By Alexander Perepechko
with Dmitry Shchigelsky
Published on August 1, 2016
Alarming Political and Military Indicators for Belarus and Ukraine
According to the Fund for Peace (FFP) data, political and military indicators play the key role in an understanding of the fragility of the Belarusian and Ukrainian states. Out of six indicators, all but one (“public services”) have been in the poor or weak category (Figure 26).
One can notice at once that Ukraine’s weakness is attributed to temporal and situational circumstances. Only during the last couple of years, several political and military indicators quickly moved to the poor category (8-10). The indicators of “state legitimacy” and “external intervention” express high alert and danger. Elites remain strongly factionalized and the “security apparatus” of the state is quickly failing; these two indicators are in the weak category (6-8) and are quickly worsening. Russian intervention and occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas put the Ukrainian state on the brink of collapse. Nevertheless, with the help of western powers and the Ukrainian diaspora, the Ukrainian people were able to halt Russia’s intervention. Ukraine is slowly moving away from the edge of the abyss – from being a critically weak (almost failed) state toward a weak state.
During 2006-2015, indicators of “state legitimacy,” “human rights,” and “factionalized elites” in Belarus were in the poor category (8-10) (Figure 26).
Figure 26. Measuring Fragile States: Political and Military Indicators for Belarus and Ukraine, 2006-2015. (Source: Generated by the first author based on FFP data at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015). FFP indicator values: 0-2 excellent, 2-4 good, 4-6 moderate, 6-8 weak, 8-10 poor.
To begin with, state legitimacy in Belarus is undermined by rampant corruption. According to Transparency International, in Europe only Ukraine has a higher corruption perception index (the perceived levels of public sector corruption) than Belarus. In 2015, Ukraine ranked 130th in corruption and Belarus was 107th (Corruption, 2016).
In Belarus, law enforcement agencies are partially responsible for this problem. Inadequate training, poor working conditions, and shortages of basic equipment also contribute to the general ineffectiveness of these organizations (Belarus 2015 Crime, 2015). Recent efforts to fight corruption are not effective for several reasons. Firstly, corrupt high-ranking executives go largely unpunished. Secondly, Lukashenko’s ruling “elite” has a shortage of qualified people to fill positions in state institutions, especially at the high level. The regime has pushed a large number of professionals and intellectuals out of government service and many have left the country. Officials imprisoned for corruption often leave prison ahead of schedule and receive management positions at state-owned enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy (Astapenia, 2016). Realistically, one cannot take seriously Lukashenko’s anti-corruption campaign because the state apparatus is the pivot of his power. It is unlikely that the ruler is going to saw the branch he is sitting on.
To attract foreign investment, Lukashenko repeatedly uses propaganda and sends business emissaries, bureaucrats, and intelligence officers abroad. But these attempts fail over and over again. Foreign investors are aware of the inefficiency of the Belarusian state apparatus: for example, attempts to “modernize” agriculture and the woodworking industry did not make their products competitive on the international market.
Lukashenko’s bureaucrats are slow and inflexible. Potentially, China could have become a big investor. But the Belarusian bureaucracy is barely capable of managing large projects and neither can it play by Chinese rules… Observers (for example, Iosub, 2016) rightly argue that these bureaucrats can barely forecast and deal with the multiple risks associated with business investments. Crucially, the business institutional environment in Belarus does not fit the expectations of foreign investors on how to do business. The new business institutional environment cannot be created simply by copying laws and regulations from abroad. These regulations have to be attuned to the Belarusian cultural realm. After that, it will take several years to win the trust of potential investors.
In addition to corruption and government inefficiency, the illegal (shadow, illicit) economy strongly undermines state legitimacy in Belarus. Experts (e.g., Bohdan, 2015; Experty, 2016; Romanchuk, 2015) estimate that its share lies somewhere between 35% and 52% of GDP, or 20-30 billion American dollars. Among Belarus’ neighbors, only Ukraine is doing worse. In Belarus, irregularities are found in 70% of tax returns filed by businesses. Every second apartment in Minsk is rented illegally. Many employers avoid paying taxes and social insurance and employees routinely receive cash under the table. In doing so, these employers cut pensions for their workers and destroy honest businesses, which pay taxes and social insurance. The Lukashenko regime tolerates the shadow economy and illicit business activities. But in return, he asks the private sector for one “small” favor: “Do not finance the political opposition!”
Narcobusiness is part of the illegal economy in Belarus. From 2013 to 2014 alone, the number of drug-related crimes demonstrated a 31.5% increase (Belarus 2015 Crime, 2015). In Belarus, like Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova, among unconscious patients arriving to hospital, the majority has acute methamphetamine intoxication. The use of the acetylated opium and pharmaceutical opiates in Belarus is also on the rise. The number of drug users in Belarus is growing fast and it does not seem as though new anti-drug legislation (see Smok, 2015) is going to improve the situation.
Changes in the flow of drugs in Eurasia also impact Belarus. International help in restructuring the Afghan economy to become less drug-dependent stopped, in fact, several years ago. Since 2011, poppy plantations in Afghanistan increased about 50% and heroin consumption in the EU increased about 100%. In 2014, Russia intervened in Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Customs Union. Consequently, the “northern flow” of heroin from Afghanistan (Afghanistan – Central Asia – Russia – EU) increased and adjusted its geography (Faskhutdinov, 2014; Tamozhennyi, 2013). In 2013, up to 25% of heroin from Afghanistan went through Belarus. Today, the role of a quiet and seemingly stable Belarus in this illegal activity is, most likely, higher.
