By Alexander Perepechko

Published on July 5, 2015

Compared to earlier stages of Modernity, Late Modernity in the West is less “heroic” and less patriotic. Americans and Europeans do not want to go to war and fight. Three crucial factors partly explain this unheroic realism: 1) small families and the breakdown in family structure, 2) refusal to tolerate combat casualties and mass antiwar protests (e.g., mammismo, “momism”), and 3) changes in governmental regulations pertaining to illicit and illegal activities. The first two factors were portrayed by Luttwak (2009: 109-114). Kurginyan (2007: 38-46) provided a general description of the third cause.

These three issues present serious obstacles for the securitization of the West. Securitization implies the shift of power from an open society and its elites to national security and military elites and closed social systems and organizations controlled by these national security and military elite. Since control in elitology is commonly thought of in term of success or failure (Gibbs 1989: 320), we can say that after September 11, 2001, the United States moves from a system of control governing in open society to a system of control dominating in closed social systems. As French sociologist Jean Baudrillard (2010: 97) put it: “Security is quietly taking hold as “white terror” [counter-terror – AP] draining the system of its Western values: freedom, democracy, human rights. This is the diabolical trap laid by the terrorists, forcing “democracies” to sabotage themselves “progressively.”

How do the three aforementioned factors impact the securitization of the United States and other western countries?

Modern, postindustrial societies predominantly consist of small families. For parents with two children or one child, sending their son or daughter into a potential combat situation is unacceptable. Unlike many politicians, the American public increasingly rejects new commitments and military interventions which involve high risks to U.S. soldiers (Busby et al, 2015).

Small families are a relatively new demographic trend in the United States. The new demographics of western societies affects their armed forces and security services in a similar way: western societies are not willing to sacrifice the lives of their members in wars abroad and western ruling elites are able to overcome this attitude only sometimes and in part. Unfortunately, surveys and polls do not give much insight into this topic. To better comprehend the long-term consequences of the new demographics on the securitization of the West, we need to turn to demographic cycle theory (figure 7) described by Paul Demeny (2011).

According to this theory, the progression of a western nation from a predominantly rural, agrarian, and illiterate society to a mainly urban, industrial, and literate one go together with demographic changes. As a country develops from a pre-industrial to an industrialized economic system, high birth and high death rates decline to low birth and low death rates. Simultaneously, the share of youth gets smaller and the share of elderly increases (see Jones, 1990: 16-20, 117-124).

 

Figure 7. Five stages of the demographic cycle in the West (Source: Generated by the author based on Demeny, 2011).

In pre-industrial (before the 18th century) Europe and North America, both fertility (birth rates) and mortality (death rates) are high and population is stable. At this first stage of the demographic cycle (figure 7) the birth rate is relatively constant, while the death rate fluctuates. The latter temporarily increases in response to wars, epidemics, and famines. The death rate can also decrease when conditions for earlier marriage get better. During the first stage families have many children and population is young.

Some would say that at the first stage Europeans and Americans live is the Malthusian world. Rudimentary technologies impose limitations on the use of resources and the growing population presses inevitably on scarce available resources. Nobles of the sword and armed bands fiercely compete for farming and hunting territories; skirmishes are a part of daily routine. Low-tech warfare takes many lives and the death of young family member is tragic but acceptable for a large family. Indeed, the minimalist economic necessities of large pre-modern families are, to some extent, eased by high death rates. Like famines and epidemics, wars in the Malthusian world are among the geographical environment regulators to which the demographic behavioral norms of the preindustrial population of Europe and North America need to adjust…

The demographic transition is represented by stages two and three, when high birth, high death rates decline to low birth, low death rates and the population gets older (figure 7). The progress of technology and science involves a certain liberation of humanity and a reduction of the environmental constraint. This decline of mortality increases the population growth.

During the early expanding stage (stage two), when fertility is still high, mortality declines as a result of progress in sanitation and agriculture. The population explodes. The late expanding stage (stage three), which began in 18th century, features a lag of the birth rate behind the death rate while both decline. There is still considerable population growth at this stage. Note that fast economic development, urbanization, and social transformation impact first mortality and then, about a century later, fertility. Mass education, literacy, improving female status, and especially secularization also confront unchecked reproduction. The rearing of children in urban-industrial society becomes more burdensome and expensive for parents. To deal with these new challenges, western societies need to regain control of population growth. To control fertility, new methods of contraception and late marriage become common practice for the majority of the population.

