Category Archives: Elites

The enigma of Donald Trump (part 3)

Elites, Strategy, , , ,
Alexander Perepechko. De-GLOBolshevization?

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 30, 2017

The geography of risks. The votes for Donald Trump

Risks, identified, measured, and analyzed in parts 1 and 2 of this research, can be associated with a few maps from the 2016 presidential election.

A. The social risks defined by “group grievance” and “refugees and IDPs” are – at least to some degree – real in the United States. These risks are perceived as acute ontological insecurity by the majority of whites: most whites, even the majority of college graduated whites (49%), voted for Donald Trump (Figure 34). During his emotional – postmodernist! – campaign, the charismatic Trump raised the fear level, played up humiliation, and articulated a need for the great leader. Trump’s nativist (some incorrectly use the term “nationalist”) (see Leahy, 2015) perspective and rhetoric awakened dormant features of universal human nature in Middle America. Machiavellian intelligence (in a time of resource scarcity or crisis a “lion” can terrify the “wolves”) became a powerful factor in the electoral behavior of these voters.
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The enigma of Donald Trump (part 2)

Elites, Strategy, , , , ,
Alexander Perepechko. GLOBolshevization

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 11, 2017

In the part 1 of this paper we discussed the Machiavellian intelligence approach in elitology. According to this theory, when we must act under uncertainty (a state of mind) with incomplete information about risks (the world is almost out of control) our “non-logical” conduct follows from a particular belief about the world in conjunction with a particular sentiment, desire or psychic state. This conduct is guided by two permanent sets of assumptions associated with two particular ways of life shaped by evolution. The two specific cultural and personological patterns, developed over time to help us withstand different risks during upswings and downswings of socio-economic and political development, influence our experiences of uncertainty into one of two fixed ways. In a competitive individualist environment a “fox” can discover snares. In a time of resource scarcity or crisis a “lion” can terrify the wolves.

We already learned (see figure 32) that a new Pareto long elite cycle started in 2008. It seemed as though the upswing of this new elite cycle could have become more and more synchronized with the new psychosocial health economic cycle (and with the fading IT long economic cycle) in the American economy. Unfortunately, during Obama’s presidency the governing elite was overrun by individuals with the skills and inclination to utilize legal and financial means and ideological persuasion. In Pareto’s language, these skills and proclivities are a deceitful and cunning craft. Overrun by these “foxes,” the governing elite lost its political domination in the 2016 presidential election: the upswing of the new elite cycle, which began in 2008, took a downturn in 2016. The new psychosocial health economic cycle (and the fading IT long economic cycle) and the downswing of the Pareto long elite cycle are asynchronous again…

As we know, downswings are related to an increase in in-group altruism as well as prejudice and suspicion toward out-groups (“others”). During periods of resource scarcity or crisis, risks to social solidarity dominate. This is a good time for Pareto’s “lion,” which can describe the conservative authoritarian personality. We pointed at increasing risks in socio-economic development, at the imbalance in elite circulation, and at political Balkanization as important threats which played to the hands of Donald Trump. We also emphasized that Trump skillfully used uncertainty, pertaining to postmodernist media, social networks, and expert knowledge. He succeeded in presenting himself as an intense realist preoccupied with objective reality and able to restore foundational principles and to develop a strategy for the United States.
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The enigma of Donald Trump (part 1)

Elites, Strategy, , , , ,
45/2016. Cartogram by Mark Newman

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 4, 2017

After the 1948 presidential election in the United States, the Chicago Daily Tribune ran with the headline “Dewey Defeats Truman.” Actually, Harry Truman beat the Republican Thomas Dewey. A copy fell into Truman’s hands and he simply smiled at the mistake because the Republican-supporting Chicago Daily Tribune had once referred to him as a nincompoop (Greenslade, 2016). Since that time electoral forecasts have improved dramatically: social scientists and political technologists can now forecast election results with more than 95% certainty. But in 2016 history repeats itself. Mass media, social networks, academics, experts, and analysts in the United States and abroad almost unanimously forecasted the victory of Hillary Clinton in the presidential election. The Democratic presidential nominee signed her autograph on the Newsweek “Madam President” commemorative magazine backstage after a campaign rally on November 7, 2016 in Pittsburgh. 125,000 copies of this magazine are for sale on eBay, Amazon, and similar commercial websites and can be purchased – if you are lucky – for 80-100 American dollars.

The vast majority of predictions failed miserably. American voters and the Electoral College worked against the liberal establishment candidate Hillary Clinton. She was sponsored by Wall Street, part of the IT sector, and some special interests and globalist institutions. Today these same organizations and individuals predict major trouble in the United States because Donald Trump won the election.

