In the middle of March, 2016, I presented a lecture “Belarus: Heeling to the West and New Risks” to students of the Eastern European School of Political Studies (EESPS). This new contact with Belarusians inspired me to do research on Belarus.
What is going to happen to my country of origin? What is the logic of political development of Belarus after 1991? Are there any analogies in the world? Does the recent crisis in the country signify that the Lukashenko regime has symptoms of a fragile state – a state on the brink of collapse? Why? Is there any strategy to avoid the collapse of the Belarusian state? Does the Ukrainian experience matter? How?
From “Soldier of Fortune” written by David Coverdale & Ritchie Blackmore in 1974
By Alexander Perepechko
Published on April 9, 2016
Illicit activities authorized by powers: contractors vs. mercenaries
Private military and security companies have been operating in a legal vacuum for decades. In doing so, they pose a considerable threat to civilians and to international human rights law. Confusion begins with the subject matter definition.
According to The Montreux Document. On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict (hereafter, The Montreux Document) (2009: 9), private military and security companies are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.
In accordance with the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) (2013: 18), private security companies and private security service providers include any company whose business activities include the provision of security services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective of how such a company describes itself. Security services guard and protect persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for which personnel are required to carry or operate a weapon in performance of their duties.
From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)
In the period of Late Modernity, or even postmodernity, the clausewitzian trinity is still popular among American military-political leaders. In his seminal The Rise and Decline of the State, Israeli strategist Van Creveld summed up results of this approach over the last half-century for developed countries: “From France to the United States, there has scarcely been one “advanced” government in Europe and North America whose armed forces have not suffered defeat at the hands of underequipped, ill-trained, ill-organized, often even ill-clad, underfed, and illiterate freedom fighters or guerillas or terrorists; briefly, by men – and, often, women – who were short on everything except high courage and the determination to endure peacekeeping operations, and whatever other types of operations that were dreamt up by their masters” (2009: 395).
In two previous research essays we discovered that international jihadists find operational ground across the world by sponging off local leaders (often Salafists) and criminal groups. When I was working on this paper, new facts proved this finding.
Supported by the Russian Air Force, Syrian (also, Iranian and Lebanese) governmental ground troops squeezed out IS military units and moderate Syrian groups in several strategically important locations and significantly expanded a zone controlled by Damascus (Van Creveld, 2015). The area under ISIS control was reduced by one-third (Bidder et al, 2016). With Russia’s help, the regime of Assad might manage to reinstate control over all territories of the Syrian state. But even this development would not save the dictator from a demographic impasse. Assad understands that he and his Alawite minority cannot rule Syria without major changes. His first option is democratic elections and political power sharing mechanisms. The second option is tyrannical: Assad might use a depopulation strategy against Sunnis. In order to change the country’s demographics and create a religiously and ethnically homogenous Syria, the dictator might utilize a policy of cleansing through deportation, displacement, and killing of the Sunni population. Local Sunni communities that have supported anti-Assad fighters probably would be targeted first. Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 4)→
Alexander Perepechko. Off Valencia, San Francisco, California
By Alexander Perepechko
Published on February 7, 2016
From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)
To a significant extent, low intensity conflict in the United States and the Middle East is defined by social demographic, geopolitical, and geostrategic parameters of state and non-state actors. In this research essay I will discuss some of them.
