russian Federation in 1995. This issue of guberniya/oblast statistical aggregates, divided by the external boundaries of the Russian Federation, was approached through areal interpolation procedures.

Figure 38. Russian Macro Regions (RMRs) as an amalgamation of 1995 raions and gorsovets. (Generated by the first author.)

The socioeconomic variables employed for the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and parliamentary election of 1995 are comparable, but not identical. Accordingly, the macro–regional voting returns by party lists attributes consist of five variables: Kadets and Socialist Revolutionaries for 1917-RMRs and Liberal Democrats, Yabloko and Democratic Choice of Russia for 1995-RMRs. Population variables for the two elections years investigated here are comprised of urbanization in 1914 and urbanization in 1995, respectively. Socioeconomic attributes include small business employment for 1897 and self-employment by cities for 1993, machinery construction and metal-working industry production for 1910 and machinery construction and metal-working industry production for 1993 (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet 1995; Radkey 1950; Rossiiskii Statisticheskii 1994; Svyatinskii 1918; Troinitskii 1897; Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya 1996; Tsentral’nyi Statisticheskii 1906-1915).

Figure 39. The boundaries of actual 1995 raions and gorsovets (Generated by Alexander Perepechko and Dmitry Sharkov.)

Figure 40. The boundaries of actual 1995 raions and gorsovets (Chukotka area). (Generated by Alexander Perepechko and Dmitry Sharkov.)

Probabilities are predicted by the use of a probit model (Agresti 2002; Finney 1971; Kemper 1985; Liao 1994; Park 1996; Southwell & Waguespack 1997; Wrigley 2002). We have built sequential hierarchical (nested) probit models for each of the eight parties. Probabilities of winning the observed percentage of votes are associated with the proportions of the party voting within each guberniya. Probit analyses produce odds ratios (o) for each party. The odds ratio is the relative increase/decrease in the proportion of votes for a given party in a given guberniya, once the party votes and the values of demographic, socioeconomic and political regionalism variables for this gubernia are known. The odds ratios for the political parties are then mapped using three categories: 1) poor predictability (o≤0.9), 2) moderate/low predictability (0.9<o<1.1), and 3) high predictability (o≥1.1).

The geographical inversion between the communitarian and liberal spatial continuity/change patterns is calculated for each of seven historical cultural regions – (1) the European North-West and North, (2) the Center, (3) Volgo-Vyatka and Volga, (4) the Central Black Earth, (5) the North Caucasus, (6) the Urals, and (7) Siberia and Far East. The smaller the index is, the less inverse are communitarian and liberal continuity/change spatial patterns in the historical cultural region.

Change and continuity are not measured for occidentalist OHR (Our Home Is Russia) and fundamentalist CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation). The covariance matrix of parameter estimates could not be computed, possibly due to linear dependencies among covariates. This computational limitation narrows down the scope of our research in terms of the number of parties involved in analysis. But since it is known that the same political tradition can be represented by several different parties (see Siegfried 1964), we are left with a sufficient number of parties to address our research objectives.

The post-Soviet communists claim direct lineage to the CPSU and Russia’s Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks). Indeed, the CPSU sanctified the formation of the CPRF and sponsored its ideological and organizational foundation (Grzymała-Busse 2002). As a result, the CPRF inherited a large part of the extensive local and regional structures and networks from the disbanded CPSU and still relies on these structures and networks. We know however that the geography of the power of the party organization and the geography of the support of the party are not the same (Taylor 1985). It is not surprising that the CPRF votes do not exhibit continuity with the Bolshevik votes of 1917.

 The political regionalizations

       Pre-revolutionary political traditions vs. Soviet developmental efforts

To reveal the role of change and continuity in the occidentalist and in the fundamentalist voting, three probit models have been built. The dependent variables here are the percentage share of party votes for the DCR, Yabloko, and LDPR, respectively. The explanatory demographic and socioeconomic variables utilized to predict change for the DCR and for Yabloko are urbanization (1995) and self-employed (1993) (a class surrogate for petty bourgeoisie). The explanatory change variables for the LDPR are urbanization (1995), self-employment (1993) and machinery and metalworking industrial production (1993). The independent variables predicting continuity are the percentage share of party votes for the Kadet, Bolshevik, and Socialist Revolutionary parties. In other words, the pre-Revolutionary parties’ turnouts provide a measure of political regionalism.

The results of probit analysis for the DCR, the Yabloko, and the LDPR parties are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Change and continuity: probit analysis [Beta (odds ratio)]

	DCR	Yabloko	LDPR
Urbanization_1995	3.80 (44.6)	2.46 (11.7)	-1.26 (3.51)
Petty_bourgeoisie_1993	-0.27 (1.31)	-0.05 (1.05)	0.06 (1.06)
Machinery_1993	—	—	-0.04 (1.04)
CD_1917	0.49 (1.63)	0.22 (1.24)	-0.32 (1.38)
Bolsheviks_1917	-0.04 (1.04)	-0.05 (1.05)	0.32 (1.38)
PSR_1917	-0.46 (1.58)	-0.42 (1.52)	0.58 (1.79)

Source: Compiled by the first author.

The results demonstrate strong changes in the patterns of the DCR, Yabloko, and LDRP. Among all the predictors, urbanization – one of the most essential factors of Soviet modernization efforts – contributes the most to an understanding of the voting patterns of occidentalist as well as fundamentalist voting. Correlation with urbanization is particularly dramatic in the case of the radically pro-Western Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR). Urbanization also strongly affected the voting pattern of the moderately occidentalist Yabloko party. By comparison with other independent variables, the negative impact or correlation of urbanization on the Liberal Democrats (LDPR) voting is the strongest.Source: Compiled by the first author.