Narcotraffickers are very rich non-state actors capable of corrupting a state apparatus’ officials. Moreover, security services are often interested in the development of non-transparent nexi with these illicit structures. Why? A security service might need money for a clandestine operation but for delicate reasons is not comfortable or able to finance this activity using official channels. This cash can be obtained from an illicit structure. In return, this illicit structure typically asks the security service for favors. Also, when economic troubles come, corrupt ruling elites might impose “rent” on narcotrafficking and other illicit activities. It is not surprising that the recent narcotrafficking scandal in Belarus, involving high ranking officers of the KGB and MVD (interior ministry) (Gromkoe, 2016; V Belarusi, 2016; V KGB, 2016), happened during the economic crisis.
Human rights are the Achilles’ heel of the Lukashenko regime. The “human rights” indicator was and is poor (8-10) in Belarus (Figure 26). In Ukraine, this indicator demonstrates worsening since 2014 and today is in the weak (6-8) category.
The oppressive nature of the political regime in Belarus has not changed (Haraszti, 2016). Several generations of Belarusians do not know the meaning of such key words for the West as “pluralism,” “freedom of artistic creativity,” “freedom of the media,” “workers’ rights,” and “free business activity”, or do not have the experience of using these words. While presidential polls conducted in the country during the last election, in October of 2015, were not met with violence as in previous elections, no progress was made in serving the Belarusians’ right to free and fair elections. The election process was orchestrated, and the result was pre-ordained (Belarus presidential, 2016).
Religious persecution in Belarus is well documented (Persecuted, n.d.). Some faith groups, which find that they are unable to register with the state as required, or who will not register on principle, are forced to hide their religious activity. One such community is the Council of Baptist Churches. Many priests are denied the right to visit and serve within the country (Shcherbakov, 2016). The government limits the number of foreign priests allowed into Belarus. This makes the Catholic Church particularly vulnerable because about 40% of its 407 priests are not Belarusian citizens. The regime puts the Belarusian Orthodox Church in a privileged position; this Church gained back about 95% of its property lost during the soviet period. At the same time, other Christian denominations were much less successful in obtaining restitution of their property. Moreover, these other denominations find it difficult to gain permits for the construction of new religious buildings.
Like in the soviet time, the Belarusian KGB harasses priests. For example, the Catholic priest Vladislav Lazar from Minsk was kidnapped by the secret police and detained in a KGB detention centre without charges. Since the authentically deep civilizational cleavage of “Western Christianity” vs. “Eastern Orthodoxy” is strongly territorialized and at the same time coincides with the territorial cleavage of “westerners” vs. “easterners” (“zapadniki” vs. “vostochniki,” or West Belarus vs. East Belarus), the politics of preference towards Eastern Orthodoxy raises many questions in the Vatican, Jerusalem, and other religious centers…
Belarus is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children subjected to trafficking in persons, in particular forced labor and forced prostitution. Similar to Ukraine, Belarus is among the countries from which a large number of people illegally enter the EU. Indeed, there is currently no EU system in place capable of tracing each person’s movements following an illegal border-crossing. However, Frontex informs us about the increasing number of migrants from Vietnam, Turkey, Afghanistan, and other Asian countries entering the EU illegally through Belarus and Ukraine (Migratory, 2016).
During 2006-2015, the indicator of “factionalized elites” in Belarus has been by and large in the poor category, and in Ukraine this indicator has moved slowly from weak to poor (Figure 26). Factionalized elites can be defined as the fragmenting of a nation into political groups that promote rhetoric and actions that are harmful to the country. “Factionalized elites” and “external intervention” are the two key indicators of determining whether a country is a failed state. In terms of state failure, the split between the military and civilian establishments in Belarus is crucial. This split has a military, historical, and ethnic background.
During the soviet period, Belarus was a highly militarized territory with a dense net of military bases (see Pramym, 2015). Military families usually lived in the vicinity of these military locations and their children rarely studied or spoke Belarusian. The share of Russians who worked for military – especially, officers and generals – was very high… After 1991, most of these bases ceased to exist. Their occupants lost jobs, benefits, and perks and found themselves in a foreign country. Not surprisingly, these folks were and are unsympathetic toward the new Belarus.
Based on these facts, some observers conclude that post-soviet Belarus turned into a “military protectorate” of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that when relations between Belarus and Russia were amicable, this issue seemed of secondary importance. However, the annexation of Crimea and intervention in east Ukraine illustrated that the Kremlin is capable of mobilizing Russian minorities abroad and making Russian generals and officers in the Ukrainian military and security services obey orders from Moscow. Indeed, under the Yanukovich regime two Ministers of Defense of Ukraine were from Russia!
Figure 26 shows that highly factionalized elites weakened the state: the external intervention in Ukraine was facilitated by pro-Russian elite groups in the security apparatus of Ukraine. After 2013 the indicators of “external intervention” and “security apparatus” have simultaneously climbed from the weak to the poor category and from the moderate to the poor category, correspondingly.