Note that, unlike in Europe, very high fertility rates in the United States up to the beginning of the 19th century are attributed to availability of land in a frontier zone. As the land available for agriculture filled up, farmers began to limit family size; they were increasingly concerned about availability of good farmland for their children…

Many western governments have held censuses since the 18th century and were well aware of these demographic changes. But as often happens in the politics of great powers, a strategist had more leverage than a diplomat. Moreover, by and large the strategist was able to convince citizens in his country that the sacrifice of life for the greatness of country, the geopolitical project, and ideology is more praiseworthy than the pleasure of a routine family life and rearing children. In case of Nazi Germany, the strategy was aligned to solving the deficit in Germany’s population. For decades, birth rates in Germany had been decreasing. To expand the territory of the Third Reich through militarization, war, and colonization, the Nazi leadership needed to fix the low-population problem. The Lebensborn Eingetragener Verein (Registered Society Wellspring of Life), an SS-sponsored agency, created by Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler in 1935, acted throughout the duration of the Nazi regime. The goal of the Lebensborn was to reverse the birth trend and to increase the Germanic Nordic population of Germany to 120 million. This ambitious plan to increase fertility was, in fact, a “positive” eugenics of the Nazi state. The Lebensborn encouraged out of wedlock pregnancy and offered prenatal care, adoption services, health care facilities, and childhood education. Its pronatalist policy not only discouraged birth control but also emphasized protecting “pure” German fertility.

During the fourth stage (the low stationary stage), good health care, a burgeoning feminist movement, later and fewer marriages, and improved family planning become important factors. Note, however, that before the demographic transition fertility is quite stable, while the death rate oscillates in relation to wars, epidemics, and famines. In post-industrial societies, the roles are reversed: while the death rate remains stable, population grows through a short-term increase in the birth rate. Fertility oscillates in relation to economic fluctuations and social trends.

In the short term, the correlation between national income per capita and both marriage and fertility are positive, as Malthus suggested. There is, in fact, an association between business cycles and demographic trends in countries like Germany and the United States. In the consumerist, postindustrial society, there is a trade-off between goods and children in the allocation of the scarce resources. The desire for children competes with the desire to buy and own goods: the choice depends on values, attitudes, and tastes. The opportunity cost (forgoing income) when women leave employment to raise children crucially impacts fertility. The costs of raising children also include time and effort. It becomes very expensive to raise children. Often the pleasure of extra income and free time outweighs the pleasure of raising children. Also, the quickly aging population of the western countries has fewer and fewer women of fertility age.

Growing crowding and pollution deteriorate the standard of life in the West. Moreover, the disproportional consumption of the world’s nonrenewable resources by the western economies leads to additional pressure on ecosystems. In these circumstances reducing global population growth has became a fashionable trend of the middle class. This fashion quickly evolved into group norms and peer-group pressure governing fertility levels.

As we can see, the small family looks like a plausible terminus of the demographic cycle. When the Cold War was over, neither national security elites nor military leaders in the West were concerned about this new family demographics. Moreover, many thought that the need for warriors was disappearing and that families would not need to risk their sons and daughters anymore. It seemed as though 1) a strategist and a warrior were replaced by a businessman and a consumer and 2) a logic of conflict gave way to a logic of commerce. Luttwak observed: “Everyone, it appears, now agrees that the methods of commerce are displacing military methods – with disposable capital in lieu of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military-technical advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases. States, as spatial entities structured to jealously delimit their own territories, will not disappear but reorient themselves toward geo-economics in order to compensate for their decaying geopolitical roles […] “geo-economics” is the best term I can think of to describe the admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce.” (cited by Baru, 2012). Today Russia and China challenge this assumption.

About the time when neo-liberals celebrated the “end of history” and the beginning of history without wars, new demographic data surprised observers. This data has indicated that the stage of low birth rate (the fourth stage) is not the last stage of the demographic cycle. New demographics indicate that a senile stage of the demographic cycle has begun in postindustrial societies. This fifth stage shows alarming symptoms: very low birth rates (with low death rates) and slow population decrease. The  first reaction of western leaders was concern about the pressure of a growing elderly population on a shrinking workforce. Importantly, large countries like Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Romania fell into this category. Westernized Japan is also in this group.

The reasons behind very low fertility are not well understood yet. Perhaps high mobility of the population, mass media, and the information revolution can shed light on the slow population decrease in the West. Kin (genetic relatives) influence is a standard feature of the family environment in any society. From an early age, family socialization instructs a person to get married and have children when they grow up. Most of this socialization comes from parents and other family members. But when the person moves out of the family home, his or her interactions with the family decrease and the encouragement to have kids loses its power. Consequently, values, norms, and attitudes pertaining to having children fade (Newson & Postmes, 2005). The less contact the person has with his or her kin, the fewer children this person might produce. The high mobility of the population, mass media impact, and information revolution penetrate new areas of the earth and more regions start socio-economic transformations. As a result, the family socialization loses its ground. Once the person is socialized in the new milieu and learned that the small family, the family without children, or no family at all is a norm, he or she accepts this new norm.