The impact of the rates of self-employment, a modernization factor that “appeared” only in the late 1980s, is rather insignificant (in this study all parameter estimates are calculated at 0.10 significance level). This predictor more significantly affects only the DCR voting and reflects the reaction of the petty-bourgeoisie to the “shock therapy”. With regard to LDPR voting, the impact of industrialization on the voting as measured by ruble value of production in the machinery and metalworking industry is negative and negligible. On the other hand, what one can observe is pervasive evidence revealing high levels of LDPR party voting in the milieu of small/middle-sized towns. These above geographical patterns of the occidentalist and fundamentalist voting in some way survived the Soviet period.

The new pro-Western DCR and Yabloko parties do not have any direct political predecessors. However, the DCR and Yabloko parties demonstrate continuity with the Kadets (CD). The Kadets’ turnout has substantial positive explanatory value for the DCR voting pattern and significant positive impact on or positive correlation with the Yabloko voting pattern. Moreover, the statistical association between the PSR voting and DCR and Yabloko voting is also strong and negative which we fully expected to be the case.

The fundamentalist LDPR, in its turn, shows continuity with the “third way” and Slavophil PSR. The value of the positive impact of the PSR (Beta (odds ratio) = 0.582 (1.790)) voting on the Liberal Democratic voting is comparable with the value of the negative impact of urbanization (Beta (odds ratio) = -1.256 (3.513)). The positive association of the Bolshevik and the negative association of the Kadet voting with the LDPR voting are also significant. Therefore, the political regionalism, evidenced in continuity, affects the contemporary pattern of fundamentalist voting almost as strongly as does modernization in the form of urbanization. The petty-bourgeoisie and the machinery and metalworking industry – the two other factors reflecting modernization efforts – are negligible.

      Impacts of Soviet modernization and pre-revolutionary regionalism on occidentalist and fundamentalist voting patterns

To compare change and continuity in the occidentalist and fundamentalist voting, odds ratios for RMRs were constructed and mapped (see Figs. 41-43) from the values of the corresponding predictors. The impacts of the independent variables on DCR, Yabloko, and LDPR were also measured.

The range of the odds ratio values for the DCR varies from 0.49 in Vologda to 2.00 in Amur. The hypothesized predictors explain well (o≥1.1) 14 out of 37 cases (37.8%) (see Figure 41).

In terms of change and continuity, the zone of the highly predictable DCR voting has two distinct clusters. The first cluster stretches from the eastern RMRs of Russia’s European Center to Volgo-Vyatka, the Volga, and the North Caucasus regions. Chernigov is a small separate island on the western margins of European Russia. The eastern part of the pre-Soviet Chernigov Guberniya is located on the Russian Federation side of the post-Soviet Russian-Ukrainian boundary. This cluster is encircled by a zone of moderate/low predictability (0.9<o<1.1) to the west and northwest and by a zone of the poor predictability (o≤0.9) to the east and northeast. The Amur RMR is the second center of the highly predictable DCR voting. The predictability decreases to the west (see Fig. 41).

The range of the odds ratio values for the Yabloko party varies from 0.43 in the Voyska Donskogo Oblast to 3.18 in Chernigov. Predictors explain well (o≥1.1) 15 out of 37 cases (43.2%) (see Fig. 42). The zones of high predictability of Yabloko and DCR voting overlap in 50% of the cases (see Fig. 42).

The impacts of the predictors of change (rates of urbanization and petty bourgeoisie) and continuity (the Kadet, Socialist Revolutionary, and Bolshevik voting) on the Yabloko and DCR voting are similar. The predictability is lower in the Black Earth areas (see and compare Fig. 41 and Fig. 42).

Figure 41. Change/continuity in DCR voting. (Generated by the first author.)

Figure 42. Change/continuity in Yabloko voting. (Generated by the first author.)

In terms of change and continuity, the zone of the highly predictable Yabloko voting has three distinct clusters. The first cluster encircles the old Moscow industrial region and stretches from the Tambov, Ryazan’, Tula, Kursk, Oryol, and Chernigov regions to Smolensk, Tver’ and then to Kostroma. The second cluster includes some RMRs of the Volga, Volga-Vyatka, and Ural regions, namely, the Kazan’, Perm’, Samara, Simbirsk, and Ufa RMRs. These two clusters are encircled by RMRs of moderate/low predictability (0.9<o<1.1) and of poor predictability (o£0.9). The Amur and Zabaykal’sk regions constitute the third cluster of the highly predictable Yabloko voting. Here the predictability decreases to the West (see Fig. 42).

In the zones of high predictability, the positive, strong impact of urbanization and the negative, insignificant impact of the petty-bourgeoisie (factors of modernization); the negative significant impact of the PSR voting; the positive significant impact of the CD voting; and the negative insignificant impact of the Bolshevik voting (factors of political regionalism) vary to a considerable extent on the DCR and Yabloko voting patterns. The impact of the factors of modernization on contemporary occidentalist voting is 3 to 4 times stronger than the impact of pre-Revolutionary political regionalism. This outcome seems quite understandable theoretically, that is, in most countries rates and patterns of occidentalist voting are commonly strongly positively associated with rates and patterns of modernization.

The range of the odds ratio values for the LDPR varies from 0.42 in Chernigov to 1.75 in Tver’. Predictors explain well (o≥1.1) 12 out of 36 cases (33.3%) (see Fig. 43). By comparison with the DCR and Yabloko, the predictability of the LDPR voting is slightly lower.

Figure 43. Change/continuity in LDPR voting. (Generated by the first author.)

In terms of change and continuity, the highly predictable Liberal Democratic voting has two distinct clusters. The first cluster includes the Black Earth RMRs as well as the core of the Russian European Center. One can also consider the St. Petersburg, Stavropol’, and Ufa areas as the three outliers of this cluster. The Yenisey area is the second center of the highly predictable Liberal Democratic voting. The predictability decreases to the west (moderate/low in Tomsk area) and to the east (poor in Irkutsk and Zabaykal’sk areas and moderate/low in Amur). In terms of change and continuity, the pattern of the LDPR voting in Siberia is an “inversion” of the DCR and Yabloko voting patterns (compare Fig. 43 with Fig. 41 and Fig. 42, respectively).

