By Alexander Perepechko

Published on May 22, 2012

It takes a lot of time and effort to build a modern nation-state. Several generations of Americans have built a strong state. This state can withstand wars, civil conflicts and terrorist attacks. In terms of our research, however, this state can be a fragile construction.

The failure of the American Leviathan is foreseeable. Experts (such as Carroll & Hameiri, 2011; Ivashov, 2007) estimate that the stated US dollar amounts in the accounts of individuals, organizations and states’ currency reserves are illusory. These accounts are not secured by products, valuables or anything that exists in reality. The mass of US currency exceeds the total worth of US assets (industries, buildings, etc.) more than ten-fold. Paying off US indebtedness to the rest of the world would turn the majority of Americans into new paupers. Deindustrialization and an obsolete political system make America’s future even murkier (L’erreur fatale, 2011; Zakaria, 2011). Who is to blame for these strategic miscalculations? Al Qaeda, the Taliban and terrorists? Brazilian industrialists? Telecommunication service providers in India? Human rights offenders in China and Russia? Immigrants, refugees and foreigners?
Continue reading Game of elites: using myths to maintain utopias (part 1) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 22, 2012

Why do rulers need to identify themselves with myths, beliefs or doctrines? Mosca (1939: 80) asserts that great human masses can be organized around and ruled by only generally accepted and recognized abstract universal principles. Human beings more readily defer to abstract universal ideas than to the will of individual persons. It is easier for the majority to accept rule by the minority in the form of an abstraction or myth than to accept direct rule by the ruling class. The ruling class justifies its rule by institutions and moral and legal norms which are in turn based on myths, beliefs and doctrines. Elites act through hierarchies of functionaries (bureaucracies), which guide a society materially and morally toward goals (Mosca, 1972: 1, 268). These ends conform to the visions of the ruling class and at times are desired by the masses. Figure 1 depicts major elements of the political cultural system of society offered by Mosca. Some elements of this system will be discussed later on.

Figure 1. Political Cultural System of Society (Source: Generated by the author based on Mosca, 1939 & 1972).

Rational or supernatural, universal or particularistic, principles and ideas are always bounded with material interests of elites. A considerable part of a ruling class is filled with these doctrines and beliefs and propagates and keeps them alive in the masses. The consent of masses depends upon the extent to which the governed believe in the values and ideas by which the ruling class justifies its rule. Societies in decline (manufacturing falls, middle class shrinks, bureaucracies grow, taxes increase and immigration decreases) become old because at such times doctrines and beliefs, on which social and political institutions are grounded, gradually are discredited. Accordingly, common action in an aging society becomes hardly possible. At the moment when the majority of those who joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were cynics who pursued only material and career interests and disregarded principles on which the USSR had been created the country was doomed.

The concept of the political cultural system outlined by Mosca is helpful in understanding changes in recent society. The fashion in which the ruling class is formed and the way in which norms and institutions are shaped must be suited to myths, beliefs and doctrines prevailing in the given society in its historical period. Therefore, a ruling class that bases its power on the divine needs to be formed differently from a ruling class that justifies its powers on popular sovereignty and democratic consensus (Mosca, 1972: 2, 249). For example, the Koran is Bible and Law in one (see Leroy-Beaulieu, 1991). It is the word of the Prophet that takes the place of law. Since customs and laws are sanctified to eternity by religion, Islamic societies tend to be immobile and lean to theocracy. On the contrary, the Bible has very few principles directly pertaining to political life. It is not surprising that the secular state is a feature of the West. Without seriously taking into account this crucial difference, any American project about “democratization” of Southwest Asia and North African countries seems murky. European elites learned long ago (for example, from the writings of Vicenzo Cuoco at the end of the 18^th century (Germino, 1979: 231)) that norms and institutions cannot be made similar for different countries, that norms and institutions result from the past of a country, and that they should fit the country’s history. Perhaps this fact partially explains why European colonialism was “more successful” than recent American attempts to “export” the ballot box or American democracy. These attempts have cost many thousands of human lives and hundreds billions of dollars.