Indeed, a few polls and analysts anticipated the victory of Donald Trump, and the independent American filmmaker and writer Michael Moore was one of them. After the election, Moore (2016) acknowledged: “Fire all pundits, predictors, pollsters and anyone else in the media who had a narrative they wouldn’t let go of and refused to listen to or acknowledge what was really going on. Those same bloviators will now tell us we must “heal the divide” and “come together.” They will pull more hooey like that out of their ass in the days to come. Turn them off.” In fact, only two polls consistently showed Trump in the lead—the USC Dornsife/Los Angeles Times and the IBD/TIPP tracking polls.
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Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics
N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland
N.d. photograph. Grave of Vilfredo Pareto. Cemetery of Crans-près-Céligny, Geneve, Switzerland

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 28, 2016

In part 1 of this paper, we realized that public authority in the United States has likely been hijacked by special interests. The predominant part of the American elite stubbornly defends the dysfunctional status quo at its own peril. In a world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces, neither presidential candidate has formulated a strategy to implement his or her vision for America’s future. In this situation, we conjectured that the persistence of long wave-like cycles in economics and elites on the global and national scale might shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.

Long cycles fulfill a mostly strategic goal. Leaders who identify the current Kondratiev wave (K-wave) and current Pareto elite cycle are able to take the lead in economic and social development and to avoid revolutionary transformation of society…

What are the relationships between the current K-wave and current Pareto elite cycle in America? How might these relationships impact the current state and future development of the United States? Does the appeal to emotion of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and rivalries between political parties and groups echo the deeply troubled long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites in America? Perhaps troubled so badly that the presidential candidates have not spoken about their strategies at all…
Continue reading Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 2) →

Beyond Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. American elites through the lens of Kondratiev and Pareto long cycles (part 1)

Elites, Strategy, Tactics
N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia
N.d. photograph. Nikolai Kondratiev was shot and buried in a mass grave at “Kommunarka,” Butovo, Moscow area, Russia

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on October 16, 2016

Multiple analysts of the current presidential candidates in the United States like to say that our founding fathers are turning over in their graves. Without a doubt, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are extremely controversial candidates. Regretfully, the appeal to emotions of voters, negative campaigning, mutual accusation, and hassles between political parties and groups have gained the upper hand in this election. This makes American voters confused and angry. Citizens become less and less certain about the reality in which they live and more and more frightened about the future of this world.

It has become harder for a social scientist to foresee consequences of elections and to produce electoral forecasts. In this world of fundamental uncertainty, risks, and destabilizing forces (Bernard et al, 2013), it is next to impossible to predict when and why critically important socio-economic and political events might happen and how these events might be interconnected. Empirically detecting the mechanisms of societal change, and thereby calibrating policy to the real economy, is difficult. In this situation, the persistence of long wave-like tendencies in economics and elites on the global and macro-regional scale, allows one to shed light on the current presidential election in the United States.
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Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy, Tactics
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang.
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Zugzwang

By Alexander Perepechko

with Dmitry Shchigelsky

Published on August 1, 2016

Alarming Political and Military Indicators for Belarus and Ukraine

According to the Fund for Peace (FFP) data, political and military indicators play the key role in an understanding of the fragility of the Belarusian and Ukrainian states. Out of six indicators, all but one (“public services”) have been in the poor or weak category (Figure 26).

One can notice at once that Ukraine’s weakness is attributed to temporal and situational circumstances. Only during the last couple of years, several political and military indicators quickly moved to the poor category (8-10). The indicators of “state legitimacy” and “external intervention” express high alert and danger. Elites remain strongly factionalized and the “security apparatus” of the state is quickly failing; these two indicators are in the weak category (6-8) and are quickly worsening. Russian intervention and occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas put the Ukrainian state on the brink of collapse. Nevertheless, with the help of western powers and the Ukrainian diaspora, the Ukrainian people were able to halt Russia’s intervention. Ukraine is slowly moving away from the edge of the abyss – from being a critically weak (almost failed) state toward a weak state.
Continue reading Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 3) →

Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 2)

Elites, Geopolitics
Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream - MTZ tractors... Unsold.
Alexander Perepechko. Agrarian Populist dream – MTZ tractors… Unsold.

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 30, 2016

Weaknesses of two fragile states: Warning social and economic indicators for Belarus and Ukraine.

