By Alexander Perepechko

Published on August 8, 2015

In my previous research essay I demonstrated that during Late Modernity low death rates, very low birth rates, and slow population decrease in the western countries are irreversible. One result is small families. Parents with one or two children are not willing to send their son or daughter into a potential combat situation. Western ruling elites are able to overcome this attitude only sometimes and in part. Moreover, there is a breakdown in family structure. In fact, the western family as we know it is dying as an institution. The Christian family is losing its central role in the reproduction of the population. The share of families with one parent and the share of nontraditional families quickly increase (figure 8).

These days, many leftist, neoliberal, and postmodernist leaders and activist networks, who gravitate primarily toward the Democratic Party, are working on antinatalist policies and revision of the traditional family. At the same time, these politicians and campaigners are not creating any new basic social units that could at least partially compensate for decreased population reproductive capacities of the decaying traditional family. Do these politicians, activists, and their sponsors rely on new migrants from different civilizations as the core of military and security services?

 

Figure 8. Living arrangements of children by race and Hispanic origin, 2014 (Source: America’s families living arrangements, 2014)

This problem is identified – though implicitly and only for Europe and northern Asia – by Pentagon Chiefs of Staff as an important component of the recent strategic environment: “Youth populations are rapidly growing in Africa and the Middle East, regions that face resource shortages, struggling economies, and deep social fissures. Meanwhile, population in Europe and across northern Asia are set to decline and get older. Around the world, millions of people […] are moving across borders and seas in growing numbers, accepting great risk and placing strain on nations that receive them” (Contribution to National Security, 2015). The leaders of the American military do not, however, project this strategic environment on North America and the United States…

A few options can be considered to circumvent the intolerance of American casualties in wars and conflicts. In terms of this study, we are interested in new organizational models for the American military. These models need to be seriously taken into account because they are 1) about American citizens fighting and perishing for this country abroad and 2) about American taxpayers’ dollars spent in America’s foreign wars. Nevertheless, Americans are willing to tolerate some casualties if the demographics of casualties and goals of wars are known and understood.

It is well known that even in our era of globalization Americans are still isolationists and are willing to accept significant inequalities among individuals in the economic area. It is less known that Americans also hold strict norms of equality in the political area. We already learned that in elitology, equality is seen as utopia because it is based on abstract criteria and thus is impossible to apply: what might be just and represent equality for one person might be unjust and represent inequality for another (see figure 2 in Game of elites, 2014). Yet, Americans believe that wars should involve equally shared sacrifice.

Kriner and Chen (2010) measured causes and consequences of American wartime inequalities on Americans’ willingness to fight and die in future wars. They studied the casualty gap, which refers to much higher casualty rates in some communities and social classes than in others. This inequality and information about it define differences in “casualty sensitivity” across different territorial and social groups. Also, casualty sensitivity depends on the type of war or conflict.

Unlike the Second World War, inequalities in sacrifice in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the two Gulf Wars were more obvious (Kriner & Chen, 2013). Americans who are informed about these past inequalities in sacrifice are less willing to accept more than a small number of casualties in future military missions. Concerns about inequality are so strong that they influence casualty sensitivity toward wars of choice, which involves military missions to change internal policy in foreign countries, and wars of necessity, which are grounded in the national security interests of the United States and its allies.

Information about casualty inequality does not affect the casualty sensitivity in humanitarian missions, wherein the United States uses force to alleviate human suffering abroad. Although the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations criticizes the United States for its focus on the military component of peacekeeping and stabilization in regions of humanitarian crisis, this Panel does not shift away from a military-centric model (Uniting our Strengths, 2015). Perhaps Americans put this type of mission in the category of conflicts that require a particular calculation, and the altruistic nature of the humanitarian intervention reduces the effect of casualty inequality.

Citizens from high casualty communities are much more likely to decrease their casualty tolerance in future wars and conflicts in response to information about past and anticipated inequalities in casualty rates.

Deaths of warriors within communities and neighborhoods have impact through personal networks with dead combatants and their families and friends. For example, the effect of the casualty inequality is strongest among residents of communities that experienced the highest casualty rates in the Second Iraq War. Many of these communities are located in Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. All these states but Vermont are west of Mississippi River. Also, most American battle deaths are borne by soldiers from socio-economically disadvantaged communities. Many citizens in these communities have lost confidence in government and are uninterested in the political process any more. Note that New York-Newark, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, and Chicago – the three largest urbanized areas with the highest population densities and liberal voting preferences – are located in states with low casualty rates.

Local media has a say through the way casualties are reported. Yet, this impact can be constrained. Precise and timely broadcasting of casualty data can influence both the citizenry and the adversary. For this reason the military often imposes limitations on media coverage of military casualties. For example, right before the First Gulf War, in 1991, the Department of Defense instituted a ban on media coverage of honor ceremonies that marked the return of military casualties from abroad (figure 9). In 2009, the Department of Defense lifted the ban (Obama Administration, 2009).

