By Alexander Perepechko

Published on November 23, 2014

Why did Barack Obama not take the initiative in reforming the American ruling class? Why could he not find ways to reach consensus among clashing political elites? Why did he choose to abandon normative politics and switch to post-modernism? Are theorists of elites right that in a multi-racial, multi-religious, multi ethnic or socially complex state the ruling class should be recruited almost exclusively from the dominant majority? Although his campaign was monitored and analyzed by innumerable observers of all calibers, one can hardly find answers to these questions.

In reality, freedom of speech and political discourse in the United States are framed by a two-party system: to criticize American politics one has to take a stand for one of the two major parties and direct his or her critics against the other major party. One shortcoming of this approach is that Democrats avoid criticizing Republicans (and Republicans avoid condemning Democrats) when the critique can be used against their own political party. The Machiavellian school allows one to overcome this and some other drawbacks while studying politics in this country. The Machiavellian approach already helped us to discern (see my October 15, 2012 post) that beliefs and doctrines in America quickly lose meaning. At the same time, norms, institutions, and changes in the ruling class increasingly fall behind the changes in beliefs and doctrines. Instead of reforming old norms, institutions and the ways in which elites renew, the American ruling class empties beliefs and doctrines of their original meaning. Drained of a “political epistemology”, a citizen might find it difficult to grasp the meaning of some of the moves of the American ruling class and key political actors. While the White House team prepares its lame duck agenda in the aftermath of the 2014 election, we will scrutinize Obama’s maneuvers through the lens of the theory of elites.
Continue reading Why did Obama not find ways to reach consensus among clashing political elites? (Part 1) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 15, 2012

According to theorists of elites (Mosca, 1939: 105), in a multi-racial, multi-religious, multi ethnic or socially complex state the ruling class should be recruited nearly exclusively from the dominant majority. A subjected minority group almost always has its own elite. Its upper stratum often is the first to be absorbed by majority rulers. Cooptation starts with minority leaders who are willing to cooperate and – often – give up essential interests of the group they represent. In my opinion, this reasoning is not convincing. It is known that when a minority group has particular memories of a glorious or tragic national past or a sense of group superiority, this group’s leaders are unlikely to be assimilated. Certainly, the massive “non-white” vote for Obama in 2008 (Gurfinkiel, 2012) reflects an upheaval of identity in America. That was the year when for the first time in American history more non-white than white babies were born. In several decades America will be a country with a new identity and new work ethic. But does this necessarily mean that Obama is not assimilated? It seems to me that Barack Hussein Obama II can represent various racial, ethnic, religious and cultural groups of citizens (Melber, 2012) better than Willard Mitt Romney. Also, social groups such as old aristocracies, immigrants, refugees and foreigners can hardly assimilate at all. In countries like the United States the Catholic clergy can take leadership roles in immigrant populations. At the same time, the Holy See is not thrilled about the assimilation of Catholic priests in the United States: the Vatican would like to have Roman Catholics in America, not American Catholics. For this reason, Popes send more Italian and Irish bishops to America to replace those who are presumably assimilated by the politics of cooptation. Therefore, modification of the ruling class can lead to situations in which minority elites represent both majority and racial, ethnic, religious and other groups in a country.
Continue reading If reelected could Obama find ways to reach consensus among clashing political elites? →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 3, 2012

Theorists of elites have shown that a foundation mythology would not be sufficient to provide a political consensus for the ongoing political process in America. The ways in which the ruling class renews its membership are of critical importance for the future of this country. Elite-related theories state that elites vary with respect to the number and rank of social forces which they represent (control, conciliate, tolerate, stimulate or create). There has to be a certain correlation between the dynamics of elites and the dynamics of social forces in a country (Mosca, 1972: xix). I have provided examples to show that electoral and parliamentary mechanisms are not the only means of this renewal. The theory of elites emphasizes important challenges pertaining to the modification of the ruling class.

Firstly, when the ruling class can no longer deliver crucial services to society, this ruling class is no longer relevant. In the 21^st century, neo-conservatives failed to deliver security to Americans, and neo-liberals denied many Americans (leaving aside immigrants, refugees and foreigners!) the American dream. Electoral, parliamentary and political party mechanisms are not enough anymore to fix the long-lasting structural crisis. Important rules by which the ruling class renews itself need to be changed. Otherwise, a structural crisis can turn in a systemic crisis.
Continue reading Theory of elites on the renewal of the ruling class →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on July 5, 2012

We continue the literature review of the major theories about elites.