Recall that in the part 1 of this research I found multiple similarities in the political development of the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries. Created on ruins of dissolved empires, these rural countries experienced short periods of a democracy, and the triumphant agrarian populism, followed by dictatorship and a fragile state. I also outlined that agrarian populism in this part of the world has two tactical impasses. Firstly, Populism cannot benefit from the simultaneous victory of an agrarian party (movement, group, or corporation) and the rise of a democratic political regime because liberal capitalism can easily destroy peasants as a class. Secondly, economic strains and crises in this part of the world leave little chance to put into action programs based upon rural populist ideals of comprehensive social transformation. I inferred that similarities between the Republic of Belarus and the interwar Eastern European countries lead to a similar four-stage political path: democratization, rise of peasant Populism, dictatorship, and a fragile state. Yet, we still need to find out how the last stage might look for Belarus…

A weak state, a failed state, a collapsed state, and a recovered (reanimated) state are specific concepts reflecting different stages of a fragile state (Carment, Langlois-Bertrand, Samy, 2016; Rotberg, 2003). Fragile states are on the brink of collapse in at least one of three areas: 1) authority over territory and the populace, 2) capacity of the economy and resource mobilization, and 3) effective and responsive governance (see Carment & Samy, 2014; Jenne, 2003). In other words, the state fails because it is seized with internal violence and cannot deliver positive political goods to the population.
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Belarusian Zugzwang? (part 1)

Elites, Tactics
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra
Alexander Perepechko. Belarusian Saṃsāra

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 25, 2016

In the middle of March, 2016, I presented a lecture “Belarus: Heeling to the West and New Risks” to students of the Eastern European School of Political Studies (EESPS). This new contact with Belarusians inspired me to do research on Belarus.

What is going to happen to my country of origin? What is the logic of political development of Belarus after 1991? Are there any analogies in the world? Does the recent crisis in the country signify that the Lukashenko regime has symptoms of a fragile state – a state on the brink of collapse? Why? Is there any strategy to avoid the collapse of the Belarusian state? Does the Ukrainian experience matter? How?

I first will look for examples of regimes similar to the one in the Republic of Belarus…
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Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 5)

Elites, Strategy
From "Soldier of Fortune" written by David Coverdale & Ritchie Blackmore in 1974
From “Soldier of Fortune” written by David Coverdale & Ritchie Blackmore in 1974

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 9, 2016

Illicit activities authorized by powers: contractors vs. mercenaries

Private military and security companies have been operating in a legal vacuum for decades. In doing so, they pose a considerable threat to civilians and to international human rights law. Confusion begins with the subject matter definition.

According to The Montreux Document. On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict (hereafter, The Montreux Document) (2009: 9), private military and security companies are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.

In accordance with the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) (2013: 18), private security companies and private security service providers include any company whose business activities include the provision of security services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective of how such a company describes itself. Security services guard and protect persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for which personnel are required to carry or operate a weapon in performance of their duties.

So, what is similar in these definitions? And what is the difference between them?
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 5) →

Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 3)

Elites, Geopolitics, Strategy
Alexander Perepechko. Off Valencia, San Francisco, CA
Alexander Perepechko. Off Valencia, San Francisco, California

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 7, 2016

From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)

To a significant extent, low intensity conflict in the United States and the Middle East is defined by social demographic, geopolitical, and geostrategic parameters of state and non-state actors. In this research essay I will discuss some of them.

According to the Pew Research Center, only 37% of Muslim Americans were born in the United States; 35% were born in the Middle East, North Africa, or Pakistan. 19% of Muslims in America are not U.S. citizens (Income Distribution, 2009; Muslim Americans, 2011). The Muslim American population is much younger, on average, than the non-Muslim population. More than three-quarters of Muslim Americans are either first-generation immigrants (63%) or second-generation Americans (15%), with one or both parents born outside of the country. 55% of the first generation immigrants are from the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan. Muslim Americans – particularly those born in the United States – are more likely than Americans as a whole to have only high school education. Among the 12 largest religious groups, Muslims have a relatively small middle class; only two religious groups – Jehovah’s Witness and historically Black Protestant churches – have a middle class smaller than Muslims. Moreover, after the economic crisis of 2008, the income pattern represents something of a decline for Muslim Americans. 29% of Muslims are underemployed. Underemployment is particularly prevalent among younger Muslim adults: 37% of those under 30 are underemployed. Muslims are underrepresented in the military. Only about 0.16% of the active-duty and reserve members in the U.S. military self-identify as Muslims (Khan & Martinez, 2015).

These numbers are worrisome. The high percentage of marginalized youth (unemployed with low levels of education), high proportion of first-generation immigrants and second-generation Americans in the Muslim population, and high share of immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan suggest that radicalization of Muslims in the United States is among the possible scenarios. Yet this process is not as straightforward as some clichés offered by some analysts and media.
Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 3) →