The geography of risks. The votes for Donald Trump
Risks, identified, measured, and analyzed in parts 1 and 2 of this research, can be associated with a few maps from the 2016 presidential election.
A. The social risks defined by “group grievance” and “refugees and IDPs” are – at least to some degree – real in the United States. These risks are perceived as acute ontological insecurity by the majority of whites: most whites, even the majority of college graduated whites (49%), voted for Donald Trump (Figure 34). During his emotional – postmodernist! – campaign, the charismatic Trump raised the fear level, played up humiliation, and articulated a need for the great leader. Trump’s nativist (some incorrectly use the term “nationalist”) (see Leahy, 2015) perspective and rhetoric awakened dormant features of universal human nature in Middle America. Machiavellian intelligence (in a time of resource scarcity or crisis a “lion” can terrify the “wolves”) became a powerful factor in the electoral behavior of these voters. Continue reading The enigma of Donald Trump (part 3)→
In the part 1 of this paper we discussed the Machiavellian intelligence approach in elitology. According to this theory, when we must act under uncertainty (a state of mind) with incomplete information about risks (the world is almost out of control) our “non-logical” conduct follows from a particular belief about the world in conjunction with a particular sentiment, desire or psychic state. This conduct is guided by two permanent sets of assumptions associated with two particular ways of life shaped by evolution. The two specific cultural and personological patterns, developed over time to help us withstand different risks during upswings and downswings of socio-economic and political development, influence our experiences of uncertainty into one of two fixed ways. In a competitive individualist environment a “fox” can discover snares. In a time of resource scarcity or crisis a “lion” can terrify the wolves.
We already learned (see figure 32) that a new Pareto long elite cycle started in 2008. It seemed as though the upswing of this new elite cycle could have become more and more synchronized with the new psychosocial health economic cycle (and with the fading IT long economic cycle) in the American economy. Unfortunately, during Obama’s presidency the governing elite was overrun by individuals with the skills and inclination to utilize legal and financial means and ideological persuasion. In Pareto’s language, these skills and proclivities are a deceitful and cunning craft. Overrun by these “foxes,” the governing elite lost its political domination in the 2016 presidential election: the upswing of the new elite cycle, which began in 2008, took a downturn in 2016. The new psychosocial health economic cycle(and the fading IT long economic cycle)and the downswing of thePareto long elite cycleare asynchronous again…
As we know, downswings are related to an increase in in-group altruism as well as prejudice and suspicion toward out-groups (“others”). During periods of resource scarcity or crisis, risks to social solidarity dominate. This is a good time for Pareto’s “lion,” which can describe the conservative authoritarian personality. We pointed at increasing risks in socio-economic development, at the imbalance in elite circulation, and at political Balkanization as important threats which played to the hands of Donald Trump. We also emphasized that Trump skillfully used uncertainty, pertaining to postmodernist media, social networks, and expert knowledge. He succeeded in presenting himself as an intense realist preoccupied with objective reality and able to restore foundational principles and to develop a strategy for the United States. Continue reading The enigma of Donald Trump (part 2)→
After the 1948 presidential election in the United States, the Chicago Daily Tribune ran with the headline “Dewey Defeats Truman.” Actually, Harry Truman beat the Republican Thomas Dewey. A copy fell into Truman’s hands and he simply smiled at the mistake because the Republican-supporting Chicago Daily Tribune had once referred to him as a nincompoop (Greenslade, 2016). Since that time electoral forecasts have improved dramatically: social scientists and political technologists can now forecast election results with more than 95% certainty. But in 2016 history repeats itself. Mass media, social networks, academics, experts, and analysts in the United States and abroad almost unanimously forecasted the victory of Hillary Clinton in the presidential election. The Democratic presidential nominee signed her autograph on the Newsweek “Madam President” commemorative magazine backstage after a campaign rally on November 7, 2016 in Pittsburgh. 125,000 copies of this magazine are for sale on eBay, Amazon, and similar commercial websites and can be purchased – if you are lucky – for 80-100 American dollars.
The vast majority of predictions failed miserably. American voters and the Electoral College worked against the liberal establishment candidate Hillary Clinton. She was sponsored by Wall Street, part of the IT sector, and some special interests and globalist institutions. Today these same organizations and individuals predict major trouble in the United States because Donald Trump won the election.
Indeed, a few polls and analysts anticipated the victory of Donald Trump, and the independent American filmmaker and writer Michael Moore was one of them. After the election, Moore (2016) acknowledged: “Fire all pundits, predictors, pollsters and anyone else in the media who had a narrative they wouldn’t let go of and refused to listen to or acknowledge what was really going on. Those same bloviators will now tell us we must “heal the divide” and “come together.” They will pull more hooey like that out of their ass in the days to come. Turn them off.” In fact, only two polls consistently showed Trump in the lead—the USC Dornsife/Los Angeles Times and the IBD/TIPP tracking polls. Continue reading The enigma of Donald Trump (part 1)→