In Southwest Asia and North Africa, neoconservatives would like to change the organization of local elites using coup d’état and create new institutions and norms using war and occupation. But these techniques do not produce corresponding changes in myths, beliefs and doctrines. Quite the contrary, these approaches can harden Islamic tradition and catalyze radical Islam. Neo-liberals are more prone to work at the grassroots level via NGOs and educational, public health, youth and other organizations. Neo-liberals are also more eager to use public relations experts and broadcast networks to reshape traditions in the Southwest Asian and North African societies. A mild modernization effort can also be a part of this approach. Neo-liberal approaches can to some extent succeed in emptying Islamic ideas and norms and eventually produce some changes in beliefs and institutions, but this can take decades. Also, it is hard to predict how stable imitative atheism is in Muslim countries. Current transformations in Tunisia (but also in Libya (Libyan General, 2012)) are not very encouraging. Ruling classes in Muslim countries are not willing to quietly observe and accept the situation when “infidels” proselytize new ideas. This ruling class is well aware that these changes would cause its transformation and jeopardize its power.

Table 1. Examples of the Failed Paths to Democracy after the End of the Cold War

Source: Generated by the author.

Table 1 illustrates that American foreign policy in Southwest Asia and North Africa has not worked because factors outlined by Mosca have been ignored. An attempt to export the ballot box and democratic institutions plays a key role in most of these scenarios. At the same time, the citizens in Southwest Asia and North Africa have not received a satisfactory answer to the question: “What ends will the ballot box and other democratic means serve in Muslim countries?”

Germino, D. (1979) Modern Western Political Thought: Machiavelli to Marx. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Leroy-Beaulieu, A. (1991) L’Empire des tzars et les Russes. Paris: R. Laffont.

Libyan General National Congress elections results, 2012. Available at http://maplecroft.com/map-of-the-week/2012/30/.

Mosca, G. (1972) A Short History of Political Philosophy. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Mosca, G. (1939) The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza Politica). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on April 16, 2012

Elections and political equality in a modern state facilitate access to membership in the ruling class to people with specialized knowledge and a scientific education. However, Mosca observed that hereditary mechanisms obstructed the access of intellectually superior individuals to elites. All things being equal, candidates who have political influence (often hereditary) and candidates whose leadership qualities were formed in the milieu of wealth, social and residential segregation and in their particular upbringing are successful in democratic elections.

At the same time, when the infrastructure of elites and the infrastructure of the masses become disconnected, these elites lose the support of ordinary citizens (Mosca, 1939: 111-113). Life in an exclusive infrastructure is to a significant extent accountable for the ignorance of the ruling class. Elites endure and permit practices that can ruin the rulers and the ruled. For example, rulers increasingly turn elections from a tool of representation into a tool by which certain political forces are enabled to control and limit the activity of other political forces (Democrats vs. Republicans, open system elites vs. closed system elites, etc.).
Continue reading Mosca on the dynamics of elites (part 2) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 31, 2012

Gaetano Mosca knew that elites do not like to be studied. But the faltering parliamentary regime in Italy in the late 19^th –early 20^th century worried him. Mosca thought that the ruling class was behind these political troubles. In his seminal The Ruling Class and A Short History of Political Philosophy, he investigated how the manner in which the ruling class renews its membership has a crucial impact on the prosperity of countries. Mosca applied the notion of the ruling class merely to political activities. One of the founding fathers of the Machiavellian school of thought, Mosca is also known as an architect of comparative political analysis and in some way an opponent of democracy. Qualities of rulers, prevailing political ideas and values, ineffectiveness of elections and leadership selection were among Mosca’s major concerns. His work is important for understanding the dynamics of elites in present-day America, where the political regime malfunctions and the political system possibly suffers systemic failure.