According to the Pew Research Center, only 37% of Muslim Americans were born in the United States; 35% were born in the Middle East, North Africa, or Pakistan. 19% of Muslims in America are not U.S. citizens (Income Distribution, 2009; Muslim Americans, 2011). The Muslim American population is much younger, on average, than the non-Muslim population. More than three-quarters of Muslim Americans are either first-generation immigrants (63%) or second-generation Americans (15%), with one or both parents born outside of the country. 55% of the first generation immigrants are from the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan. Muslim Americans – particularly those born in the United States – are more likely than Americans as a whole to have only high school education. Among the 12 largest religious groups, Muslims have a relatively small middle class; only two religious groups – Jehovah’s Witness and historically Black Protestant churches – have a middle class smaller than Muslims. Moreover, after the economic crisis of 2008, the income pattern represents something of a decline for Muslim Americans. 29% of Muslims are underemployed. Underemployment is particularly prevalent among younger Muslim adults: 37% of those under 30 are underemployed. Muslims are underrepresented in the military. Only about 0.16% of the active-duty and reserve members in the U.S. military self-identify as Muslims (Khan & Martinez, 2015).
From Organized Crime to Low Intensity Conflict? (continued)
Together with small families and mammismo, changes in governmental regulations pertaining to legitimate and other types of societal activities partially explain why Americans do not want to fight and die in wars. In spite of this unheroic realism, the Middle East slowly but surely exports low intensity conflict (LIC) to American state territory. Also, proper American organized crime might evolve into LIC by coalescing along religious, racial, political, and socio-economic lines and merge with foreign-born LIC…
Based on an analysis of temporal patterns of radical Islamic terror attacks in the United States, I suggested in my previous research essay that the hierarchically organized bureaucratic security and intelligence agencies created after September 11, 2001 might not be up to the task of fighting radical Islam. Indeed jihadists change strategy and tactics very often and operate efficiently. American security and intelligence agencies operate according to governmental regulations which frame their strategy. How good is this strategy?
Compared to earlier stages of Modernity, Late Modernity in the West is less “heroic.” Americans and Europeans do not want to go to war and fight. Together with small families and mammismo, changes in governmental regulations pertaining to illegal activities, illicit activities, and activities regulated by classified legal procedures partially explain this unheroic realism. What are these activities about? When did governmental regulations change for these activities? Why did these changes occur?
As a matter of fact, Modernity (and we live in Late Modernity), like any other epoch (except post-modernity), is about regulations. Regulations can be viewed in a variety of ways. We know that secular law is a key regulator in the epoch of Modernity. In the West, most of societal life is located within the domain of legal activities.
But this is not the only domain where societal life can be found in western societies. The elitologist from Russia Sergey Kurginyan (2007: 42-46, 52), l’enfant terrible of the methodological school of Georgy Shchedrovitsky, uses a normative matrix to define legitimate and other types of societal activities in the West. According to this matrix, there are 4 types of activities relating to legality: 1) legal activities; 2) illegal activities; 3) activities regulated by classified legal procedures; and 4) illicit activities authorized by powers. The first diagonal of this matrix is (legal activities) + (illegal activities) and the second diagonal is (activities regulated by classified legal procedures) + (illicit activities authorized by powers). Figure 13 depicts these two diagonals. Continue reading Securitization of post-heroic America. From organized crime to low intensity conflict and from the liberal state to the “post-modern” state? (part 1)→
Along with small families and refusal to tolerate combat casualties, antiwar protests demonstrate why Americans and Europeans do not want to fight and die in foreign wars. In this research essay I will investigate one of the forms of these protests – mammismo (can be translated a momism from Italian).
The term mammismo was coined in 1952 by the Italian intellectual Corrado Alvaro (1952). He was looking for reasons for Italy’s poor performance in the two world wars. According to Alvaro, poor mothering was the root cause of many of the shortcomings of Italian men and therefore of Italian society. He blamed Italian mothers for being unable to rise above animal instinct and for bringing up immature sons lacking civic responsibility and high moral qualities. Primitive Italian mothers emasculate, devour, and make dependent male children, he said. Alvaro (1952: 186) criticized Italian society for simultaneously exalting mothers and depriving them of sons sent “inexperienced and unprepared …to desperate and reckless wars.” Therefore, mammismo initially meant that in the case of war nobody loves sons as much as their mothers. Loss, nostalgia, and guilt are keys to mothers’ primary concern for sons. Italian historian Maria D’Amelio (2005) located the beginning of the exclusive mother-son bond in the period of Risorgimento (1750-1870) and traced its development through the two world wars.