The Russian intervention in Crimea and east Donbas alarmed Belarus, known for pro-Russian elite groups that are even more powerful than in Ukraine. In 2006-2015, the indicator of “factionalized elites” in Belarus was staying mostly in the poor category. In Belarus, the percentage of foreign-born individuals and graduates of Russian military schools and service academies in political and especially in military and security establishments is extremely high. Some observers (see Ivashin, 2015) consider that, in case Russia intervenes in Belarus in the future, these foreign-born individuals and graduates of Russian military schools and service academies might shift their loyalty away from the Republic of Belarus. Is there any evidence supporting this concern?
The top KGB official in Belarus (a graduate of the “Higher School of KGB of USSR, Counter Intelligence Program”) “does not see extremist formations in Belarus” (Vakul’chik, 2016). Really? Does this statement reflect reality in Belarus?
To begin with, military and security elites in Belarus are intertwined with Russia’s military, security services, and military industrial complex. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms transfer database, Belarus is the 18th largest exporter of arms; the country’s share of world arms exports is about 0.5%. This is akin to Turkey, Norway, South Africa, and Australia. In 2015, Belarus supplied Russian-made combat helicopters (Mi-24P, Mi-35P) and bomber aircraft (Su-24/Fencer) to Libya and Sudan, regions of low intensity conflict (LICs).
In terms of the impact of terrorism, Belarus ranked number 77 in the world in 2014. This is better than Russia (number 23) and much better than Ukraine (number 12). The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) estimates that Ukraine accounts for nearly 2.0% of global terrorist deaths (Global Terrorism, 2015: 16). The American strategist Robert Bunker (2016: 45-46) argues that “current Russian operations in Ukraine have an insurgent component within them and must be considered. Still, this component is subordinated within the larger umbrella of Russian hybrid warfare. The sending of Russian troops into the Ukraine without their uniforms—the “little green men” that Putin calls local self-defense groups—is one component of hybrid warfare. Another component is paying indigenous organized crime groups to engage in assassinations and street terrorism. Still another is arming local ethnic Russian insurgents. The list goes on with Russian cyberwarfare campaigns, European natural gas embargos, proposed money bailouts to Greece, and even the shaping of Western public opinion via RT network, originally Russia Today, news broadcasts. Hybrid warfare draws upon all attributes of coercive power—utilizing force, economics, and communication—to promote authoritarian Russia state international agendas. For this reason, Russian insurgent activity in the Ukraine is beyond the scope of the insurgency forms…”
At the end of 2014, the KGB of Belarus arrested 20 Muslim Salafis. They belonged to Hizb ut-Tahrir, a moderate radical Islamist organization, which support the goals of terrorists but not their methods (Astapenia, 2015). In Belarus, the security services monitor and control the activities of approximately 45,000 Muslims, amounting about 0.5% of the total population in the republic. Thus, Belarus cannot avoid Islam’s globalization and radicalization. Individuals and organizations from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Russia finance the construction of new mosques in Belarus (primarily in West Belarus). Belarus has become a transit point for radical Islamists who head to the EU. Migrants from Arab countries, Turkey, and Tatarstan are more religious than Belarusian Muslims and bring to the republic radical forms of Islam.
Maidan in Kyiv inspired Belarusian anarchists and nationalists to protest against Russia’s military presence in Belarus. Young anarchist and nationalist volunteers from Belarus fight Russian intervention in Ukraine. In doing so, they acquire valuable anti-terrorist skills, which can be used in Belarus in the case of Russian intervention (Aktsia protesta, 2009; “Delo Belorusskikh,” 2011, Yurintsev, 2016). Belarusian security services in Belarus keep an eye on these young men and women; some of them are arrested and jailed.
What about “insugent” organizations of the Russian world which at present have mushroomed in Belarus? The attitude of the pro-Russian establishment in the security services and military toward these “cells” possibly could be expressed (and this is an optimistic vision!) as “wait and see.” This factionalism can be fatal for the Belarusian state and Lukashenko himself. Why?
The Kremlin has lost hope of “integrating” the former soviet republics by economic methods and has turned to military intervention. Vladimir Putin activated the doctrine of the “Russian world” because Russia’s faltering “energy empire” building efforts demonstrated bankruptcy in the new world economy. This doctrine is, in fact, an attempt to use Russian culture (and Russians as careers of Russian culture and interests abroad), the Eastern Orthodox Church, and limited wars to keep potential opponents on Russia’s periphery weak (Jenne, 2015; Luttwak, 2009:415-418). In other words, the goal of “Russian world” strategy is to advance Russia’s security interests on its periphery and to demonstrate that Russia remains a power to be reckoned with.
It is doubtful, however, that Russia is capable of being engaged in insurgency and terrorism beyond what it considers “lost territories.” Putin’s new ideology is nationalistic, revisionist, irredentist, and macro-regional. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is no longer the leader of a transnational, global ideology that allowed its predecessor to cooperate with and support insurgent and terrorist movements throughout the world (see Metz, 2016). Russia’s attempt to utilize anti-Americanism is not a sufficiently strong replacement ideology to solidify its ties to insurgent and terrorist movements on a global scale. Really, did Russia transform itself into a more attractive country than America, or the European countries, or China? Does the “Russian world” offer something better to the rest of world than the “American world,” “European world,” or “Chinese world”? I think that the answer is negative… Thus, according to “Russian world” strategy, Belarus and other post-Soviet states must be weak and, if at all possible, must fail at some point.