In the zone of high predictability, the negative strong impact of urbanization, the positive insignificant impact of the petty-bourgeoisie, the negative insignificant impact of the machinery and metalworking industry (the factors of modernization), the positive significant impact of the PSR and of the Bolshevik voting, and the negative significant impact of the CD voting (the factors of regionalism) vary to a considerable extent on the LDPR voting patterns. By comparison with the occidentalist DCR and Yabloko, the impact of modernization on contemporary fundamentalist voting is almost as strong as the impact of the pre-Revolutionary political regionalism.

The impact of continuity variables (factors of political regionalism) is much higher for fundamentalists than for occidentalists. This finding should not astonish one. By the end of Tsarist Russia fundamentalists were, in fact, absolute masters of the country’s political space; about 77.0% of these voters voted for the Bolsheviks and peasant Revolutionary Socialists in the Constituent Assembly election. Under the influence of Soviet developmental efforts this fundamentalist totality did not collapse; as evidenced by the fact that 33.5% of voters voted for the Liberal Democrats and Communists in the Duma election of 1995.

 Delayed succession: geographic patterns of continuity and change

       “Balance” of continuity/change

 The detection of geographic patterns of continuity and change for the CD/DCR, CD/Yabloko, and PSR/LDPR regionalization models includes the following steps. To detect continuity/change in occidentalist voting, a probit model of Kadet voting was constructed using the values of urbanization in 1914 and of petty-bourgeoisie in 1897, a probit model of the DCR and of the Yabloko voting was constructed using the values of urbanization in 1995 and of petty bourgeoisie in 1993. To compare the continuity/change in fundamentalist voting, a probit model of the Socialist Revolutionary voting was constructed with the values of urbanization in 1914, of petty-bourgeoisie in 1897, and of machinery and metalworking industry in 1911, and a probit model of the Liberal Democratic voting was constructed from the values of urbanization in 1995, of petty-bourgeoisie in 1993, and of the machinery and metal working industry in 1993.

The odds ratios of the five political parties are mapped using the three categories defined earlier in this paper.

Based on these categories of predictability, change and continuity can be analyzed for the CD/DCR, CD/Yabloko, and PSR/LDPR pairs of political parties. Those RMRs with the same category (“poor predictability,” “moderate/low predictability,” and “high predictability”) did not change (say, “poor predictability” in 1917 for the CD and “poor predictability” in 1995 for the DCR) and reflect continuity, while those with different classifications (say, “poor predictability” in 1917 for the CD changed to “moderate/low predictability” for the DCR in 1995) did change.

      CD/DCR and CD/Yabloko: two similar spatial-social loyalties

The CD/DCR and the CD/Yabloko pairs of the pro-Western parties manifested quite similar spatial patterns of continuity and change. Of 38 RMRs 18 are the strongholds of continuity in the CD/DCR model. Including Moscow and St. Petersburg, 32 RMRs are the areas of change in the CD/DCR model. Thus, change occurred in 51.4% of the cases. In European Russia, the spatial pattern of continuity and change in the CD/Yabloko model is similar to that of the CD/DCR.

By comparison with the CD/DCR, the strongholds of continuity in the CD/Yabloko in Siberia include not only Irkutsk and Zabaykal’sk but also Tobol’sk and Tomsk. Yenisey and Amur are the only areas of change in the CD/Yabloko pair in the Asiatic Russia. In terms of the models used, the change/continuity geography of the liberal voting (CD/DCR and CD/Yabloko) has five essential features:

(1) In European Russia, the change/continuity pattern of occidentalist voting consists of three major zones. The Russian core includes the Moscow center and Smolensk, Vladimir, Kostroma and Vyatka. This is the inner, continental core of the change in occidentalist voting.

(2) The second zone of the change in occidentalist voting in European Russia falls into northern and southern belts. The northern belt includes the St. Petersburg and Arkhangel’sk regions. The southern belt stretches from the Voyska Donskogo Oblast and Tambov to Astrakhan’, Samara and Orenburg. The two outer belts of the change in occidentalist voting are located in maritime (Barents and Baltic Seas in the north and Black, Azov, and Caspian Seas in the south) frontier locations.

(3) In the European Russia, the zone of continuity includes Vitebsk (the eastern part of the pre-Soviet Vitebsk Guberniya is located on the Russian Federation side of the post-Soviet Russian-Belarusian boundary), Pskov, Novgorod, Yaroslavl’ and Vologda in the north; Perm’, Ufa, Kazan’, Simbirsk, Penza, Saratov, Nizhniy Novgorod, Ryazan’, Tula, Oryol and Chernigov in the east and south; and Kursk and Voronezh in the southwest (Black Earth). This inner, continental ring of continuity in occidentalist voting is “squeezed” between the inner, continental zone of change in occidentalist voting and the maritime, frontier zone of change in occidentalist voting.

(4) In Siberia, Irkutsk and Zabaykal’sk are the strongholds of continuity in the CD/DCR voting as well as in the CD/Yabloko voting. Tobol’sk and Tomsk in West Siberia are also the strongholds of continuity in the CD/Yabloko voting. Yenisey and Amur are the areas of change in the CD/DCR and CD/Yabloko voting in Siberia. By comparison with the CD/Yabloko, Tobol’sk and Tomsk are also the regions of change in the CD/DCR voting.

Next we attempt to present a reasoned analysis or interpretation behind the revealed geographical patterns just described.