Luttwak (2001: 52) modified and applied the concept of mammismo onto warfare in the postindustrial period. Since Italian and other western societies have very low birthrates, mothers in the West view the wounding or death of their only son or daughter in war as an outrageous scandal rather than an occupational hazard. Luttwak argues that today this attitude has enormous impact and powerfully constrains the use of the force in Europe, North America, and other postindustrial regions. How plausible is this generalization? Continue reading Can mammismo stop America’s next foreign war?→
Limitations of the Gurkha and Foreign Legion Models
We continue investigating an unheroic realism in America during Late Modernity. In my two previous research essays, I showed how small families and refusal to tolerate combat casualties impact the securitization of the West. It was conjectured that the Gurkha model of the British army and the foreign legion model of the French army can potentially be copied by Americans to circumvent the intolerance of casualties. Both models have, however, drawbacks and consequences.
A segmented labor market is part and parcel of life in western societies. Segmentation can result in different groups, for example foreigners and native born, receiving different wages, benefits, and privileges. Gurkha veterans continue fighting for equal pensions with the British soldiers they serve alongside (Who are, 2010). In 2007, these veterans won a partial victory when pension rules were changed to give serving Gurkha soldiers equal pension rights with other service personnel in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the British Gurkha Welfare Society claimed that about twenty-five thousand men, who had retired before July 1st, 1997, were denied the opportunity to transfer into UK armed forces pension schemes. This organization stated that the government had acted unlawfully by paying Gurkha veterans only a third of the income of UK-based soldiers. Continue reading Combat specialties, new immigrants, and old political elites→
In my previous research essay I demonstrated that during Late Modernity low death rates, very low birth rates, and slow population decrease in the western countries are irreversible. One result is small families. Parents with one or two children are not willing to send their son or daughter into a potential combat situation. Western ruling elites are able to overcome this attitude only sometimes and in part. Moreover, there is a breakdown in family structure. In fact, the western family as we know it is dying as an institution. The Christian family is losing its central role in the reproduction of the population. The share of families with one parent and the share of nontraditional families quickly increase (figure 8).
These days, many leftist, neoliberal, and postmodernist leaders and activist networks, who gravitate primarily toward the Democratic Party, are working on antinatalist policies and revision of the traditional family. At the same time, these politicians and campaigners are not creating any new basic social units that could at least partially compensate for decreased population reproductive capacities of the decaying traditional family. Do these politicians, activists, and their sponsors rely on new migrants from different civilizations as the core of military and security services? Continue reading Who will fight and die for post-heroic America?→
Compared to earlier stages of Modernity, Late Modernity in the West is less “heroic” and less patriotic. Americans and Europeans do not want to go to war and fight. Three crucial factors partly explain this unheroic realism: 1) small families and the breakdown in family structure, 2) refusal to tolerate combat casualties and mass antiwar protests (e.g., mammismo, “momism”), and 3) changes in governmental regulations pertaining to illicit and illegal activities. The first two factors were portrayed by Luttwak (2009: 109-114). Kurginyan (2007: 38-46) provided a general description of the third cause.
These three issues present serious obstacles for the securitization of the West. Securitization implies the shift of power from an open society and its elites to national security and military elites and closed social systems and organizations controlled by these national security and military elite. Since control in elitology is commonly thought of in term of success or failure (Gibbs 1989: 320), we can say that after September 11, 2001, the United States moves from a system of control governing in open society to a system of control dominating in closed social systems. As French sociologist Jean Baudrillard (2010: 97) put it: “Security is quietly taking hold as “white terror” [counter-terror – AP] draining the system of its Western values: freedom, democracy, human rights. This is the diabolical trap laid by the terrorists, forcing “democracies” to sabotage themselves “progressively.”