In view of the new Russian strategy, recent publications (e.g., Belorusskii “Vaiar,” 2016; Melianas, 2016; Malady Front, 2015) about insurgent organizations of the “Russian world” in Belarus have some credibility. There are geo-demographic foundations of this credibility. The major axes (Orsha – Minsk – Brest and Gomel’ – Bobruisk – Minsk) and clusters (Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Grodno areas) of the Russian minority (785,000 ethnic Russians, or 8.3% of the population of Belarus) are strategically located. And – what a surprise! – almost all of the new Russian nationalist, military, patriotic, “sportive,” “cultural,” “spiritual,” “self-defense,” and Cossack organizations (registered and non-registered) operate in these strategic territories.
Counter-insurgency literature (e.g., Searle, 2008: 141-142) explains this phenomenon well. In terms of a LIC (low intensity conflict, or limited war), we deal with the formation of Russian active insurgent cells (small groups of insurgents ready to take orders) and passive support networks for these cells in strategically located areas of the Russian minority in Belarus. This is the first operational phase of a LIC. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare are the subsequent phases. The higher the phase, the larger the scale and the greater the violence.
Russian insurgency in Belarus is traditionalist (see O’Neil, 2005: 19-23) because it seeks to restore a political system from both the recent (Soviet Union) and distant (Russian Empire) past. Also, this insurgency is subversive (camouflaged) and combines a legitimate, above-ground component participating in the political process and an under-ground component using political or criminal violence to weaken or delegitimize the government (see Bunker, 2016: 14; Metz, 1995). “All warfare is based on deception,” wrote the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzǔ (2005: 12) more than 24 centuries ago. The American strategist Edward Luttwak (2001: 152) defines subversion as the undermining and displacement of the official state machinery by propaganda and terrorism. Therefore, subversion is a form of deception that requires employing the services of inhabitants and making use of officials of the enemy country (Sun Tzǔ, 2005: 96-98).
Overtly operating pro-Russian nationalist, patriotic, self-defense, and Cossack groups and clubs is only part of the larger picture of Russian subversion in Belarus. Also, pro-Russia compradors infiltrate political parties, labor unions, community groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Working in and through existing organizations insurgents generate revenue and acquire other resources, support political allies, resist governmental policies, and attract foreign support. For situations in which infiltration is difficult or too dangerous, insurgents might establish their own front groups – organizations that are controlled clandestinely by other entities (Rosenau, 2011: 28). Front groups are often used to detract dissatisfaction away from its real cause and to redirect this dissatisfaction against the state or institution that the insurgents are targeting.
Infiltration of the armed forces, security services, police, and other key institutions and organizations of the state (such as the oil and natural gas industry) is the most dangerous under-ground form of subversion. Insurgents and terrorists who penetrate state institutions can gain five significant advantages (see Rosenau, 2007). Firstly, insurgents can collect intelligence about capabilities, intentions, and weaknesses of the government and state. Secondly, infiltration gives insurgents opportunities to surreptitiously disrupt the state’s counterterrorist or counterinsurgency campaigns. Thirdly, successful infiltration may result in the illegal obtaining of government funds, weapons, and valuable equipment. Fourthly, penetration allows insurgents and terrorists to identify potential recruits and to spot candidates for intimidation or corruption. And fifthly, infiltration can contribute to the insurgent strategy of weakening and delegitimizing the incumbent power. For example, the state’s ability to provide key public services can be degraded by mismanaging resources, pilfering funds, and damaging the reputation of government employees.
Infiltration of military and security services – a dream of insurgents – is the most difficult task of any insurgent and terrorist organization because these two institutions are designed to protect the state and fight both inside enemies and foreign invaders (Luttwak, 1979: 57-104). The Ground Forces are crucial. Those who become officers and generals lose much of their old identities because military schools and service academies break up their earlier civilian values and sensibilities (Mills, 2000: 193). The army develops a corporate, even caste, mentality which diverges from or even opposes civilians. History knows many examples when military formations infiltrated by foreign and native insurgents and terrorists fought citizens and the legitimate powers of their own country. Infiltration of security agencies is an even more important aim of insurgents and terrorists than infiltration of armed forces. Unlike the military, the organization, deployment, and personnel of security services cannot be studied by insurgents and terrorists from the outside. The budgets of these agencies are allocated by many different departments and cannot easily be identified. Also, security services finance some delicate activities using money obtained from organized crime, narcotraffic, and the arms trade. Moreover, job skills and training allow a secret service employee to break the rules and operate in all areas of social activity… Needless to say, the infiltration of military forces and security services by foreign and native insurgents and terrorists facilitates the task of weakening of the state and delegitimizing the government.