      Interpretation of the geographical patterns of CD/DCR and CD/Yabloko voting

In terms of the models, the inner, continental Russian core seems to be the region of “long-term change” in occidentalist voting. Naturally, even in the darkest times of the Soviet period, Moscow, St. Petersburg and other largest cities of this region were nodes and sources of dissidents, famous political debates, and public disputes. In the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and parliamentary election of 1995, the largest cities situated in these historical core Russian regions with occidentalist political culture were centers of innovations in policy and economy; hence, their voters expressed a much stronger support for pro-Western parties in 1995 than in 1917. Put differently, national capitals, most cities with a population of more than one million and many capital cities of regions of large historical cultural macro-regions have the long-term tendency to vote in a similar occidentalist way. By contrast, middle- and especially small-sized cities bear some reflection of their surrounding rural areas (Petrov & Titkov 2000) and are strongly influenced by the regional political culture (Kolossov, Vizgalov & Borodulina 2003).

The inner, continental ring of continuity in occidentalist voting is the loser in the long-term prospect. Soviet modernization arrived relatively late and appears to have relatively weakly affected the Chernozem belt (Central Black Earth and Volga regions) and the non-Chernozem (Nechernozem’e) areas. At the very beginning of the 1930s the European south, especially the Black Earth, fell victim to collectivization. Millions of the rich peasants (kulaki) living in this region were eliminated or sent into exile (Mendras 1993). The productivity of the Black Earth made the region an important producer of surplus grain harvests during the Soviet period. Yet as soon as post-Soviet marketization forces became a fact, collective farms and state farms sought protection from inflation and from importation of farm produce. The rural voters of the Black Earth remain quite skeptical about land reform. In the European north lie the non-Chernozem lands that had become the object of large-scale state agricultural programs (i.e., creation of agro-industrial complexes (APC) and rural resettlement) in the 1970s that appeared to be inefficient and failed (Ioffe & Nefedova 1997; Ioffe, Nefedova & Zaslavsky 2006). Continuity in the occidentalist voting in the Urals and Volgo-Vyatka can be explained by the fact that already prior to the Revolution of 1917 these areas had become industrial regions whose voters sympathized with pro-Westerners.

The major commercial export cities, such as St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangel’sk, Rostov-na-Donu, and Taganrog are located in the two outer maritime belts of change in occidentalist voting. In these areas the new pro-Western parties act as links of articulation between the interests of the global economy and export-oriented sectors of the Russian political economic space.

In Siberia, the areas of continuity in the occidentalist voting were and are also the losers under Soviet industrialization and collectivization. The industrialization of Siberia was/is closely connected with the evacuation of industrial plants from the European part of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, with the building of a military industrial complex in the 1950s-1980s, and with the discovery and exploitation of major natural gas and oil deposits from the mid-1960s until today. As a result, the newly industrialized Soviet Siberia “enjoyed” the patronage of the central administration.

Naturally, the marketization and the demilitarization of the post-Soviet economy severly negatively affected the gigantic industrial plants in Barnaul, Novosibirsk, and some other cities. They are the centers of relatively densely populated rural areas. By the time of the 1995 election the “shock therapy” program of the reformist government of Gaidar, the “globalizer,” had not demonstrated significant signs of success in modernizing industrial plants. Hence, these often-antiquated, large-scale plants became appropriate places for the mobilization of voters by fundamentalists, the contemporary Russian “domestic anti-globalization” force. Richly endowed with natural gas and oil, central and northern parts of West Siberia received huge investments and changed dramatically. In terms of the probit models and guberniya statistical aggregates used, it seems as though this modernization by the force of the totalitarian state did not dramatically increase the occidentalist voting in these pioneer territories. Instead, voters in these areas often voted OHR – then the party in power, or the nationalistic LDPR.

In the Soviet period, collective farms and state farms of the fertile Siberian south became important producers of sugar beets and several cereals. The Soviet state guaranteed fixed prices for these agricultural products. When the post-Soviet marketization policies started, the big collective and state farms in southern Siberia appeared to be in a similar adverse situation to that of the collective farms and state farms in the Black Earth of European Russia.

In Siberia, the areas of change in occidentalist voting (Yenisey and Amur RMRs) are the least populated, and least developed. These two regional units have had different Soviet development histories. The Yenisey region (especially within Krasnoyask Kray during Soviet times) received very significant investments in various energy and non-ferrous metal ore mining and processing, such as, the hydroelectric dams on the Yenisey and its tributaries, the low-grade Kansk-Achinsk coal mining project, aluminum production and the metallurgical complex at Noril’sk. The hydroelectric projects on the Zeya and Amur Rivers in Amur Oblast were initiated later than those in the Yenisey region. The Amur region includes an agricultural south and scarcely populated north rich in timber and other resources. Compared to the Yenisey RMR, the Amur RMR is less urbanized and industrialized. While products from both regions entered international markets during the Soviet era, metals from the Noril’sk complex were the leading export commodities whereas timber led Amur Oblast exports. Perhaps, the dynamics of this response has a distinct logic, independent of the spatial logic of change in occidentalist voting in European Russia. Compared to 1917, the Yenisey RMR in 1995 demonstrated a significant growth of the popularity of the pro-Western parties. Quite the opposite, the occidentalists in the Amur area were less influential in 1995 than in 1917.

Short-term changes in the economic situation did not affect, at least directly, the change/continuity pattern of the occidentalist voting. Zones of continuity as well as the zones of change of occidentalist voting may not depend on the economic situation (Smirnyagin & Bylov 1995). For example, post-Soviet relatively prosperous (often, the peripheries of the RMRs are crisis-ridden while the RMRs urban centers have not undergone as serious an economic depression) Irkutsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Kazan’, are regions of continuity in occidentalist voting. Economically prosperous Yenisey and Samara are regions of change in the occidentalist voting. In this case in the former regions the percent of occidentalist voting remained similar whereas in Yenisey and Samara the percent of occidentalist voting increased.