Figure 9. Ban on media coverage of honor ceremonies (Source: Public affairs, 1991)

Elites also can affect the casualty sensitivity by emphasizing certain attitudes, norms, and values. Indeed, both parties in Congress respond to casualties in their constituencies by increasingly criticizing the war. Also, Democrats from high casualty constituencies are significantly more likely to cast anti-war roll call votes than their peers (see Kriner & Chen, 2014). However, one has to be careful when interpreting this kind of data. In reality, influential political groups progressively depreciate core values and aim to destabilize and discredit or strip away reality by parody, mockery, or masquerade.

American citizens became suspicious about the real goals of the American political class when they learned that only about 1% of U.S. representatives and senators have a child in uniform (Absence of, 2006). Citizens realized that political decision makers in the Capitol building are disconnected from soldiers and officers in combat zones. Americans found out that their political representatives are morally incapable: these representatives do not have moral connection to the American forces they send into harm’s way. For politicians, inequality translates into privilege. They enjoy these privileges and are determined to retain them (Bacevich, 2010). The inequality of suffering (casualty gap) is one of the leading causes of the de-heroization of American society. What is the demographics of casualties?

It is empirically proven that there are no significant differences in the predisposition to join the military across race, ethnicity, and immigration status (Lutz, 2008). Service in the military is available to Whites, Blacks, Asians, and Latinos. Also, children of immigrants (including members of the first and second generations and foreign-born children of immigrants) are not significantly less likely to serve than the children of the U.S.-born parents. Minorities do not die in wars in extraordinarily higher proportions relative to the rest of the population. Not surprisingly, females are significantly less likely to serve than males.

The children of the poor fight and die regardless of their skin color or immigration status. After the Second World War the demographics of casualties are defined by socio-economic standing (Kriner & Chen, 2010). Among the factors determining individual propensity to enlist, economic considerations became paramount. Financial interests play a key role in the decision to enlist. Enlisted Americans often plan to use the money, benefits, and privileges gained by military service for education. Many want to start a new life. The American political class sends the poor (unemployed and underemployed, unskilled, and less educated) off to fight and die. Income was a significant factor in the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq wars. The lower the income of a person at the moment he or she enlisted, the higher the probability that this person will die in war. Differences in education played a decisive role in the casualty rates in Iraq: soldiers with lower levels of education died more often than their more educated peers. Why do the poor and less educated fight and die more often?

Only fixed or large, easily recognizable targets are vulnerable to remote attack (e.g., by cruise missiles); in these cases the number of casualties of the attackers is equal to zero. Ground forces – the Army and Marine infantry, for which the risk of casualties is inherently high – are needed in close proximity to the fighting (see Luttwak, 2009: 111, 113, 131-132). Even though these combat forces are mechanized, they have numerous manpower-intensive ground units that are highly exposed to casualty. The closer to combat engagement ranges (from 0-50 meters in an urban environment to several hundred meters in rural areas), the higher the probability of casualties. The more often the Army and Marine infantry forces are used in combat, the greater the likelihood of casualties. The poor and less educated serve in the infantry. How do these people get assigned to positions of high combat exposure?

This placement is a result of the processes of selection into the military and the occupational assignment mechanisms. For example, The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test measures developed abilities and helps to foresee future academic and occupational success in the military. If a candidate gets a low score, this candidate would most likely get the position of infantryman, mechanic, or cook in the Army infantry. If the score is high, the candidate would probably get a technical position farther from harm on the battlefield. College graduates are usually offered the rank of corporal and have a good chance to be assigned to rear-echelon duties. A Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) code is used in the United States Army and United States Marines to identify a specific job. Contractors like Glacier Technical Solutions (GTS) perform these and other tests and evaluations for the military.

Today, leftist, neoliberal, feminist, and postmodernist leaders and activist networks are eager to send women and sexual minorities to the battlefield. And the Obama administration is pressuring the military brass to fill quotas of sex. Whereas imposing higher standards of military skills might result in fewer women serving in these roles, the political pressure to achieve diversity will result in more unqualified women (and men) attaining positions for which men may be more qualified (Eden, 2013). Women can already serve on the front line, but not where the primary aim is combat, “to close with and kill the enemy.” But it seems as though combat roles for women will open in 2016.

There are about fifteen thousand transgender service members in the U.S. military; some of them are in the Army and Marine infantry forces. The Pentagon announced that it is reconsidering its approach to transgender people, who want to serve openly in the armed forces (Raphael, 2015). Yet, there are reports (Army should, 2015) about considerable difficulty in accepting transgender people, who identified as women, to roles especially in the infantry.