For the American ruling class protecting the foundation mythology is a matter of survival. Otherwise, this ruling class will need to tell the American people who they are and why they are what they are. But such a confession can be suicidal for elites because Americans do not want to give up their status as “demi-gods”. When the center of world power moved from France to England and later from England to the United States the ruling class of the declining power relatively easily adapted to the new situation. This happened because these shifts took place within West. The upcoming change in world leadership involves the rise of Sinic (China) and Hindu (India) civilizations and the end of the 500 year (note this number one more time; we will come back to it in a future essay) leadership of the West. India and especially China belong to conflict-ridden civilizations, dominated and humiliated in the past by western countries. In the forthcoming new world, Chinese and Indian elites will set up and impose new rules. In this forthcoming new world, will the American ruling class be willing to adjust to these rules and follow them? Will it be willing to learn and speak foreign languages? Will it be willing to change behavior? How will it explain the decline of America to the American people? American elites know that revising these myths can cost them this country. And without this country American oligarchs (not unlike some Russian oligarchs in exile – disgusting outcasts in their villas) might drain the bitter cup. Even “intellectual elites”—such as post-modernist gurus and Marxist ringleaders, promoting ideologies of globalization and internationalism—do not want to live the lives of pariahs abroad!

Meanwhile, slow corrosion of the independence mythology is underway. It goes in three directions. Firstly, the divine component of the independence myth fades due to a decrease in religiosity (Douthat, 2012; Howard, 2011; Shifting, 2009). Current religious revivalism and charisms have slowed down this trend, but it is not clear whether they will reverse the trend. Secondly, post-modernists and globalists revise the doctrine of the sovereign state and reshape and restructure the theory and practice of the sovereignty of the people. Electoral, parliamentary and other democratic mechanisms are used extensively to replace the “power of the majority” by the power of minorities and constructed surrogates. Thirdly, immigrants, refugees and foreigners are not eager to accept American foundation mythology. Since this population comprises tens of millions (illegal immigrants alone in America include 12-13 million) and immigration today is one of the major campaign issues, we need to write a few words about this attitude.
Continue reading Game of elites: using xenophobia to unite the populace →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on July 4, 2012

How does myth work?

Philosophical foundations for the analysis of myth have been outlined by Henri-Louis Bergson and developed in behavioral science.

According to this approach, there are two different selves: ourselves and outside ourselves (Bergson, 1950). We are very concerned about what others think of us. We speak rather than think, and we are acted on rather than act ourselves. “Living” outside of ourselves in this way involves a perception of time as a quantitative measure of information observed and stored in memory (Ornstein, 1969). This is about chronological (clock) time. The duration of chronological time is indirectly constructed from the quantity of information stored in the memory. Clock time is used to measure and spread out events, states and intervals (Figure 2).
Continue reading Game of elites: using myths to maintain utopias (part 2) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 22, 2012

It takes a lot of time and effort to build a modern nation-state. Several generations of Americans have built a strong state. This state can withstand wars, civil conflicts and terrorist attacks. In terms of our research, however, this state can be a fragile construction.

The failure of the American Leviathan is foreseeable. Experts (such as Carroll & Hameiri, 2011; Ivashov, 2007) estimate that the stated US dollar amounts in the accounts of individuals, organizations and states’ currency reserves are illusory. These accounts are not secured by products, valuables or anything that exists in reality. The mass of US currency exceeds the total worth of US assets (industries, buildings, etc.) more than ten-fold. Paying off US indebtedness to the rest of the world would turn the majority of Americans into new paupers. Deindustrialization and an obsolete political system make America’s future even murkier (L’erreur fatale, 2011; Zakaria, 2011). Who is to blame for these strategic miscalculations? Al Qaeda, the Taliban and terrorists? Brazilian industrialists? Telecommunication service providers in India? Human rights offenders in China and Russia? Immigrants, refugees and foreigners?
Continue reading Game of elites: using myths to maintain utopias (part 1) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 22, 2012