This finding raises again the question of Russian localism, now in terms of continuity/change. Geographers have talked about the issue many times. Yuri Medvedkov, Olga Medvedkov, and George Hudson (1996) discussed diffusion models while studying the Duma election of 1993. All large cities in the world have certain comparative advantages and live by the concentration of resources. These conditions are different, however, from those existent in Russia’s core, where little or no reciprocal benefits spread to the periphery, or at least, these benefits spatially drop off very quickly away from individual Russian cities. Spatial diffusion, trickle-down processes represent one form of reciprocity. Innovation diffusions are another form. According to these authors, neither has yet succeeded very well in Russia’s case.

The diffusion of innovations is concerned with technological innovations where there are relatively clear criteria of efficiency. This is more problematic and often much less clear-cut in the case of political movements. However, new information technology innovations may have consequences for the space and time characteristics of a country (see ZumBrunnen & Trumbull 2003). The continuity/change models at the guberniya-level or geographic scale are exactly the cases where using diffusion models may not yet be appropriate. It seems as though Russian localism is a manifestation of regional political cultures.

      PSR/LDPR: continuity and change in fundamentalist allegiance

The social structure of the PSR and LDPR voters is very different, that is, socialist revolutionaries enjoyed the support of peasants in rural settlements while Zhirinovsky’s party counted on the votes of industrial male workers in middle/small-sized cities. Next, the PSR mirrored authentically deep social and economic cleavages (e.g., “authoritarian particularism” vs. “occidentalist cosmopolitism,” “Westerners” vs. “Eurasianists,” “rural fundamentalism” vs. “industrial socialism,” “landed interests” vs. “industrial interests”) whereas the LDPR was created, in fact, “from the top” and merely tried and continues to try to exploit the cleavages and conflicts (e.g., “authoritarian particularism” vs. “occidentalist cosmopolitism,” “Westerners” vs. “neo-Eurasianists”) (see Perepechko et al 2006). We nevertheless believe that uncovering the change/continuity geography for this pair of parties seems useful and instructive.

The geography of the LDPR votes is strongly correlated with geographies of the PSR and to a lesser extent with Bolshevik votes (Table 5). Both geographies are not strongly differentiated. This indicates that the PSR reflected and the LDPR attempts to take advantage of the two acute all-Russian problems: (1) the PSR demanded expropriation of land without compensation to the owners and (2) as Breslauer and Dale (1997; see also Gaidar, 2007) argue the LDPR makes the most of the all-Russian anger as a corollary of a “post-imperial trauma”. Russia’s central, “cosmopolitan” RMRs around St. Petersburg and Moscow and also central non-Russian Muslim RMRs (Kazan’, Ufa) illustrate voting list support for socialist revolutionaries in the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and for Zhirinovsky’s party in the parliamentary election of 1995. Both the PSR and the LDPR, in effect, represent different parts of the same Russian hinterland and are united by the rural, peasant, collectivist and paternalistic characteristics of Russia’s authentic political culture.

Existing in the small/middle-sized cities and rural settlements, this is, in fact, a political culture on the all-Russian scale. It appears that the impact of this political culture on the geography of voting for the PSR and the LDPR is stronger than the generic and institutional differences between these parties (PSR was formed by territorial diffusion and was internally and extra-nationally legitimated and centralized party organization; on the contrary, LDPR was formed by territorial penetration and was externally legitimated, pure charismatic and strongly centralized organization). It seems as though different social bases and gender ratios are less important than the local settings for socioeconomic and political interactions. For example, in 1917 both male and female peasants who lived in rural areas or small/middle-sized cities voted for the PSR, whereas in 1995 male blue-collar workers in rural areas and small/middle-sized cities voted for the LDPR. In other words, local settings can be strong enough to “transmit” collective memories or political culture even through a long-standing totalitarian political regime.

The model for the PSR voting in 1917 using urbanization, petty-bourgeoisie, machinery and metal working industry variables in the pre-Revolutionary period and the model for the LDPR voting in 1995 using urbanization, petty-bourgeoisie, machinery and metal working industry in the post-Soviet period demonstrate the following pattern of continuity and change.

Of 37 RMRs, 22 are revealed as regions of change whereas 15 RMRs are the regions of continuity. Therefore, change occurred in only 40.5% of the cases.

In 48.6% of the cases, the fundamentalist continuity/change spatial pattern (PSR/LDPR) is a geographical inversion of the occidentalist continuity/change spatial patterns (CD/DCR and CD/Yabloko). The Northwest and North (the stronghold of occidentalists) and the Central Black Earth (the citadel of fundamentalists) have the most inverse patterns (Table 6). The inversion between the fundamentalist and occidentalist continuity/change patterns is significant also in the pro-Western oriented Center and the Urals. Perhaps, strong indexes of inversion reflect a stable “areal differentiation” in the fundamentalists/occidentalists conflict. Of the twenty RMRs constituting the Russian historical core, similarity between the fundamentalist and occidentalist continuity/change patterns is found only in 5 RMRs (Tambov, Kostroma, Smolensk, Vladimir, and Yaroslavl’).

Table 6. Inversion between the occidentalist and fundamentalist continuity/change patterns

Historical cultural region	Index of inversion
North-West and North	1.00
Central Black Earth	0.80
Center	0.67
Urals	0.67
North Caucasus	0.50
Volgo-Vyatka and Volga	0.22
Siberia and Far East	0.17

Source: Compiled by the first author.