Perhaps Russia’s subversion in Belarus today can be seen as a form of “non-violent terrorism” of the early phases of a LIC. If true, it is crucial to identify and counteract subversion during these early phases, when pro-Russian active insurgent cells mature and their passive support networks expand. In its early phases, insurgents establish networks in urban and rural areas to collect intelligence, infiltrate, and cadre official and non-official organizations, isolate and intimidate opposition, and provoke protests, strikes, sabotage, and uprisings (McCuen, 1966: 42). At these early phases, it’s a matter of utmost importance to respond by countersubversion without delay…
During 2006-2015, the indicators of “external intervention” and “security apparatus” in Belarus fluctuated in the range of the weak category. Echoing the Russian intervention in Ukraine, these two indicators have climbed simultaneously in Belarus after 2013. It is not surprising that western politicians tend to project the situation in Ukraine on what might happen in Belarus in the near future. We will perform one more statistical test to help assess whether these projections are reasonable.
Does the Ukrainian Experience Matter?
A simple statistical test (Pearson’s r) shows revealing correlations between several indicators for Belarus and Ukraine (Table 5).
The correlation between the “group grievance” indicators for Belarus and Ukraine is moderate-to-strong (r=-0.43). The negative sign suggests that ethnic, religious, and other kinds of violence between socio-territorial groups and the dynamics of this violence in Belarus and Ukraine are not the same. Recall that the revisionist and irredentist Russian Federation promoted the Russian communities in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and east Donbas. This generated perceptions of increased minority leverage and produced mobilization and radicalization among Russian minorities in the fragile Moldovan, Georgian, and Ukrainian states. Today a similar mechanism of regional destabilization is deployed against the Belarusian, Kazakh, and Baltic states. There is an appalling resemblance to the 1930s, when Germany made demands on territories lost during the First World War to several countries in Eastern Europe. The empowerment of a revisionist and irredentist Nazi German state relative to a weakened Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Lithuania encouraged the radicalization of German communities in the Sudetenland, Danzig, and Memel and led to German minorities’ mobilization in these areas… Issues pertaining to sizable ethnic and religious minorities in Belarus, Ukraine, and other Eastern European countries were and are important factors weakening each state.
Table 5. Pearson’s correlations between social, economic, and political and military indicators for Belarus and Ukraine
Source: Calculated by the first author based on FFP data at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015.
The correlation between the “state legitimacy” indicators for Belarus and Ukraine is positive and very strong (r=0.89). Rampant corruption, ineffectiveness of state apparatus, electoral fraud, an enormous illicit economy, the drug trade, and other problems undermine state building efforts in Belarus and Ukraine. When in addition economic strains and crises hit Belarus and Ukraine hard – the correlation between their “poverty and economic decline” indicators is positive and very strong (r=0.74) – these countries become easy prey for foreign intervention. Indeed the correlation between the “external intervention” indicators for Belarus and Ukraine is positive and strong (r=0.52).
The correlations between corresponding indicators for Belarus and Ukraine (“group grievance,” “state legitimacy,” “poverty and economic decline,” and “external intervention”) reveal, in fact, factors similar to those which brought the weak Eastern European states of the interwar period to collapse. Recall the interwar history one more time. In 1931, Germany moved toward a customs union with Austria. This was a step in the direction of Anschluss and elimination of the political, financial, and business ties built up within the Versailles system. After 1933, National Socialist Germany directed its Grossraumwirtschaftspolitik (Greater economic policy) primarily toward Eastern Europe. According to one of the leading economic historians of Eastern Europe, Alice Teichova (1985), “[b]ilateral trade with Germany did not aid industrialization of the less developed economies or accelerate their economic growth to a remarkable extent as has been claimed. On the contrary, the larger Germany’s share in East European foreign trade on a bilateral basis grew, the more the industrialization of the region was threatened. Indeed it was National Socialist policy to prevent indigenous industrialization as far as possible.” Are there parallels with current Russian revisionism and irredentism, the Eurasian Customs Union, oil and natural gas economic policies, and other projects pertaining to Ukraine, Belarus, and other Eastern European countries?
Tactics
Let us summarize the findings of this and the two previous articles. Does the recent crisis in Belarus signify that the Lukashenko regime has symptoms of a fragile state – a state on the brink of collapse? Why? Is there any strategy to avoid the collapse of the Belarusian state? Does the Ukrainian experience matter? How?
The bad news is that unlike Ukraine’s temporal and situational weakness, Belarus seems to be an inherently weak state. Actually, Belarus is a special category of the weak state. The seemingly strong personalist regime rigidly controls territory and dissent among the population but at the same time fails to provide economic opportunities and offers very few political goods. Like in Ukraine (or Moldova, or Georgia), security in Belarus can be removed from the population or from significant segments therein. It is known that terrorists in particular but also other underworld groups in general prefer weak states over failed states (see Jenne, 2003; Kraxberger, 2012: 84-85).
The good news is that fragile states result pretty much from human factors: political leaders operate based upon false assumptions, make wrong decisions, and formulate incorrect policies. It is not unusual that these leaders use biased information sources. In this situation, there is a chance for new tactics and new strategy. The fact that Belarus is not the first country in Eastern Europe to face these challenges can greatly help in this endeavor. Indeed, I have demonstrated that in the interwar period countries in this part of the world have faced a similar four-stage political path: democratization, rise of peasant Populism, dictatorship, and a fragile state. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Belarus has followed the same path…
Over two hundred years ago, the great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clauzewitz in his famous work “On War” defined tactics as “the FORMATION and CONDUCT of […] single combats themselves” and strategy as “the COMBINATION of them with one another, with a view to the ultimate object of the War” (2011: 42). Let us start with tactical considerations first.