This trend of reduced family size–an element of de-Christianization–in the West can be partially offset. The most reliable way for religious groups to maintain or grow their membership is through sexual reproduction (Park, Tom & Andercheck, 2014). Networks combining family socialization with religious education and active involvement in religious community can, indeed, successfully persuade people to have more children. Differences in fertility rates among religious groups are a large part of this approach. Overall, women from evangelical Protestant traditions have one more child over their lifetime than their mainline Protestant counterparts. Another way for religious groups to grow is through the bringing in new immigrants of the same religion. After 1964, Latino Catholics offset the decline of fertility among white Catholics in the United States. Nowadays, Latino Catholics have fertility rates above replacement. This maintains the Catholic share of the American adult population at a stable 25%. Possibly these fertility rates will fall as immigrants live longer in the U.S.

In the United States, the population’s natural growth numbers are not as disturbing as in Europe and Japan. Yet the family, the reproductive factory of the American society, falters. In 1960, about 90% of children in this country resided in two-parent families. In 2014, only 68% of children were living in two-parent families (Cavanagh, 2015). Supposedly, parents limit their family size in order to allocate more resources to each child. This strategy is reasonable because in the 21st century the relative cost of raising children in the West has skyrocketed. But this concept doesn’t explain why so many couples today decide to stay childless. It is not because they cannot afford it. Many wealthier people decide to stay childless. Perhaps many well-off people prefer hedonistic pleasures and the joy of freedom in their lives to the responsibility of having children. As we know, many wealthier people belong to elites.

Here we can summarize the points of our investigation.

1. Leaders in the western countries need to accept that the demographic cycle is irreversible. At different stages of the demographic cycle birth rates, death rates, population growth, and other demographic, economic, and social characteristics of western societies vary. Therefore, at different stages of the demographic cycle, military and national security elites have different capacities for drawing soldiers from the general civilian population. The more modern the family is, the fewer children it tends to have. The fewer children the family has, the less it is willing to sacrifice the life of a child in a war. 

2. In the preindustrial period of Modernity wars were among the geographical environment mechanisms defining high death rates. To compensate for these deaths, population of Europe and North America responded with high birth rates.

3. Progress in sanitation and agriculture reduces mortality and the population explodes. Following fast economic development and urbanization, the population continued growing and western societies needed to regain control of population growth. To be sure, mass education, literacy, emancipation of women, secularization, costly education of children, and other social transformations were going hand in hand with economic modernization and enhancement of health care services. Contraception and late marriage were among the main methods in controlling fertility. And the Moloch of war was taking the lives of young men in colonial wars and conflicts.

4. Tragically, during most of the 20th century, in their strategic calculations, western elites continued considering population as a resource for use in combat. The French political demographer Alfred Sauvy (1954) theorized that given technology and social organization, the preoccupation with national security often goes together with the desire for a population size larger than the population size considered optimal for wellbeing. The ruling class wants as many subjects as possible not only to recruit soldiers but also to collect more taxes to enhance military and security organizations in terms of quantity and quality. Perhaps this theory is applicable to many countries of the West for most of the 20th century. Luttwak (2009: 117, 119) called this type of warfare Napoleonic: it is fought for great ideological goals and societies are willing to accept causalities even in large numbers.

5. The period of Late Modernity is the last stage of western civilization. Late Modernity is associated with the senile stage of the demographic cycle (small population decrease). This decrease is a result of the slow disintegration of the Christian family. The Christian family is losing its central role in the reproduction of the population. In fact, the western family as we know it is dying as an institution. Decades ago, Sorokin (1991: viii-xi) cautioned that a breakdown in family structure is one of the key indicators of a shift of a civilization from one supersystem of values to another. Also, during Late Modernity, the warrior culture, which is based on manliness and similar qualities, is losing ground. Demilitarization of the western mentality is a fait accompli.

Perhaps after a stormy period of transition, a new family structure with new ideals and values will appear on the horizon. By now we know that parents with two children or one child do not want to send their son or daughter into a combat zone. We know less how families with one parent react to sending their offspring to a war abroad; the share of these families quickly increases. Even less is known about the fast growing share of nontraditional families and how they will act in response to the loss of a youngster in combat. There will be more of these families in the United States. To circumvent the intolerance of casualties, military and national security elites need to develop new political, technical and organizational solutions.

These days, many leftist, neoliberal, and postmodernist gurus and activist networks are passionately working on antinatalist policies (Obama’s science, 2009) and revision of the traditional family. At the same time, these politicians and campaigners are not creating any new basic social unit that could at least partially compensate for decreased population reproductive capacities of the decaying traditional family. Do these ideologists and zealots idealistically rely on new migrants from different civilizations as the core of military and security services?

In my next research essays I will briefly discuss a few potential solutions. I then will investigate the mammismo (“momism”) effect and the changes of governmental regulations pertaining to illicit and illegal activities.

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Busby. J., Monten, J., Tama, J., Smeltz, D., Kafura, C. Measuring up. How Elites and the Public See U.S. Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs, June 9, 2015. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-06-09/measuring

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