The “similarity” between the fundamentalist and occidentalist continuity/change patterns is salient in Siberia and the Far East and within the Volgo-Vyatka and Volga regions. These small indexes of inversion indicate a weak areal differentiation within each region. The inversion between the fundamentalist and occidentalist continuity/change patterns is found only for “more Russian” Nizhny Novgorod and Samara RMRs. In the areas with substantial national and religious minorities the patterns are similar. The similarity in these RMRs may point out the inadequacy of PSR/LDPR, CD/DCR, and CD/Yabloko continuity/change patterns for detecting the areal differentiation. Information about the nationality and the religion of voters is absent in our database. Accordingly, the demographic, socioeconomic, and political explanatory variables, utilized in the models, may be not sufficient to detect inversion/similarity.

In terms of the models used, the depopulation and urbanization processes that occurred in the former rural areas in the European North did not favor fundamentalists. On the other hand, it is even more difficult to explain the case of the Chernozem soil belt (Central Black Earth and Volga). Western RMRs of this macro-region show signs of continuity and the eastern ones show signs of change. We theorize that continuity in the western RMRs of the Chernozem belt was brought about by an overlap between a high support for the PSR and LDPR in this macro-region. However, high support for the PSR in all guberniyas of 1917 in the Chernozem macro-region has one (and the same) reason while high support for the LDPR in the western RMRs and low support in the eastern RMRs of 1995 in the Chernozem macro-region have rather two (different) reasons as we discuss below.

After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the redistribution of lands, the peasants in the Chernozem areas lost part of their land holdings. The peasants of these areas protested the status quo and voted for the PSR. It is not surprising that our model poorly (o≤0.9) explains this major reason of voting for the PSR in the Chernozem region (except the Chernigov RMR; but about three quarters of its territory is located on the Ukraine side of the post-Soviet Russian-Ukraine boundary); we simply do not have better socioeconomic predictor describing this reason.

In the parliamentary election of 1995, the high support for the LDPR in the Chernozem belt expresses the vote of industrial male workers in a relatively dense system of small/middle-sized cities moderately impacted by late Soviet modernization efforts. Also, many of these voters are Russian “rurbanites” without adequate housing and decent jobs in the cities and loyal to a rural home. These voters with dual identities can be easily mobilized by the nationalist and left parties. Our model predicts well (o≥1.1) an ontological insecurity in more Russian western border RMRs of the Chernozem macro-region (Kursk, Tambov, Voronezh) due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Our demographic and socioeconomic predictors are, however, much less useful (o≤0.9) in explaining the vote for LDPR in more ethnically and religiously diverse eastern RMRs (e.g., Saratov, Samara, Simbirsk) of the Chernozem belt. The numerous Tatar, Mordvinian, and Kazakh voters living in these eastern areas have never voted for Zhirinovsky. As a result, western RMRs of the Chernozem region show signs of continuity and the east ones show signs of change.

 Discussion: the empire strikes back?

 Based on this new measurement framework, comprehensive database and probit analysis, the following two-part research question was addressed. Are contemporary geographical patterns of the occidentalist parties associated with Soviet modernization efforts whereas the geographical patterns of the fundamentalist parties are associated with regional political cultures?

Demographic, socioeconomic, and geometric spatial features seem to be links between the voting in pre-Revolutionary and post-Soviet Russia albeit our data and models are not sufficient to infer the continuity/change in the least populated and the least developed Yenisey and Amur RMRs. Indeed, regional political cultures and Soviet developmental efforts (modernization) are two major phenomena that affected the continuity/change in the Constituent Assembly election of 1917 and the Duma election of 1995. Modernization radically changed and reshaped institutions. It was, however, less successful on the level of non-institutionalized regional and social group loyalties.

Regional political identities in post-Soviet Russia do not need to be invented and assembled from scratch, as some political scientists claim (for example, see Fish 1995). By the time of the Duma election of 1995 the occidentalists/fundamentalist conflict was strident in the strongholds of pro-Westerners (Northwest and North, Center and the Urals) and in a citadel of the third-way political tradition (the Central Black Earth). Soviet developmental efforts have altered (not unified) the country’s political space. Political preferences of the Russian electorate are developed not in a void, but in a hierarchy of places. The processes of collectivization, industrialization, urbanization, and cultural revolution have changed and “repackaged” these places. Localities have developed, changed, and differentiated within raion/gorsovet power containers during the Soviet period.

      “Successful” modernization… But at what human toll?

Patterns of occidentalist and fundamentalist voting are quite different for 1917 and 1995. The impact of Soviet developmental efforts (modernization) on contemporary pro-Western voting is three-to-four times stronger than the influence of the pre-Revolutionary political regionalism. The influence of modernization on contemporary fundamentalist voting is weaker and is comparable to the impact of pre-Revolutionary regionalism. Overall, modernization engenders support for the occidentalists, while political regionalism engenders support for the fundamentalists.

In comparison with the pre-Revolutionary period, human domination of post-Soviet space became denser. When fast economic, social and administrative changes began most post-Soviet citizens routinely interacted in urban public and private locale settings inherited from the Soviet and pre-Revolutionary periods. By the time of the election of 1995, post-Soviet urbanization came out as a powerful predictor of modernization and of change in the pro-Western voting.

The number of Post-Soviet petty-bourgeoisie engaged in the new economy is also a significant predictor of modernization and of change in the radically pro-Western voting (DCR). Not unlike in 1917, the petty-bourgeoisie in 1995 was dissatisfied with radical socioeconomic changes. Soviet cities have comprised dormant locales for breeding of the petty bourgeois. Commercial and services areas in the public space and separate (occasionally communal) apartments in the private space of the capital or large city are the examples of these locales.