1) Agrarian populism has outlived its day. Agrarian populism put the Republic of Belarus into the group of inherently weak states. The time of peasants, rurbanites, and red barons in Belarus is over. These declining social groups are important obstacles to capitalism in the republic. Economic difficulties were simply postponed for more than 20 years by high oil prices on the world market, cheap Russian oil for Belarus, and Belarus’ offshore role in the oil and petroleum product business. The “manual control” practices of Lukashenko will not save the population from mass pauperization. Belarus needs to find (create) a new niche in the new world labor market. Countries of the size and population of Belarus usually specialize in one, maximum two, sectors of the economy.
2) Security can be removed from the population in Belarus at any time. It seems as though, infiltrated by compradors, security services and military in Belarus are fighting insurgency and terrorism only selectively. Three forms of insurgency are likely present in Belarus: anarchism (downgraded to sporadic civil unrest), radical Islamism, and Russian internal separatism. Security services and the military are determined to fight the radical Islamist and anarchist forms of insurgency and terrorism but probably not Russian nationalism and internal separatism. As in Ukraine, pro-Russia factions in security services and the military might play the role of Trojan horse. A well known maxim states: “There are friendly nations, but no friendly intelligence services.” Does this maxim apply to the Belarusian security services? Or, do Belarus’ military and security elites find more in common with Russia’s military and security elites than with other elites of Belarus? If the answer is negative to the first question and positive to the second question, then why does the Belarusian state pay high salaries, and provide benefits and privileges to these generals and colonels?
3) Subversion is the covert manipulation of politics (Luttwak, 2001: 180). Russia is a strong and experienced player in international politics and uses this tool against its neighbors, especially when these neighbors are fragile states. Invisibility is a powerful, dangerous weapon in the hands of insurgents and terrorists (Rosenau, 2007). This is especially true in the early phases of a LIC, when a targeted state has huge material superiority but frequently is unable to detect the deadly threat. How to counter the subversion of a foreign power? Unlike the army with its corporate mentality, the police are typically closely involved – for better or worse – in civilian life. Therefore a police “counter-intelligence service” can play an important role in identifying subversive activities among military and security service personnel (Luttwak, 1979: 98, 101). Then, the military itself may operate their own counter-intelligence agency and their own police force. Each branch of the armed forces may do the same. Next, some departments may have specialized services to protect their installations. These agencies can also be used for counter-subversion purposes. But in many cases, exposing and publicizing subversive activities helps enormously to neutralize them. The identification of subversive activities is usually followed by repression of their actors and total eradication of the threat.
4) Even though transferability of skills between military and civilian establishments in modern states tends to increase, these establishments may resemble each other organizationally without doing so functionally or morally (see Keller, 1991). Members of the military and security elites must be prepared to kill and die – a destiny that is uniquely their own. Compared to the life of a civilian bureaucrat, the life of a military or security officer is more dangerous because it is more deadly: an officer is required to die for the country and to kill in the interests of its defense. Consequently, moral duties and expectations pertaining to military and security elites differ from those of other elites. This is why in many countries military and security elites are less accessible to minority group candidates in terms of nativity, ethnicity, and religion. Does this unspoken rule apply to Belarus?
5) Borders between Belarus and Russia and between Belarus and Ukraine are porous. This is unacceptable because terrorists, mercenaries, military instructors, and arms can freely flow to Belarus (Ivashin, 2016). Also, some militants can come in as “refugees” from the war-torn east Ukrainian territories.
6) According to the Constitution, the Republic of Belarus is a neutral state. Nevertheless, Belarus hosts Russian troops and probably will host more as an answer to NATO buildup. NATO decided to send 4,000 troops to Poland and the Baltic states, with many on either side of the Suwalki gap (Bearak, 2016). The probability is high that if Russia comes into conflict with NATO, Lukashenko will side with Russia and take direct part in a war. Presumably both Russian and Belarusian armed forces would attempt to take the region of Suwalki in Poland, the eastern region of Latgale in Latvia, and the municipalities Lazdijai and Druskinkai in Lithuania. This would cut off the Baltic states from Poland and Western Europe. Do Belarusians want to die for the interests of foreign states?
7) If a war begins, a traditionalist subversive insurgency might quickly turn into a commercial insurgency. Most likely, the ideology of the “Russian world” would not remain a long term motivator for the local population in a country ridden by crisis. This ideology might simply play the role of igniter. An impoverished population terrorized by a government that imposes fees and taxes on all existing and even non-existing activities and wages campaigns against illicit economic activities but does not offer anything (economic opportunities, security) instead, might turn towards non-state actors – local clans (see Williams & Felbab-Brown, 2012: 53). Members of such clans have blurred identities and overlapping and perhaps even common membership in insurgent organizations and criminal gangs. The clan calls the shots: you can see a guy who is one day selling stolen oil and the next day fighting against government troops. Local clans often sponsor illegal economic activities which provide a livelihood for the local population. For pure materialistic reasons, locals might become mercenaries and join both pro-Russia “insurgents” and criminal organizations. Accordingly, some areas might turn into stateless grey zones controlled by banditry. What tactics should the Belarusian state use in the case of this nightmare scenario?
