By Alexander Perepechko

Published on July 5, 2015

Compared to earlier stages of Modernity, Late Modernity in the West is less “heroic” and less patriotic. Americans and Europeans do not want to go to war and fight. Three crucial factors partly explain this unheroic realism: 1) small families and the breakdown in family structure, 2) refusal to tolerate combat casualties and mass antiwar protests (e.g., mammismo, “momism”), and 3) changes in governmental regulations pertaining to illicit and illegal activities. The first two factors were portrayed by Luttwak (2009: 109-114). Kurginyan (2007: 38-46) provided a general description of the third cause.

These three issues present serious obstacles for the securitization of the West. Securitization implies the shift of power from an open society and its elites to national security and military elites and closed social systems and organizations controlled by these national security and military elite. Since control in elitology is commonly thought of in term of success or failure (Gibbs 1989: 320), we can say that after September 11, 2001, the United States moves from a system of control governing in open society to a system of control dominating in closed social systems. As French sociologist Jean Baudrillard (2010: 97) put it: “Security is quietly taking hold as “white terror” [counter-terror – AP] draining the system of its Western values: freedom, democracy, human rights. This is the diabolical trap laid by the terrorists, forcing “democracies” to sabotage themselves “progressively.”

How do the three aforementioned factors impact the securitization of the United States and other western countries?
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. In the low birth rate hole →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 23, 2015

When I tell my fellow Americans that I study American elites, I often get a bizarre reaction: “How can you, a foreigner, study American elites?” It happens so frequently that a special essay is required.

It is not unusual for foreigners to scrutinize American elites. Just like many other scientific disciplines, elitology in the United States was founded by immigrants. Moisey Ostrogorsky and Pitirim Sorokin, immigrants from the Eastern Europe, were among the founding fathers of elitology in America. Ostrogorsky was a Belarusian Jew. Sorokin’s father was Russian and his mother was Komi. American elitologist and strategist Edward Luttwak was born into a Jewish family in Romania. By the same token, Sergey Kurginyan, one of the founding fathers of elitology in another country – the Russian Federation – is also a “foreigner” there with Jewish and Armenian cultural roots. I often utilize his provocative findings about military and national security elites in my work. Thus, it is not credible to conjecture that an immigrant cannot study American elites.
Continue reading Elites and elitologists →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 26, 2015

In four previous essays on Barack Hussein Obama, I left unanswered the following question: “Are theorists of elites right that in a multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-ethnic or socially complex state the ruling class should be recruited almost exclusively from the dominant majority?” This question requires an answer after Rafael Edward “Ted” Cruz announced his 2016 presidential bid. In his speech, Cruz dedicated the first 900 words to a detailed retelling of his origin story. That is more than most candidates will do. It seems as though Cruz plans to lean heavily on his biography to distinguish himself from the rest of the candidates and to send the message that he represents real change and the future face of America. That is exactly what Obama did during his own presidential campaigns. His background functioned as proof of how different he was from the rest of the candidates (Cillizza, 2015). After Ted Cruz, another minority candidate – Marco Rubio – announced his 2016 presidential bid.

The theory of elites gives few clues about this culturally sensitive matter. Neither bureaucratic advancement nor party patronage is the rule for a leader of a minority group. The rule is cooptation: the outsider must be like those who are already in. Indeed, the cooptation of leaders of minorities in the United States used to be quite successful. American theorist of elites C. Wright Mills (2000: 142) describes the two ways elites are formed: “Those who have started from on high have from their beginnings been formed by sound men and trained for soundness. They do not have to think of having to appear as sound men. They are just sound men; indeed, they embody the standards of soundness. Those who have had low beginnings must think all the harder before taking a risk of being thought unsound. As they succeed, they must train themselves for success; and, as they are formed by it, they too come to embody it, perhaps more rotundly than those of the always-high career.”
Continue reading Circulation of elites: from azamoglans in the Ottoman Empire to creoles in the United States →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 26, 2015

The x axis and y axis are respectively the time and development (figure 5). In the epoch of Modernity (the last 500 years), the technosphere has demonstrated an exponential growth (see my February 17, 2015 post). No exponential curve of economic growth can continue indefinitely. The technosphere has limits of growth and approaches a critical barrier. At the same time, the anthropos remains constant. As a result, the gap between development of the technosphere and development of the anthropos – the anthropotechnological scissors – increases. At a certain point this gap reaches a critical width and a civilization destroys itself. This phenomenon is called the Peters paradox (or, Peters barrier) after Thomas Peters, the first author of the book In Search of Excellence (1982), which is celebrated in the theory of elites. Peters and his colleagues researched organizational effectiveness. Results of their research were used and developed in the area of elite studies. There is a hypothesis that both the development of the technosphere and the development of the anthropos arrive at trifurcation points with three options for each (figure 5).

The development of the technosphere has three options:

a) Apocalypse is self-termination of the human race owing to uncontrolled exponential growth.

b) Counter-Modernity bears a resemblance to Pre-Modernity (a society prior to Modernity regulated by religion, tradition, and rules of estate corporation in rural society). However, unlike Pre-Modernity, Counter-Modernity is unnaturally imposed upon a society in the time of Modernity (see Kurginyan, 2012: 108).

c) Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
Continue reading Why did Obama not find ways to reach consensus among clashing political elites? (Part 4) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 17, 2015

To be honest, I am late with this post because I was waiting for Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Address (delivered in 2015). In his speech, the President did not signify that his vision of the technosphere and anthropos had changed. He pointed out that fast economic growth combined with several new ecological regulations demonstrate the successful development of the technosphere. He repeated in fact one of last year’s key proclamations. In the 2013 State of the Union he declared that “we can make meaningful progress on [climate change] […] while driving strong economic growth” (2013). As for the anthropos, in the 2014 State of the Union Address the President praised the melting pot of cultural groups and expressed excitement about identity politics. He named new minority groups: religious, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. It seems as though the continuing reformatting of human society requires that more groups be created on various criteria. Glued together by the strength of the American work ethic and the scope of American dreams (State of the Union, 2014), a growing number of ever-changing, old and new, real and surrogate groups symbolizes the march of the human progress in the United States.

Based on our earlier analyses and this new text, we infer that these days development of the West is not the progress described by Kant – it is not a change for the better in terms of science, technology, and modernization. Progress does not increase exponentially. No exponential curve of economic growth or scientific development can continue indefinitely. In other words the technosphere has limits of growth.
Continue reading Why did Obama not find ways to reach consensus among clashing political elites? (Part 3) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on December 25, 2014

Unlike his vision of the development of the technosphere, Obama’s idea of the development of anthropos (human beings) is less apparent. Nevertheless, he makes several hints pertaining to anthropos. For example, he states: “When times change, so must we.” (Inaugural, 2013). This change needs to be a collective action in response to the call of history and an uncertain future. Therefore, Obama’s hope for change is related to a left-wing political ideology.

Political ideologies of the major American parties replicate communitarianism and individualism, two of America’s major political traditions. Communitarianism emphasizes the role of the community or group in defining individuals, collective action and group rights and is marked by leftist perspectives on economic issues and a number of social matters. Communitarian elites represent the state as a benign entity, implement egalitarian and communitarian ideology in society, and encourage citizens to self-sacrifice in the name of supreme group interests. Individualism’s highest espoused value is defending and preserving the personal and economic liberty and freedom of individuals. The Democratic Party leadership departs from communitarianism. The Republican Party establishment claims the supremacy of the individual above all else.
Continue reading Why did Obama not find ways to reach consensus among clashing political elites? (Part 2) →