Pre-Soviet occidentalist political culture (Kadet voting) is a significant predictor of continuity in radically pro-Western voting (DCR) and moderately pro-Western voting (Yabloko). This fact indicates that not unlike in 1917, intelligentsia in 1995 received strong inspiration from the liberal tradition and from the development of democratic political institutions in Western Europe. In this sense the intelligentsia’s support for occidentalists was and is value-rational (Weber 1978), that is, determined by a conscious belief in Western values and institutions for their own sake. The influence of pre-Soviet liberal political culture on the post-Soviet occidentalist voting also suggests that the Soviet intelligentsia was a custodian of the collective memories about the pre-Soviet past. These memories had been processing in the locales-refuges. When the Soviet totalitarian regime failed, intellectuals mobilized memories about liberal political traditions in pre-Soviet Russia and converted them to votes for pro-Western political parties.

The political space of successful modernization and change in the occidentalist voting reflects a more modern, pro-Western class-based politics. This space is, however, limited and – as the Duma elections of 2003 and 2007 warned – may well not be long lived. In comparison with Western parliamentary democracies, the socio-spatial structure of Russian society was not and is not developed sufficiently. The spatial extent of the high social strata, especially the old Soviet intelligentsia and new bourgeoisie, has still not diffused far from the capitals and large cities. The space of modernization and change in the pro-Western voting comprises the inner, continental Russian core, early-modernized territories (i.e., Urals and Volgo-Vyatka) and commercial export centers in the maritime European North and maritime European South. In terms of our data and probit models, Soviet modernization efforts produced larger and better urban environments and succeeded in the social sphere (improvements in public health, a universally and well-educated population, major advances in science, engineering, and technology), but also achieved these at a very heavy human toll.

      Flawed modernization

Our economic variable (the machinery and metalworking industry) is a negligible predictor of modernization and of change in the occidentalist voting (DCR and Yabloko) and in the fundamentalist voting (LDPR). During this recent post-Soviet time of market reforms, many cities with large machine building and metal-working plants became a “rustbelt” with low chances of industrial reconstruction and modernization. Residing in microraions, educated, skilled workers and white-collar personnel faced unemployment. Attempting to preserve their industrial towns from market reforms and from international competition, they pleaded with the central government for help and pledged their support to the pro-government OHR, the party of the prime minister (Perepechko et al 2006).

This is evidence of flawed modernization by the force of totalitarianism. It appears that the Russian locales described by our economic variable (such as a machinery plant) are not global. Technological characteristics of a machinery plant in Russia may be comparable to technological characteristics of an analogous plant in Western Europe or North America. But labor and management are what really make the machinery plant in Russia different. Gaidar or Yavlinsky were sympathetic to a combination of Russian administration, management and markets for labor with Western technological settings. In other words, interactions on the plant floor can be strong enough to disrupt foci for interactions.

Regions and nodes of the military industrial complex and of the oil and natural gas industries, the two other focal points of Soviet development efforts, were not among the locations in Russia where modernization and change in the occidentalist voting (DCR and Yabloko) materialized. Adapting munitions factories to the civilian market was challenging in the extreme. Military personnel from the barracks and hostels at military locations and testing sites voted for OHR because their commanders ordered them to do so. Oil and natural gas workers living in new settlements of urban type and small/middle-sized towns dependent on the patronage of the central government voted for OHR or the nationalist LDPR.

The space of flawed modernization is comprised of the newly industrialized territories of Russia. Machinery and metal working plants in large cities (for example, Barnaul and Novosibirsk), parts of the military industrial complex, especially in Siberia, and oil and natural gas fields in central and northern areas of West Siberia do not predict modernization and continuity in the pro-Western voting and suggest that late Soviet industrialization was anything but successful.

      “Restoration” juxtaposed by modernization?

In the 1995, Duma election fundamentalists mastered Russian political space. Pre-Soviet political regionalism (PSR and Bolshevik turnouts) is a strong predictor of continuity in fundamentalist (LDPR) voting. The Russian rural area is composed both of an egalitarian community of numerous small holders of personal plots and units dominated by highly stratified areal (collective farm, raion, oblast, federal district) and corporatist (the departments of agriculture of regional and district administrations) structures.

Since elimination of the kulaks and establishment of the internal passport system at the very beginning of the 1930s, the Soviet and then post-Soviet state assured domination over the public and – to a significant extent – the private sphere in rural areas. The Soviet state did not eliminate the traditional status structures in the rural areas. They replaced the peasant egalitarian and patriarchal authoritarian household with the peasant nuclear family (Jowitt 1992; Todd 2004). At the same time, the Soviets replaced the paternal rule of the manor-house with the paternal rule of the corporate-state bureaucracy. Equality was “achieved” by the expropriation of the rural land, and paternalism outweighed egalitarianism.

The collectivization can be seen as a “restoration” of pre-Stolypin communal order and an attempt to modernize (mechanization, electrification, resettlement) this order by the force of the totalitarian state. As a result, a communal mir changed into a collective farm; a strip transformed into a personal plot; a rod split into an urban part and a rural part of a kinship-community with an older generation often living in a rural izba and a younger generation residing in a separate apartment in a mikroraion; a landlord changed to a state bureaucrat; and large scale, export-oriented enterprises created by manorial lords within their authoritarian households evolved into APCs (agro-industrial complexes). Pre-Soviet rural, peasant, collectivist and egalitarian patriarchal authoritarian political culture has mutated into rural, peasant, collectivist and paternalistic political culture. The Soviet state repacked customs and ancient structures of political life in raion administrative power containers and finely adapted the political behavior of its voters to the new conditions.

By the time of the 1995 election the village remained the customary settlement form in rural Russia and the personal plot was the primary source of the household economy. Post-Soviet marketization forces became a fact, and collective farms and state farms sought protection from inflation and from the foreign importation of farm produce. The marketization efforts “alienated” villages and collectivist rural communities from “modern” urban areas (Allardt & Valen 1981; Rokkan 1966) “responsible” for the “shock therapy”, privatization and individualism.