The second author of this article spent several months in the trenches of east Ukraine and made valuable observations which should be seriously considered in the case of Russia’s intervention in Belarus. Dmitry Shchigelsky is convinced that the absence of structured civil society in cities like Luhans’k or Donets’k was the major cause of defeat of Ukraine soon after Russia’s invasion. When large Ukrainian government structures – the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Security Service of Ukraine – were paralyzed and confused, the role of small mobile local paramilitary forces (militia and even criminal organizations) at the level of the urban agglomeration, city, and raion (county) was crucial. The presence of Ukrainian patriots was not enough. For example, there were patriots but no organized structures in Horlivka. As a result, the local administration was paralyzed and the small poorly armed pro-Russian group of Igor Bezler (40-50 people) captured this city. In another example, billionaire Igor Kolomoisky, a governor of the eastern Ukrainian region of Dnipropetrovsk, spent tens of millions of dollars to prevent his territory from falling into enemy hands. He organized Ukrainian self-defense fighters into the pro-Ukrainian “Donbass Battalion.”
Localization of combat in east Ukraine was so strong that events in the neighboring Donets’k and Slov’yans’k only indirectly influenced events in Horlivka. Because of this patchiness, Russians still struggle to reinstate administrative territorial management of the Donets’k and Luhans’k region as well as the Novorossiya region. This problem, however, does not exist in the annexed Crimea, where Russia’s military has played a binding role since the very beginning of the occupation.
Shchigelsky points out that not unlike the Ukrainian Donbass, Belarus is politically emptied territory. He draws parallels between Belarus and east Ukraine in terms of the language, self-identification, vision of history, and elites. Like in Donbass, Belarusian society is atomized, the rule of law is replaced by the code of the underworld, and local criminalized elites live by the code of criminals… Urban agglomerations, cities, and raions (counties) in Belarus need small mobile local structures (any structures, even paid criminal structures!), which in critical situations will be able to maintain order and fight invaders and terrorists. Perhaps in Belarus some opposition groups and political parties can play this role in the case of Russian invasion or a transfer of power, when most of the population will watch and wait...
What are these tactics for? To combine “them with one another, with a view to the ultimate object of the War” (von Clauzewitz, 2011: 42). When Lukashenko was immune to external attack or conquest, he was mostly concerned with domestic challenges to his rule and not with foreign challenges. He was not motivated to mobilize an effective army, facilitate a competitive economy, or create an efficient taxation system to provide valuable public goods and services. His assured control over the territory and population removed a critically important motivator for state success (see Kraxberger, 2012: 53-54, 87-88). A few years ago, Lukashenko’s military and security machine did not even have a foreign intelligence service; the ruler was receiving information from the intelligence service of a foreign country – the Russian Federation. This fact is so unprecedented and bizarre that it will be studied by military historians at the proper time…
These days, to keep from sinking, Alexander Lukashenko, like Thumbelina in the fairy tale of Hans Christian Andersen, is jumping from lily pad to lily pad. This is not a strategy but strategic escapism, which leads to strategic impasse. As we already learned, the final outcomes are determined at the level of strategy. None of the tactical victories over the seven big problems discussed above (and there are many more problems) can reach the ultimate – strategic – goal (see Luttwak, 2012: 63-64). For all his hard work, Lukashenko achieved nothing, just as if all his solutions were the worst. Strategic incompetence is a frequent companion of tactical brilliance. They do not teach strategy in an agricultural academy.
Strategy
Recent EU defensive measures in response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine include a change of strategy toward the Belarusian regime. Europeans moved from a strategy of regime change in Belarus to a strategy of encouragement of reforms and changing of foreign policies (about these policies see Gompert & Binnendijk, 2016). The US reaction to this new European strategy is to keep the status quo in Belarus.
In terms of geostrategy for Belarus, this recent change does not mean much. Not unlike Mongolia and Nepal, Belarus is a landlocked state with only two neighbors, Russia and Europe. It is even more important that, not unlike Mongolia and Nepal, Belarus remains a space “where developments are governed by processes of outside interference and influence that are stronger than inside forces. Its history is composed of recurrent adversity, while lack of durability prevents accumulation and causes return to previous states, contributing to a cyclic, discontinuous experience of time that does not favor integration of what has been previously acquired.” (Rey, Groza, 2009). In other words, the Republic of Belarus is a space doomed to be in-between (l’entre-deux in French) – between Russia and Europe, between Eastern Christianity and Western Christianity, etc. The Belarusian space is the stake in the struggle between Russia and Europe… A few weeks ago, I discussed this issue in France with Violette Rey, one of the authors of this concept and one of the world’s leading experts on Eastern Europe. Her verdict is final and cannot be appealed: “The problem of Eastern Europe has no solution.” In other words, Belarus has only three options: 1) to be part of the Russian world, 2) to be part of Europe, or 3) to be divided between Europe and Russia. In each of these scenarios Belarus remains a space where two marginalities are met: a marginality with reference to the East, and a marginality with reference to the West (Chercheures, 2014).