Why do rulers need to identify themselves with myths, beliefs or doctrines? Mosca (1939: 80) asserts that great human masses can be organized around and ruled by only generally accepted and recognized abstract universal principles. Human beings more readily defer to abstract universal ideas than to the will of individual persons. It is easier for the majority to accept rule by the minority in the form of an abstraction or myth than to accept direct rule by the ruling class. The ruling class justifies its rule by institutions and moral and legal norms which are in turn based on myths, beliefs and doctrines. Elites act through hierarchies of functionaries (bureaucracies), which guide a society materially and morally toward goals (Mosca, 1972: 1, 268). These ends conform to the visions of the ruling class and at times are desired by the masses. Figure 1 depicts major elements of the political cultural system of society offered by Mosca. Some elements of this system will be discussed later on.

Figure 1. Political Cultural System of Society (Source: Generated by the author based on Mosca, 1939 & 1972).

Rational or supernatural, universal or particularistic, principles and ideas are always bounded with material interests of elites. A considerable part of a ruling class is filled with these doctrines and beliefs and propagates and keeps them alive in the masses. The consent of masses depends upon the extent to which the governed believe in the values and ideas by which the ruling class justifies its rule. Societies in decline (manufacturing falls, middle class shrinks, bureaucracies grow, taxes increase and immigration decreases) become old because at such times doctrines and beliefs, on which social and political institutions are grounded, gradually are discredited. Accordingly, common action in an aging society becomes hardly possible. At the moment when the majority of those who joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were cynics who pursued only material and career interests and disregarded principles on which the USSR had been created the country was doomed.

The concept of the political cultural system outlined by Mosca is helpful in understanding changes in recent society. The fashion in which the ruling class is formed and the way in which norms and institutions are shaped must be suited to myths, beliefs and doctrines prevailing in the given society in its historical period. Therefore, a ruling class that bases its power on the divine needs to be formed differently from a ruling class that justifies its powers on popular sovereignty and democratic consensus (Mosca, 1972: 2, 249). For example, the Koran is Bible and Law in one (see Leroy-Beaulieu, 1991). It is the word of the Prophet that takes the place of law. Since customs and laws are sanctified to eternity by religion, Islamic societies tend to be immobile and lean to theocracy. On the contrary, the Bible has very few principles directly pertaining to political life. It is not surprising that the secular state is a feature of the West. Without seriously taking into account this crucial difference, any American project about “democratization” of Southwest Asia and North African countries seems murky. European elites learned long ago (for example, from the writings of Vicenzo Cuoco at the end of the 18^th century (Germino, 1979: 231)) that norms and institutions cannot be made similar for different countries, that norms and institutions result from the past of a country, and that they should fit the country’s history. Perhaps this fact partially explains why European colonialism was “more successful” than recent American attempts to “export” the ballot box or American democracy. These attempts have cost many thousands of human lives and hundreds billions of dollars.

In Southwest Asia and North Africa, neoconservatives would like to change the organization of local elites using coup d’état and create new institutions and norms using war and occupation. But these techniques do not produce corresponding changes in myths, beliefs and doctrines. Quite the contrary, these approaches can harden Islamic tradition and catalyze radical Islam. Neo-liberals are more prone to work at the grassroots level via NGOs and educational, public health, youth and other organizations. Neo-liberals are also more eager to use public relations experts and broadcast networks to reshape traditions in the Southwest Asian and North African societies. A mild modernization effort can also be a part of this approach. Neo-liberal approaches can to some extent succeed in emptying Islamic ideas and norms and eventually produce some changes in beliefs and institutions, but this can take decades. Also, it is hard to predict how stable imitative atheism is in Muslim countries. Current transformations in Tunisia (but also in Libya (Libyan General, 2012)) are not very encouraging. Ruling classes in Muslim countries are not willing to quietly observe and accept the situation when “infidels” proselytize new ideas. This ruling class is well aware that these changes would cause its transformation and jeopardize its power.

Table 1. Examples of the Failed Paths to Democracy after the End of the Cold War

Source: Generated by the author.

Table 1 illustrates that American foreign policy in Southwest Asia and North Africa has not worked because factors outlined by Mosca have been ignored. An attempt to export the ballot box and democratic institutions plays a key role in most of these scenarios. At the same time, the citizens in Southwest Asia and North Africa have not received a satisfactory answer to the question: “What ends will the ballot box and other democratic means serve in Muslim countries?”