Pro-Western newcomers could neither penetrate nor mobilize these sparsely populated rural communities by deploying institutional channels such as a raion administration. After the disbanding of the CPSU, the corporate-state bureaucracy retained economic, administrative, and political control over these locales on the territories with a historical fundamentalist voting. In villages and rural communities local bosses did not encourage voters to vote for occidentalist newcomers. As a result, the old regime parties (those registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Soviet Union on the eve of the communist collapse, the LDPR (Golosov 2004) and the CPRF sanctified by the CPSU at the moment of its disbanding) gained the votes of the collective farms and state farms. Not unlike the Constituent Assembly election of 1917, the population of entire villages and even raions voted as a herd and cast nothing but one party votes.

Proxy variables for modernization still predict fundamentalist reactions against occidentalist modernization. Even areas that show strong support for fundamentalists were industrialized and urbanized. Workers and city-dwellers in these regions, compared to workers and city-dwellers elsewhere, are relatively supportive of post-Soviet fundamentalists. In the parliamentary election of 1995 city-dwellers in Nizhniy Novgorod voted for Gaidar while city-dwellers in Stavropol’ voted for Zhirinovsky.

During the Soviet period, an otkhodnik transformed to a rurbanite. Soviet developmental efforts “moved” tens of millions of migrants to cities. In many parts of Russia cities however did not provide these migrants with adequate housing and decent jobs. Typically industrial workers, the rurbanites, resided in poorly maintained hostels, communal apartments, or privately owned houses (frequently substandard and not integrated into the municipal water and sewer networks) of small and middle towns moderately impacted by modernization efforts. Soviet development in these locales and nodes was a failure in that it resulted in a large part of the countryside and many small and even middle towns becoming places of economic and moral stagnation and decay. Thus, not surprisingly, the nationalist and left parties could easily mobilize the socially uprooted rurbanites.

The political space of failed modernization and of continuity in fundamentalist voting includes the Russian hinterland, especially the more recently urbanized and modernized territories (i.e., Central Black Earth, Nechernozem’e, fertile Siberian South) and western border regions affected by post-imperial trauma as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Implications for Russian democracy

By comparison with fundamentalist voting, occidentalist voting is much more responsive to modernization. Yet, modernization phases of Russian history and politics are shorter than the orientalist ones. Nonetheless, our research strongly supports the idea that locales, nodes, and areas of Russia’s political space have a capacity to maintain a continuity between electoral patterns produced by two consecutive occidentalist cycles of Russian politics and history. Within the Russian realm similar localities can produce similar geographical voting patterns for occidentalist and fundamentalist political tendencies in 1917 and 1995. The structure, logic and dynamics of the political space of Russia may not be “hopelessly incomparable” with the structure, logic and dynamics of the political space of some European countries.

It is not clear how much reforms and political culture explain the change and continuity in voting for different families of political parties in the elections of 1999, 2003, and 2007. Reforms of the political party system in the 2000s is, in fact, an attempt to leave voters with no choice but to vote for a pro-government party (Golosov 2008). This political engineering can be seen as a partial restoration of pre-Yeltsin order since it has forced an expansion of fundamentalist voting and a contraction of occidentalist voting.

This political engineering has an elegant geographic alternative. Intelligently designed and carefully implemented reforms of raion-level administrative territorial divisions might accelerate fragmentation of fundamentalists and play into the hands of the pro-reform parties. Altered “geometric” characteristics of raion/gorsovet administrative territorial division could “rewire” locales and thus potentially create a major challenge to the developed and smoothly functioning networks of the regional and local organizations of old regime fundamentalist parties (LDPR and CPRF). Redrawing the raion map of Russia all at once is a potentially risky enterprise since it involves a great deal of uncertainty. The current municipal reform being implemented since 2006 delegates the right to redraw the administrative map to regional/republican authorities. Generally, it radically changes the map at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy and considerably increases the number of these lowest level territorial units called volosts, but only rarely touches the level of raions, which became the second level of the local governments. Moreover, because of the insufficient and unprofitable tax basis even raions and small and middle towns still remain completely dependent on funding from the upper levels, and hence, have been vulnerable to the recentralization of political power currently underway in Russia.

Increasing the number of volosts concurs with the de-secularization of education and civic society in Russia. New churches, parish services, and church charities have been mushrooming in post-Soviet Russia. In pre-Soviet Russia the volost was a natural place (administrative container) for a church to operate, proliferate, and proselytize. Building spiritual communities (sobornost’) and creating parish services, clergy in post-Soviet Russia actively mobilize collective memories spatialized in local landscapes (for example, cemeteries or religious monuments), customs and ceremonies. In doing so, Eastern Orthodoxy establishes a grip upon private and public space of Russia’s authentic political culture in local communities – especially in rural and small/middle-sized towns. The only pre-Soviet institution which managed to survive the totalitarian regime, the Russian Orthodox Church, might ultimately manage, at least partially, to restitute its land holdings confiscated after the Bolshevik Revolution and, thus, to become an employer for the local populace. If on top of that new volost boundaries would overlap the parish boundaries, then a political clericalism in post-Soviet Russia is a matter of time. The rise of these neo-fundamentalists could technically be hold in check by a pro-government neo-totalitarian party relying upon the densely developed neighborhood-based and workplace-based cells. Hence, institutions and people in charge of drawing the boundaries of volosts would be dealing with a special form of the gerrymandering in which volost boundaries may be used to help either pro-governmental party constituents or neo-fundamentalist constituents.

In Russia pro-Westerners were usually modernizers, but modernizers were not pro-Westerners. As some observers (such as Huntington 1997) point out, historically in Russia the centralization of power is a prerequisite of social and economic reforms. Our research suggests that modernization by the force of centralism in the form of Soviet totalitarianism was a poor “democratizer” of Russia’s political space. In the 2000s Russia has entered a new phase of recentralization. It remains to be seen whether new political leaders will take into account the lessons of the rise and fall of Bolshevik developmental efforts.

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