Mosca (1939) had no confidence in the inborn “good sense” of the masses or that man is born “good”. He also understood well that since politicians and administrators manage the public wealth, political and administrative heads are far more powerful than affluent citizens. Mosca believed that the qualities of people who govern are crucial. Following L’Ancien Régime of Taine (1986), Mosca was convinced that the decadence of the ruling class leads to major upheavals and revolutions. He was well aware that many elected officials (politicians) advocate moral principles to achieve power, but when in power these same politicians often rule without regard to moral principles. In addition to qualities described by Machiavelli, Mosca considers energy, capacity for work, personal courage and ability to make sacrifices as essential to politicians. In the current difficult time, can the American ruling class make sacrifices? Do members of American elites offer their lives or the lives of their children to wars in Iraq or Afghanistan? Or do these elites simply continue using the American political system, especially the state, to increase unlawful appropriations and to indulge in major usurpations of the national patrimony?
Continue reading Mosca on the dynamics of the elites (part 1) →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on March 6, 2012

We know well that states are not governed with rosary beads (Machiavelli, 2006a). States are governed by human beings with the virtues and vices of which we are capable. 500 years ago (note this number; we will come back to it in a future essay) Niccollò Machiavelli (2006b) in The Prince designed a set of rules for how to achieve and keep power and how to govern while in office. These rules are observed in various societies, consistent for different historical periods, and cannot be ignored by American elites today.

The central intent of these rules can be summarized this way. To achieve a desired end, a politician must keep information about his projects, and the means he possesses to implement them, as opaque as possible. At the same time, the politician must have a fast and accurate intuition about the character of the people with whom he deals, the ability to penetrate their hearts, and awareness of their projects and means to accomplish them. The effective politician must never be upset by fear, ambition of office, greed for money, hate, love, vanity, pride and lust. According to Machiavelli, this art is primarily a natural gift.
Continue reading Machiavelli revisited →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 23, 2012

The vision described above remains a journalistic narrative, unless research questions are asked and methodology designed.

Issues of theory and research techniques for this vision are complicated in a country where a foreign accent is often met with displeasure, governments are not happy about the flow of ideas, and public relations experts and broadcast networks are frequently in command of reality. Since the late 1990s, academic social science rapidly becomes an extension of projects designed by political parties, governments, corporations and global networks. Topics pertaining to elites are not discussed in American universities at all. More than 170 years ago Tocqueville (1988: 254-255) offered an image of freedom of discussion: “I know no country in which, speaking generally, there is less independence of mind and true freedom of discussion than in America.” There is little public space to discuss eccentric visions today. America is still America; it speaks and understands only American English. For all the impediments, new technologies and media provide people in America with an opportunity to explore unconventional subjects and to make socially embarrassing discussions public. Surveillance and other socio-political consequences of cyberspace are a different story.

In terms of the vision described above, what is the role of the ruling class in quickly changing the social and political dynamics in America? What are rules of elite games? What (human) technologies do American elites use to effect these changes? Do the changes result from conflicts in the American ruling class? What are these conflicts about? What are the possible consequences of these conflicts for America and the rest of the world? Since there is a profound and original nexus between the fulfillment of a person and the destiny of the world (see Giussani, 1997: 77), what are implications of these conflicts for my own destiny, for destinies of other newcomers?
Continue reading Making sense of time in America →

By Alexander Perepechko

Published on February 17, 2012

Historical time is a local phenomenon. Since the density and frequency of events in different locations varies, we perceive time in different places as flowing at different speeds. When we move from one country to the next, we adjust to the local “movement of time” (Lightman, 1994).

When twenty years ago I found myself an asylee in Seattle, Washington, I thought “This is my terminus.” The American “modern” project and linearity of time were everywhere. The golden age of production was still present. The social factory was open to change and innovation. Progress and speed were among the major features of life, and nonstop work did not prevent Americans from smiling. Regardless, old immigrants tirelessly talked about the “cold monster of the state” and strongly advised educated newcomers like me to leave America for Canada. They even quoted Dostoevsky (1994), who had portrayed the exploitation of educated immigrants from Eastern Europe in unskilled jobs in 19^th century America. It was strange to hear these warnings. For someone who just left behind the dissolved Evil Empire – the Soviet Union – the American Leviathan had a smiling face.
Continue reading Time in America →