Germino, D. (1979) Modern Western Political Thought: Machiavelli to Marx. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Leroy-Beaulieu, A. (1991) L’Empire des tzars et les Russes. Paris: R. Laffont.

Libyan General National Congress elections results, 2012. Available at http://maplecroft.com/map-of-the-week/2012/30/.

Mosca, G. (1972) A Short History of Political Philosophy. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Mosca, G. (1939) The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza Politica). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 16, 2012

Elections and political equality in a modern state facilitate access to membership in the ruling class to people with specialized knowledge and a scientific education. However, Mosca observed that hereditary mechanisms obstructed the access of intellectually superior individuals to elites. All things being equal, candidates who have political influence (often hereditary) and candidates whose leadership qualities were formed in the milieu of wealth, social and residential segregation and in their particular upbringing are successful in democratic elections.

At the same time, when the infrastructure of elites and the infrastructure of the masses become disconnected, these elites lose the support of ordinary citizens (Mosca, 1939: 111-113). Life in an exclusive infrastructure is to a significant extent accountable for the ignorance of the ruling class. Elites endure and permit practices that can ruin the rulers and the ruled. For example, rulers increasingly turn elections from a tool of representation into a tool by which certain political forces are enabled to control and limit the activity of other political forces (Democrats vs. Republicans, open system elites vs. closed system elites, etc.).
Continue reading Mosca on the dynamics of elites (part 2) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 31, 2012

Gaetano Mosca knew that elites do not like to be studied. But the faltering parliamentary regime in Italy in the late 19^th –early 20^th century worried him. Mosca thought that the ruling class was behind these political troubles. In his seminal The Ruling Class and A Short History of Political Philosophy, he investigated how the manner in which the ruling class renews its membership has a crucial impact on the prosperity of countries. Mosca applied the notion of the ruling class merely to political activities. One of the founding fathers of the Machiavellian school of thought, Mosca is also known as an architect of comparative political analysis and in some way an opponent of democracy. Qualities of rulers, prevailing political ideas and values, ineffectiveness of elections and leadership selection were among Mosca’s major concerns. His work is important for understanding the dynamics of elites in present-day America, where the political regime malfunctions and the political system possibly suffers systemic failure.

Mosca (1939) had no confidence in the inborn “good sense” of the masses or that man is born “good”. He also understood well that since politicians and administrators manage the public wealth, political and administrative heads are far more powerful than affluent citizens. Mosca believed that the qualities of people who govern are crucial. Following L’Ancien Régime of Taine (1986), Mosca was convinced that the decadence of the ruling class leads to major upheavals and revolutions. He was well aware that many elected officials (politicians) advocate moral principles to achieve power, but when in power these same politicians often rule without regard to moral principles. In addition to qualities described by Machiavelli, Mosca considers energy, capacity for work, personal courage and ability to make sacrifices as essential to politicians. In the current difficult time, can the American ruling class make sacrifices? Do members of American elites offer their lives or the lives of their children to wars in Iraq or Afghanistan? Or do these elites simply continue using the American political system, especially the state, to increase unlawful appropriations and to indulge in major usurpations of the national patrimony?
Continue reading Mosca on the dynamics of the elites (part 1) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 6, 2012

We know well that states are not governed with rosary beads (Machiavelli, 2006a). States are governed by human beings with the virtues and vices of which we are capable. 500 years ago (note this number; we will come back to it in a future essay) Niccollò Machiavelli (2006b) in The Prince designed a set of rules for how to achieve and keep power and how to govern while in office. These rules are observed in various societies, consistent for different historical periods, and cannot be ignored by American elites today.

The central intent of these rules can be summarized this way. To achieve a desired end, a politician must keep information about his projects, and the means he possesses to implement them, as opaque as possible. At the same time, the politician must have a fast and accurate intuition about the character of the people with whom he deals, the ability to penetrate their hearts, and awareness of their projects and means to accomplish them. The effective politician must never be upset by fear, ambition of office, greed for money, hate, love, vanity, pride and lust. According to Machiavelli, this art is primarily a natural gift.
Continue reading Machiavelli revisited →