The use of affirmative action (quotas of sex, race, ethnicity, and others) in the military is not well articulated and causes strong tensions between an open society and its elites, on the one hand, and security and military elites and closed social systems and organizations controlled by these security and military elites, on the other hand. The trouble is that peace and war operate according two very different logics. To preserve their power and authority within a society, democratic leaders in the United States need to obey the linear logic of consensual politics (Luttwak, 2001: 50). As a result, American democracy is being damaged by contradictory demands and unrealistic expectations of people (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2014: 127-128). We always need to keep in mind the public’s ability to want both to impose strict norms of sexual, racial, and ethnic equality in the military and to win wars without casualties. Perhaps, this sort of contradictory demand can be, to some extent, explained by the human condition. Politicians want to be reelected, so they use their power to satisfy this contradictory desire of the citizens by, say, instituting a ban on media coverage on honor ceremonies for military casualties returned from abroad (figure 8).

Politicians know well how to steer public opinion, associated with linear logic. Unfortunately, most political leaders do not have conscious understanding of the nonlinear (paradoxical) logic of strategy, which is very different from common sense logic. Military experts (such as Luttwak, 2001: 105) know that small-unit cohesion overcomes natural instincts (e.g., instinct urges infantrymen to flee, instead of holding their ground against advancing tanks) and makes combat possible. This cohesion is frequently the most important factor on the battlefield because the willingness of soldiers to fight for one another survives the dreadful impact of combat much better than other motivations. The inability of many politicians to take seriously unit cohesion alone is quite troubling. Would a unit of only women or only male transgender or only female transgender soldiers assure unit cohesion? Would the presence of these units in combat lower casualty rates? And foremost, can they fight and win the battle? If answers to these questions are negative, and if we do not want the poor and less educated to serve only in the infantry, we need to reconsider some processes of selection into the military and occupational assignment mechanisms. What options do we have?

Luttwak (2009: 114) considers two tracks to circumvent the intolerance of casualties. The United States can copy the Gurkha model of the British army, recruiting fearsome Nepalese soldiers for infantry. Gurkhas have served as ethnic mercenaries in the British Army and have not become British citizens. Historically, Gurkhas who served their time in the Army – a maximum of 30 years and a minimum of 15 to secure a pension – were discharged back to Nepal (Who are the Gurkhas, 2010). Common ethnic origin and close family links assure the basic cohesion of Gurkha regiments. They do not so much fight for their officers or the cause but for their friends and family.

The United States military also can replicate the foreign legion model of the French army. While Frenchmen make up most of the officer corps, enlisted men are predominantly drawn from outside France. Some 140 nationalities are represented in the Legion, the slogan of which is Legio Patria Nostra (“the Legion is our Homeland”). Today, Eastern Europe and Latin America are important suppliers of recruits for the Legion. All recruits must assume a new name on joining the Legion. Since some recruits want a new start and new identity, it is reasonable to make all new legionnaires undergo the same process. After one year of service, soldiers can go back (if they want) to their real identities. After three years service, a legionnaire may apply for French citizenship. There is a quicker but more painful way to become a French citizen: a soldier wounded in a battle may apply for citizenship under a provision known as Français par le sang versé (“French by spilled blood”).

Compiled mainly of foreigners, the Legion must achieve small-unit cohesion. Legionnaires are routinely expected to fight to the death. More than thirty-five thousand foreigners in the service of France, in its ranks, have already given their lives for their adopted country. The spirit of sacrifice symbolizes the strength and identity of the Legion. Devotion to common values forged the soul of the legionnaire. Discipline, the cult of the mission, the love of work well done, respect, and solidarity form the basis of his code of honor. The words “Honor and Fidelity” are inscribed on the insignia of each foreign regiment.

I can make the following generalization. Poor, low-educated Americans fight and die for the money to start a new life. Gurkhas fight and die for their friends, family, and pension. Legionnaires fight and die for a new identity and French passport.

What about the new immigrants model? Perhaps, many leftist, neoliberal, and postmodernist leaders have this model in mind but are not ready for a public discussion. I will investigate it in my next research essays. And yes, I still need to talk about the phenomenon of mammismo, (“momism”).

Absence of America’s Upper Classes From the Military. ABC News, August 3, 2006. Available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=2270473

America’s families living arrangements. Child Trends, 2014. Available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/59_fig2.jpg

Army should not exclude transgender troops – senior officer. BBC News, July 9, 2015. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33456404

Bacevich, A. Unequal Sacrifice. Why are poorer and less-educated citizens more likely to die in America’s wars? Nation, September 2, 2010. Available at http://www.thenation.com/article/unequal-sacrifice/

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Obama Administration Lifts Blanket Ban on Media Coverage of the Return of Fallen Soldiers. The National Security Archive. 2009.

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Raphael, T. J. Hailed by Caitlyn Jenner, the US Army’s first openly transgender infantry fighter. PRI, July 16, 2015. Available at http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-07-16/meet-us-armys-first-openly-transgender-infantry-fighter

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Who are the Gurkhas? BBC News, July 27, 2010. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-10782099