Do Belarusians like this reality? Probably not. Do Belarusians dream about a Baltic-Black Sea Federation? This is a beautiful dream. But how will an alliance of relatively small and mostly weak states survive? Will they be up to the challenges of our time? This is a rhetorical question: it takes many decades to build a strong state.
There is one more way out of marginalization.
According to Luttwak, “strategy is stronger than politics” (2012: 59-61). Why? Because national leaders seldom can apply whatever strategic insight they might have. To preserve their power within their societies, democratic leaders need to obey the linear logic of consensual politics. But even non-democratic regimes, like Belarus, where rulers enjoy some popular support and legitimacy (see Korosteleva, 2013), they follow a similar logic and listen to the opinions of elites and the populace. Political leaders cannot act paradoxically to surprise external foes while informing and preparing their public before acting, neither can they violate conventions without a loss of trust and authority (Luttwak, 2001: 50). Politicians have talents and skills to understand and lead public opinion which itself is linked to linear logic, which differs from the paradoxical logic of strategy.
The logic of strategy is nonlinear. In the domain of strategy, it is impossible to achieve straightforward outcomes by straightforward action because the presence of a reacting foe forbids the pursuit of optimality (Luttwak, 2001: 1-86). For example, the principles of profit maximization, efficiency, and elegant solutions (solving problems in the simplest and most effective manner) frequently fail in the paradoxical domain of strategy. Or, cease-fires and armistices imposed on conflicting warring lesser powers repeatedly lead not to peace but to …frozen conflict. At the same time, the use of preemption, dislocation, and disruption to outmaneuver a rival frequently leads to success…
Figure 27. Security and economic opportunities in Belarus? (Source: Generated by the first author based on Jenne, 2015, Kraxberger, 2012, and Luttwak, 2012.)
Yes, the Republic of Belarus is an inherently weak state (Figure 27). This weakness has persisted for many years and is caused mainly by political and military factors. Recent economic crisis and issues with the Russian minority are making the situation worse. But all these problems and conflicts are not ignited at the domestic level (small concentric circle in the centre) and they are not confined to the state borders of Belarus.
Devolution of the Belarusian state depends critically upon the geopolitics of the wider neighborhood. The middle circle shows the crucially vital macro-regional level – Eastern Europe (see Jenne, 2010; Jenne, 2015). Precisely this circle encloses kin (Russia, Ukraine, Poland) and other neighboring states, cross-border ethnic groups, religions and other entities, similar and antagonist political and economic systems, military allies and military enemies, etc. This circle contains fragile and strong states. Flows of migrants, monies, commodities, and military personnel constantly pass through Belarusian borders. Refugees, insurgents, and terrorists from the war zone in east Ukraine circulate between Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. Illegal arms, narcotics, and prostitutes penetrate the borders of Belarus. Russian media dominates in this new Eastern Europe. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine is a contagious process. The war in Ukraine generates spillover effects for neighboring states…
The outmost circle embodies the global level which contains regional and global powers. In our case, these are Russia, the EU, NATO, the United States, the Vatican, and China as well as Belarusian and Jewish diasporas and transnational terrorist networks. In addition, this circle represents system-level events such as global military conflicts, global financial crises, and changes in oil and natural gas prices, East-West energy flows, and information flows.
In the 21st century, Russian elites have failed to modernize their country. They have offered energy resources and the nuclear umbrella to Belarus and Ukraine in exchange for closer integration with Russia. But because of financial crises and changes in oil and natural gas prices, Russia lost its major economic leverage in these new Eastern European countries… The economies of Ukraine and Belarus, tied to Russian energy, have faced collapse. So, Ukraine and to some degree Belarus turned to the West in search of economic cooperation. In response to Belarusian and Ukrainian attempts to shift geopolitically towards Europe, Russia launched the doctrine of the “Russian world.” Very substantial Russian minorities in Ukraine, Belarus and some other countries of the former Soviet Union have been mobililized and are used as leverage. This mobilization led to armed conflict in Ukraine and at any time can lead to similar conflict in Belarus. Sandwiched between Russia and Europe, the New Eastern Europe one more time has become the stake in the struggle between Russia and West.
The weak Belarusian state is about to fail to provide security and economic opportunities for its citizens. Exogenous and endogenous factors of destabilization are too powerful. When a weak state is sandwiched between two much stronger forces and cannot withstand them, this state has limited options (align with one side, align with the other side, or split allegiance). But there is another option. To relieve Belarus’ strategic impasse, the country needs a heavy counterweight to Russia, or to Europe for that matter. The United States, the United Kingdom, or China could serve as such a heavy counterweight. For Belarus, if, say, numerous British (or Chinese or American) investors have sufficient interests, the risk of invasion by Russia decreases. To secure this counterweight, diplomacy, propaganda, clandestine activities, and conflictually motivated economic controls and initiatives need to be deployed. These means operate according to the same logic of strategy (Luttwak, 2001: 86; Luttwak, 1990). The logic of strategy remains the same in the geo-economic context, expressed by commercial instead of military means: capital in place of firepower, civilian innovation in place of military-technical advancement, and market penetration in place of garrisons (Luttwak, 2012: 42, 183). Without a heavy counterweight, Belarus can hardly survive as an independent state within the Russian orbit and is doomed to marginal status in the larger Europe.
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